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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article outlines a possible analytical framework employing 
recent and relevant World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
jurisprudence for evaluating whether technical regulations such as 
the European Union’s (“EU’s”)/European Community’s (“EC’s”)1 
regulatory regime for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (“REACH”),2 as adopted and/or as applied, 
are WTO-consistent. The focus of this legal review is limited3 to two 
“covered”4 agreements: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (“TBT Agreement”)5 and General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”).6 Both the GATT 1994 and the TBT 
 
 1. See UK FIN. SERVS. AUTH., A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
ITS LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES 5 (2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
other/guide_to_eu.pdf (discussing how the EU was “founded to enhance political, 
economic and social cooperation and how the EEC was renamed the EC to 
“reflect[] the determination of the Member States to expand the [EC’s] powers to 
non-economic domains”). 
 2. See Parliament and Council Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 
[hereinafter REACH]. 
 3. The reader is reminded that the analysis herein provided may need to be 
periodically updated over time to reflect the evolving nature of both the regulatory 
regime known as REACH and then-current WTO TBT jurisprudence. 
 4. See Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012) (outlining the summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round). 
 5. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 
120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
 6. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see also Appellate 
Body Report, Korea — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Dairy Products, ¶ 75, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) (noting that GATT 1994 
was incorporated in the WTO Agreements and “that the WTO Agreement is one 
treaty”). 
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Agreement are multilateral treaties7 that “form part of Annex 1A to 
the [Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization]”8 and may potentially apply to REACH. Whereas the 
GATT 1994 is concerned generally with trade in goods, the TBT 
Agreement is more specialized and establishes rules and procedures 
regarding the development, adoption, and application of mandatory 
technical regulations and voluntary standards for products and the 
procedures (such as testing or certification) for determining whether 
a particular product meets such regulations or standards (“conformity 
assessment procedures”).9 WTO jurisprudence holds that “when the 
GATT 1994 and another Agreement in Annex 1A appear a priori to 
apply to the measure in question, the latter should be examined on 
the basis of the Agreement that deals ‘specifically, and in detail,’ 
with such measures.”10 Consequently, if REACH is determined to 
constitute “a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement, then the latter [the TBT Agreement] would deal with the 
measure [REACH] in the most specific and most detailed manner.”11  
The TBT Agreement applies to all technical measures addressing 
industrial and agricultural products, except those properly 
 
 7. See Plurilaterals: Of Minority Interest, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2012) (listing the four plurilateral WTO Agreements: Trade in Civil 
Aircraft, Government Procurement, Dairy Products (terminated in 1997), and 
Bovine Meat (terminated in 1997)). 
 8. See Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 8.16, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) (citing 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 204, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) 
[hereinafter EC — Asbestos Panel Report] (explaining that after the relevant 
agreements to be applied are determined, the analysis then shifts to the order in 
which the agreements are applied). 
 9. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1, ¶ 3; see also WTO Legal 
Texts, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_ 
e.htm#GATT94 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 10. EC — Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 8, ¶ 8.16. 
 11. Id. ¶¶ 8.17, 8.56 (indicating that, even if a regulation is not covered by the 
TBT Agreement, it may be subject to other provisions of the WTO Agreement 
such as Articles I, III, and/or XI); see Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods: 
General Interpretive Note to Annex 1A, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/05-anx1a_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012) (detailing that, in the event of a conflict between GATT and another 
agreement establishing the WTO, the provision of the other agreement shall 
prevail). 
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characterized as sanitary and phytosanitary (“SPS”) measures,12 or as 
specifications for government procurement,13 which are instead 
covered under separate WTO agreements.14 “[T]he object and 
purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike a balance between, on the 
one hand, the objective of trade liberalization and, on the other hand, 
Members’ right to regulate.”15 One of the TBT Agreement’s primary 
objectives is to prevent WTO Members from using regulations as 
unnecessary barriers to trade while ensuring that they retain their 
sovereign right to regulate “for the protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of 
deceptive practices, at the levels [they] consider appropriate.”16  
The EU REACH regulation can be described as a behind-the-
border17 technical measure intended to address regional health and 
environmental concerns and impacts. It can be appropriately 
classified18 as a type of non-tariff measure (“NTM”)19 that falls 
 
 12. See Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] (covering technical regulations 
and standards addressing food product safety issues). 
 13. See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, 1915 U.N.T.S. 
103 (describing a plurilateral agreement covering measures addressing government 
procurement); see also The Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA), WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/ 
gp_gpa_e.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (relaying that the GPA is the only legally 
binding agreement found in the WTO focusing on government procurement). 
 14. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 1.4–1.5. 
 15. See Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the 
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 174, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) 
[hereinafter US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report]. 
 16. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 17. See CÉLINE CARRÈRE & JAMIE DE MELO, CERDI, NON-TARIFF MEASURES: 
WHAT DO WE KNOW, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 4 n.3 (2009), available at 
http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/55/35/99/PDF/2009.33.pdf (conveying that behind-the-
border measures are trade costs that do not result from trade policies). 
 18. See generally id. at 7–8, boxes 1–2 (summarizing the current and proposed 
classifications of non-tariff measures). See also SUDIP RANJAN BASU ET AL., 
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., EVOLUTION OF NON-TARIFF 
MEASURES: EMERGING CASES FROM SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9, 16 
(2011), available at http://www.unctad.info/upload/TAB/docs/Research/itcdttab_ 
53_Advance_unedited_jan2012.pdf. 
 19. See CARRÈRE & DE MELO, supra note 17, at 4, 7 box 1; ROBERT W. 
STAIGER, WORLD TRADE ORG. ECON. RESEARCH & STATISTICS DIV., NON-TARIFF 
MEASURES AND THE WTO 2 (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
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within the scope of the TBT Agreement because it arguably distorts 
and creates uncertainty surrounding international trade flows of 
chemical substance-based products.20 As the WTO itself 
acknowledges, “While the application of NTMs does not always 
restrict trade, they often result in unnecessary restrictions or undue 
barriers, which explains” why they are frequently and 
interchangeably referred to as non-tariff barriers (“NTBs”).21 NTBs 
are “barriers to trade that are not tariffs,” which may, in certain 
instances, include health and consumer safety technical regulations 
to the extent they are misused.22 
The WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (the “TBT 
Committee”)23 regularly compiles statistics24 about GATT 
 
res_e/reser_e/ersd201201_e.pdf (attempting to define non-tariff measures and 
identify the three broad categories of such measures). “There is no agreed 
definition in the WTO of what constitutes a ‘non-tariff measure’ nor a ‘non-tariff 
barrier’ . . . .” WTO E-LEARNING, MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS AND NON-
AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS (NAMA) NEGOTIATIONS 209 (2012), available 
at http://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_258/CourseContents/NAMA-E-
Print2.pdf; see BASU ET AL., supra note 18, at 15 (noting the WTO’s effort to keep 
a database of NTMs negotiated between countries). 
 20. Cf. WTO E-LEARNING, supra note 19, at 231 (explaining that application of 
the SPS Agreement depends on a measure’s objective and its direct or indirect 
effect on international trade). 
 21. Id. at 62–63, 209 (emphasis added). 
 22. Glossary of Statistical Terms: Non-Tariff Barriers, OECD, 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1837 (last updated Mar. 10, 2003). At 
least one OECD study that employed a cross-survey analysis to ascertain the use 
and incidence of NTBs in different markets found that technical measures were 
consistently included among the highest (“top five”) ranked NTBs. See OECD 
TRADE POLICY STUDIES, LOOKING BEYOND TARIFFS: THE ROLE OF NON-TARIFF 
BARRIERS IN WORLD TRADE 22–24, 231 (2005) (recognizing that technical 
measures have the possibility of “effectively” serving as “border-protection 
instruments”). 
 23. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 13.1 (“A Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade is . . . established and shall be composed of representatives from 
each of the Members.”). 
 24. One OECD study analyzed the lists of WTO NTB notifications submitted 
by eleven OECD and twenty-one non-OECD countries during the period spanning 
from March 2003 through October 2004. See OECD TRADE POLICY STUDIES, 
supra note 22, at 233. The study found that, of the 1200 NTB notifications 
reviewed, “TBTs represent[ed] the NTB category with the highest incidence of 
notifications with 530 entries, or almost half of the total. . . . TBTs were the 
principal reported barrier for 12 of the 21 countries, and the second most reported 
barrier for five others. Almost half of the complaints in this area concerned 
technical regulations and standards (46%).” Id. at 233–34 (emphasis added). 
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1994/WTO Member NTB notifications submitted pursuant to TBT 
Article 2.9.25 “Transparency” is one of the core obligations imposed 
generally on all GATT 1994/WTO Members, and specifically for 
TBT Agreement Parties. Article 2.9 requires that “[w]henever a 
relevant international standard does not exist or the technical content 
of a proposed technical regulation is not in accordance with the 
technical content of relevant international standards,”26 Members 
must:  
prompt[ly] publi[sh proposed] laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings affecting trade in such a manner as to enable 
governments and traders to become acquainted with them. In addition, 
some measures shall be published before their entry into force.27 WTO 
Members are also required to inform the WTO and fellow-Members of 
specific measures, policies or laws through regular “notifications.”28  
TBT Committee statistics reflect, for the most part, a steady but 
growing global trend in NTB notifications of technical regulations 
and conformity-assessment procedures.29 These statistics also reflect 
that TBT Committee Members have continued to reference in their 
notifications the same three public policy objectives as the primary 
basis for their regulatory proposals. For example, the protection of 
human health or safety and the prevention of deceptive practices and 
consumer protection were the two most frequently cited policy 
 
 25. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.9. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. art. 2.9.1; WTO E-LEARNING, supra note 19, at 60; GATT, supra 
note 6, art. X. 
 28. WTO E-LEARNING, supra note 19, at 60; see TBT Agreement, supra note 
5, art. 2.9. 
 29. See World Trade Organization [WTO], Comm. on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Seventeenth Annual Review of the Implementation 
and Operation of the TBT Agreement, ¶ 1, fig.1, G/TBT/31 (Mar. 2, 2012) 
[hereinafter Seventeenth Annual TBT Review] (providing a bar graph illustrating 
the growth of TBT notifications since 1995); see also WTO, Comm. on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Sixteenth Annual Review of the 
Implementation and Operation of the TBT Agreement, ¶ 8, G/TBT/29 (Mar. 8, 
2011) [hereinafter Sixteenth Annual TBT Review]; WTO, Comm. on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Fifteenth Annual Review of the 
Implementation and Operation of the TBT Agreement, ¶ 11, G/TBT/28 (Feb. 5, 
2010) [hereinafter Fifteenth Annual TBT Review]; WTO, Comm. on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Fourteenth Annual Review of the 
Implementation and Operation of the TBT Agreement, fig.1, G/TBT/25 (Mar. 4, 
2009) [hereinafter Fourteenth Annual TBT Review]. 
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objectives for each of the years 2003 through 2011, and the 
protection of the environment was among the top three most 
frequently cited policy objectives in six of these nine years.30 Indeed, 
the TBT Committee’s most recent (2011) Annual Review reflects 
that “[t]he most commonly stated objectives of the measures 
discussed relate to health and safety, and the protection of the 
environment.”31 
 
 30. See Seventeenth Annual TBT Review, supra note 29, tbl.1 (identifying 
protection of human health, prevention of deceptive practices and consumer 
protection, and protection of the environment as the three policies most frequently 
cited); Sixteenth Annual TBT Review, supra note 29, tbl.1 (identifying protection 
of human health and prevention of deceptive practices and consumer protection as 
the two policies most frequently cited); Fifteenth Annual TBT Review, supra note 
29, tbl.1 (identifying protection of human health and prevention of deceptive 
practices and consumer protection as the two policies most frequently cited); 
Fourteenth Annual TBT Review, supra note 29, ¶ 11 (identifying protection of 
human health, prevention of deceptive practices and consumer protection, and 
protection of the environment as the three policies most frequently cited); WTO, 
Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Thirteenth Annual 
Review of the Implementation and Operation of the TBT Agreement, ¶ 13, 
G/TBT/23 (Feb. 20, 2008) (identifying protection of human health, prevention of 
deceptive practices and consumer protection, and protection of the environment as 
the three policies most frequently cited); WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Twelfth Annual Review of the Implementation and 
Operation of the TBT Agreement, ¶ 11, G/TBT/21/Rev.1 (Apr. 4, 2007) 
(identifying protection of human health, prevention of deceptive practices and 
consumer protection, and protection of the environment as the three policies most 
frequently cited); WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the 
Secretariat: Eleventh Annual Review of the Implementation and Operation of the 
TBT, ¶ 12, G/TBT/18 (Feb. 17, 2006) (identifying protection of human health, 
protection of the environment, and prevention of deceptive practices and consumer 
protection as the three policies most frequently cited); WTO, Comm. on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Tenth Annual Review of the 
Implementation and Operation of the TBT Agreement, ¶ 10, G/TBT/15 (Mar. 4, 
2005) (identifying protection of human health, prevention of deceptive practices 
and consumer protection, and protection of the environment as the three policies 
most frequently cited); WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the 
Secretariat: Ninth Annual Review of the Implementation and Operation of the TBT 
Agreement, ¶ 12, G/TBT/14 (Mar. 5, 2004) (identifying protection of human health 
and prevention of deceptive practices and consumer protection as the two policies 
most frequently cited). 
 31. Seventeenth Annual TBT Review, supra note 29, ¶ 19, fig.9. The TBT 
Committee’s 2011 Annual Review reflects that the number of specific trade 
concerns has grown rather steadily since 1995, and has practically tripled between 
2005 and 2011 with each specific trade concern raised, sometimes covering more 
than one issue. See id. ¶ 14, fig.4, n.15. It reveals that 1,154 specific concern-
related issues were raised from January 1, 1995, through December 31, 2011, in 
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These statistics are significant because of the TBT Committee’s 
constructive role as a forum in which WTO Members “discuss issues 
related to specific measures (technical regulations, standards, or 
conformity assessment procedures) maintained by other Members” 
known as “specific trade concerns.”32 Specific trade concerns “relate 
variously to proposed measures notified to the TBT Committee in 
accordance with the notification requirements in the [TBT] 
Agreement or to measures currently in force.”33 Notifying WTO 
Members are expected to clearly explain the objective(s) of a given 
measure in its accompanying notification, or at the very least, shortly 
following the notification’s triggering of specific trade concerns 
registered by other Members.34 The raising of specific trade concerns 
is viewed as an early barometer of the perceived “trade-worthiness” 
of a given measure. 
These statistics help to place TBT notifications submitted with 
respect to technical regulations like the EU’s REACH, and WTO 
Members’ reactions to them, into proper context. The EU first 
notified the TBT Committee about the REACH regulation on 
January 21, 2004.35 Although the EU’s 2004 notification designated 
three public policy objectives—the protection of human health or 
safety, trade facilitation, and the protection of the environment36—it 
was subsequently discovered that “animal welfare” had actually 
played a very influential role in shaping the REACH regime.37 The 
 
connection with 549 specific trade concerns discussed by Members during said 
period. See id. figs.4–5. The three most frequently raised specific trade concern–
related issues invoked by WTO Members from 1995–2011 were: i) the “need for 
more (further) information, or clarification about the measure at issue”; ii) 
unnecessary barriers to trade; and iii) transparency. Id. fig.5, ¶¶ 15–16. It also 
reveals that the regulatory measures most frequently raised for discussion in the 
Committee were those proposed and/or maintained by the EU, China, and the 
United States. See id. ¶ 22. 
 32. Id. ¶ 13 
 33. E.g., WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the 
Secretariat: Specific Trade Concerns Addressed in the TBT Committee, 1 
G/TBTGEN/74/Rev.8 (June 1, 2011). 
 34. See Seventeenth Annual TBT Review, supra note 29, ¶ 18. 
 35. See WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification, 
G/TBT/N/EEC/52 (Jan. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Jan. 21, 2004, TBT Committee 
Notification]. 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. See Doaa Abdel Motaal, Reaching REACH: The Challenge for Chemicals 
Entering International Trade, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 643, 658–59 (2009) (“While 
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EU thereafter submitted eight additional notifications over the 
ensuing seven-year period reflecting several amendments, revisions, 
addenda, and implementation guidance that the EU has issued, and 
continues to issue, to the evolving REACH regulation.38  
The statistics also strongly suggest that the EU has recognized that 
the REACH’s length and complexity and the new legal obligations it 
imposes present real compliance challenges for industries that have 
affected international trade in chemical substance-based products 
and, consequently, the operation of industry global supply chains. 
Indeed, as of November 10, 2011, thirty-four WTO Members had 
expressed specific trade concerns about the EU REACH regulation, 
designated as “European Communities – Regulation on the 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) 
(ID 88),” for a record twenty-seven times since the EC’s initial 
REACH notification to the TBT Committee.39 This statistic was 
 
health and environmental concerns have certainly been major drivers of REACH, 
few expected that animal welfare considerations and the desire to minimize the 
testing of chemicals on animals would become so influential in shaping 
REACH.”). 
 38. See Mark Blainey, REACH, Still Being Developed!, 6 J. EUR. ENVTL. & 
PLAN. L. 51, 52 (2009); see also WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Notification, G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.1 (Mar. 10, 2003) (noting that the final date 
for comments is extended to June 21, 2004); WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers 
to Trade, Notification, G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.2 (Aug. 17, 2006) (noting the 
Common Position on the REACH proposal was adopted by the Council on June 
27, 2006); WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification, 
G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.3 (Jan. 22, 2007) (establishing a European Chemical 
Agency and amending the approximation of laws relating to the classification 
concerning REACH); WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification, 
G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.3/Rev.1 (Feb. 9, 2007) (informing of the adoption of two 
regulations proposed in the January 22, 2007, TBT Committee Notification); 
WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification, 
G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.4 (June 13, 2007) (notifying the TBT Committee that 
documents have been prepared to assist industry under REACH); WTO, Comm. on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification, G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.5 (Apr. 30, 2008) 
(informing TBT Committee members on regulation fees); WTO, Comm. on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification, G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.6 (Oct. 30, 2009) 
(informing TBT Committee members of proposed amendments to REACH in 
regards to Annex XVII (dichloromethane, lamp oils and grill lighter fluids, and 
organostannic compounds)); WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Notification, G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Add.7 (Apr. 21, 2010) (informing TBT Committee 
Members of the adoption of the amendment to Annex XVII). 
 39. See Members Discuss 54 Technical Barriers, China’s Final Review and 
Streamlined Work, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 2011) (emphasis added) (“Raised 
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recently emphasized by the WTO Secretariat in a May 31, 2012, 
report discussing G20 trade measures, which cited REACH as “the 
[specific trade concern] most frequently raised by the greatest 
number of Members (over 30).”40 Precisely because of REACH’s 
ongoing evolution, and the EU’s continued review of the REACH 
regulatory framework with an eye to further revising and/or adding 
to it in the future,41 it is very likely that more EU TBT Committee 
notifications with respect to the REACH will be forthcoming and 
trigger additional discussion by concerned WTO Members.  
II. REACH-RELATED TRADE CONCERNS  
AT THE WTO 2004−2011 
A. REACH IN A NUTSHELL 
The EU REACH regulation was adopted in December 2006 and 
entered into force on June 1, 2007.42 “REACH encompasses over 140 
different articles, 17 distinct annexes, almost 300 pages of text, and 
 
for a record-breaking 27th time were the EU’s Regulation on the Registration, 
Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) and Directive 2002/95/EC 
on the Restriction of the Use of certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (RoHS) and Directive 2002/96/EC on Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE).”); see also EU REACH Regulation Subject to 
Intense Debate in TBT Committee, HKTDC RES. (Nov. 30, 2007), 
http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Business-Alert-
EU/EU-REACHRegulation.subject-to-intense-debate-in-TBT-
committee/baeu/en/1/1X000000/1X005OQA.htm; Herbert Smith, EU’s REACH 
and Other Chemical Regulations Debated in the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Committee, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=773fad90-10eb-4b06-9f46-beb37e49edc2. 
 40. WTO OMC, REPORT ON G-20 TRADE MEASURES ¶ 32 (2012) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentpolicy/ 
50492978.pdf. “This seventh Report reviews trade and trade-related measures 
implemented by G-20 economies in the period from mid-October 2011 to mid-
May 2012.” Id. ¶ 1. 
 41. See, e.g., Frédéric Simon, EU Prepares to Re-Open REACH ‘Can of 
Worms,’ EURACTIV, http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/eu-prepares-
open-reach-worms-news-507129 (last updated May 10, 2012); see also Chemicals: 
Review of REACH 2012, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ 
chemicals/documents/reach/review2012/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 42. See REACH: History and Background—History of the Adoption Process 
for the New Chemicals Legislation, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/chemicals/reach/background/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012). 
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hundreds of pages of guidance—with the latter figure expected to 
grow considerably as more guidance is issued.”43 The REACH 
regulation’s primary stated objective is to “ensure a high level of 
protection” of health, safety, and the environment44 through the 
creation of a single comprehensive system that covers all (existing as 
well as new) chemical substances. It also has an important claimed 
tertiary objective of limiting the use of vertebrate animals in 
chemicals testing.45 The European Commission has described 
REACH as a response to the perceived inability of prior EC 
legislation to ensure the gathering and reporting of enough 
information about chemicals in industrial and commercial use to 
permit the relevant EU government institutions to properly identify, 
evaluate, and manage the known and unknown risks arising from 
such uses.46 While the REACH regime is composed of several 
elements, its primary (and arguably most controversial) element is its 
registration/data-gathering requirement. It applies to each legal 
entity47 within the EC that manufactures/formulates within or imports 
into the EU48 one ton or more per year49 of either existing50 or new 
 
 43. Lynn L. Bergeson, Chemical Management, North American Style: The 
Montebello Agreement, ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT., Spring 2008, at 89, 91. 
 44. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 1.1 (emphasis added). 
 45. See EUR. CMTYS., RESPONSE FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
SUBMITTED BY WTO MEMBERS UNDER G/TBT/N/EEC/52 5 (REGULATION 
CONCERNING THE REGISTRATION, EVALUATION AND AUTHORISATION OF 
CHEMICALS (KNOWN AS REACH – COM ((2003) 644 FINAL), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/eu_wto_response_0410
28_en.pdf. 
 46. See WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: 
Minutes of the Meeting of 4 November 2004, G/TBT/M/34 ¶¶ 14–15 (Jan. 5, 2005) 
[hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 4 November 2004]; 
WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of 
the Meeting of 21 March 2007, G/TBT/M/41 ¶ 24 (June 11, 2007) [hereinafter 
TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007]. 
 47. See EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6 § 
1.5.3.1 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6], 
available at http://www.safetyhitech.com/coddocumento/14/Registration%2520EN 
%2520.pdf. Such legal entities include: EU manufacturer/formulator, EU importer, 
and EU “only representative appointed by a non-EU manufacturer/formulator.” See 
REACH, supra note 2, arts. 3(9), 3(11), 8(1); see also GUIDANCE ON 
REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6, supra, §§ 1.5.2.1, 1.5.3.3 (citing REACH art. 
2(1)(d)). 
 48. See EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 2.0 § 
2.1.2.1 (May 2012) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION May 2012 Draft], 
available at http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13632/registration_en.pdf; see 
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substances,51 or articles containing more than one ton of substances 
per year.52 This requirement applies to substances on their own, in 
preparations, or in articles53 unless otherwise fully or partially 
exempt to the extent covered by other primary EU legislation.54 It is 
 
also GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6, supra note 47, § 1.5.3.4. Readers 
should note that there are seven prior versions and three subsequent draft versions 
of this guidance document currently available. See id. at 4 (providing a history of 
the prior version of the Guidance on Registration); see also EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION DRAFT VERSION 2 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft]; EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION DRAFT VERSION 2 (Jan. 2012); EUR. CHEMS. 
AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION DRAFT VERSION 2 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION Sept. 2011 Draft]. 
 49. See REACH, supra note 2, arts. 6(1), 6(3)(b), 17(1), 18(1), 23(1), 23(3), 
28(1), 28(6), 41(5)(b). 
 50. See id. arts. 3(20), 12(1)(a), 23, 26-28. 
 51. See id. arts. 12(1)(a), 26–27. 
 52. See id. art. 7(1)(a). 
 53. See id. arts. 5–7. 
 54. See id. arts. 2(3), 2(5)(b), 2(6)(d), 2(7)–(8), 9 (listing the EC Regulations 
and Council Directives that fully or partially exempt REACH). An interesting issue 
arises with respect to the general REACH registration and data-gathering 
exemptions granted for foodstuff and feedstuff additives that have not also been 
granted to food contact materials falling within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 
1935/2004, even though both are primarily regulated under the auspices of the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on “food safety” grounds and subject to 
risk assessment. REACH Articles 14(5)(b) and 56(5)(b) provide only limited 
exemptions to food contact materials on environmental safety grounds—e.g., a 
chemical safety report need not include consideration of the risks to human health 
with respect to food contact materials, and food contact materials are not subject to 
the REACH “authorization” requirement. See id. arts. 14(5)(b), 56(5)(b); see also 
Anna Gergely & Laurel Berzanskis, Food Contact Materials Lie Within REACH, 
CHEM. WATCH, Feb. 2012, at 13, available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/ 
htmldocuments/Chemical%20Watch_Food%20contact%20materials%20are%20wi
thin%20REACH.pdf (“Compliance with REACH is a prerequisite to compliance 
with the [food contact materials] legislation.”). This dichotomy would seem to 
explain why the EU filed SPS notifications on proposed food contact materials 
regulations, characterizing them as primarily relating to a “food safety purpose,” 
notwithstanding their ancillary coverage under REACH. See WTO, Comm. on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Notification, G/SPS/N/EEC/410 (Aug. 16, 
2011); WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Notification, 
G/SPS/N/EEC/388 (Oct. 4, 2010); WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Notification, 1 G/SPS/N/EEC/340 (Feb. 17, 2009). Similarly, since 
pharmaceuticals are otherwise covered by other primary EU health safety 
legislation, they are afforded certain exemptions under REACH. See COVINGTON 
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primarily dependent on production volume, which serves as a proxy 
for exposure,55 is currently being implemented in phases,56 and can 
entail significant costs and fees, some of which have been reduced 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”).57  
The registration/data-gathering requirement obliges all such 
entities:  
• To gather information in the form of a technical dossier 
describing those intrinsic characteristics of each substance 
posing human health and/or environmental hazards58 
“through literature search, data sharing [and] if necessary 
testing,” but to generally avoid vertebrate animal testing;59  
• To use that information in generating exposure information,60 
in preparing chemical safety reports (“CSRs”)61 assessing the 
risks from identified uses,62 and for putting in place and 




 55. See Eurostat, The REACH Baseline Study 26, 32 (Eurostat Working Paper, 
2009), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-
09-003/EN/KS-RA-09-003-EN.PDF; see also EUR. COMM’N, QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ON REACH 15 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
chemicals/pdf/qa.pdf (stating that while “[t]he risk of a chemical substance toward 
human health and the environment does not necessarily have a proportionate 
relationship with the volume of production,” it explained that “[v]olume is used as 
a proxy for exposure. It allows a clear, enforceable priority setting for registration 
which also gives legal certainty” (emphasis added)). 
 56. Specifically, the phases are pre-registration, late pre-registration, and 
potential/new registration. See EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON DATA 
SHARING VERSION 2.0 §§ 1.2.4, 3.1.1 (Apr. 2012) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON DATA 
SHARING VERSION 2.0], available at http://www.echa.europa.eu/documents/ 
10162/13631/guidance_on_data_sharing_en.pdf; see also REACH, supra note 2, 
arts. 23(1)–(3), 28(2), 28(6); GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6, supra 
note 47, §§ 1.7.1.1, 1.7.2. 
 57. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 74; see also Commission Regulation 
340/2008, 2008 O.J. (107/6) arts. 3(3), 4(4). 
 58. See REACH, supra note 2, arts. 10(a), 12(1)(a)–(b). 
 59. See id. arts. 13(1)–(2), 25, Annex VI; TBT Committee Minutes for the 
Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra note 46, ¶ 26. 
 60. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 10(a)(x) (applying to “substances in 
quantities of 1 to 10 tonnes” per year). 
 61. See GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6, supra note 47, § 1.8.1. 
 62. See REACH, supra note 2, arts. 12(1)(c), 14(1) (pertaining to situations in 
which more than ten tons of a substance is imported per year). 
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the safe use of each substance;63  
• To submit such information to a newly created centralized 
regulatory Agency known as the European Chemicals 
Agency (“ECHA”) for review,64 and for inclusion within a 
newly created central chemicals database to be administered 
by ECHA;65 and  
• To share the gathered information with the rest of the 
manufacturing supply chain66 through voluntary consortia and 
mandatory Substance Information Exchange Forums 
(“SIEFs”) for purposes of ensuring: a) the supply chain 
members’ safe use of such substance(s) and b) the submission 
of joint supply chain registrations that permit new supply 
chain registrants to refer to previously prepared studies which 
serves to minimize the likelihood of duplicative vertebrate 
animal testing.67  
Various levels of dossier information are required depending on 
the manufactured or imported volume of each such substance68 and 
on whether the substance is characterized as dangerous or as 
persistent, bio-accumulative, and toxic.69  
Substances are prioritized for evaluation following registration if 
they are suspected of posing a risk to human health or the 
environment. Substance evaluation under REACH, which is carried 
out by EU Member States, is more extensive than a dossier 
evaluation70 and is intended to clarify the presence and degree of risk 
posed. The ECHA has stated that “[t]he selection and eventual 
prioritisation of substances for evaluation is made according to risk-
 
 63. See id. arts. 14(1), 14(3). 
 64. See id. arts. 6(1), 7(1), 20 (detailing ECHA’s multiple organs and functions, 
including EU Member State coordination tasks and review measures). 
 65. See id. art. 16(1). 
 66. See id. art. 11. 
 67. See id. art. 13(5). 
 68. See id. arts. 12, 14, Annex XI (i.e., tonnage band). 
 69. See id. Annex XIII. 
 70. See EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, REACH FACT SHEET: SUBSTANCE EVALUATION 
(2011), available at http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13644/substance_ 
evaluation_fact_sheet_en.pdf (“Substance evaluation may involve an assessment 
of all registration dossiers from all registrants specific to the same substance as 
well as an assessment of any other sources of information available . . . .”). 
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based criteria.”71 Substances to be evaluated are listed in a 
Community Rolling Action Plan (“CoRAP”), recently adopted on a 
consensus basis by EU Member State representatives.72 It currently 
includes ninety substances, forty-three of which are “substances of 
very high concern” (“SVHCs”).73 
Once SVHCs have been notified to the ECHA, they undergo a 
two-step regulatory process (including the substance evaluation 
process), after which they are placed on an “authorisation list” and 
may be found to qualify for authorization.74 SVHCs cannot be placed 
on the market or used after a given date, unless ECHA authorization 
is granted for their specific use, or the use is exempted altogether 
from authorization.75 The authorization process is “risk-based” and is 
intended to ensure that risks from SVHCs are adequately controlled, 
restricted, or substituted. It is only at this stage that a scientific risk 
assessment is performed and employed to determine whether actual 
identified SVHC health or environmental risks can be adequately 
controlled.76 EU Commission authorizations shall be granted “if the 
applicant [is] able to demonstrate adequate control of risks” or “if 
there [is] no alternative substance or technology (even if the risks 
[are] not adequately controlled) and socio-economic benefits 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, COMMUNITY ROLLING ACTION PLAN (CORAP) 
(Feb. 29 2012), http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/corap_2012_en.pdf. 
The CoRAP is scheduled to be “updated and changes may be introduced for the 
substances . . . listed in 2012 . . . [b]y the end of February 2013 . . .” Id. 
 73. See REACH: Substance Evaluation Starts, EUR. TRADE UNION INST. (Apr. 
4, 2012), http://www.etui.org/Topics/Health-Safety/News/REACH-substance-
evaluation-starts; see also REACH, supra note 2, arts. 14(4), 31(1)(a)–(b). 
 74. Prior to being placed on an authorization list pursuant to Articles 57, 58, 
and Annex IV, substances are first placed on a “Candidate List” pursuant to Article 
59(1). As of December 19, 2012, there are 138 SVHCs on the Candidate List. See 
EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, CANDIDATE LIST FOR AUTHORISATION UPDATED WITH 
FIFTY-FOUR NEW SUBSTANCES OF VERY HIGH CONCERN (SVHCS), 
ECHA/PR/12/39 (Dec. 19, 2012), http://echa.europa.eu/view-article/-/journal_ 
content/b5d76d7f-7b28-4081-bd5c-9500e01e1ab2; EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, 
CANDIDATE LIST OF SUBSTANCES OF VERY HIGH CONCERN FOR AUTHORISATION, 
http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/candidate-list-table (last updated Dec. 19, 2012). 
 75. Authorisation, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://www.echa.europa.eu/web/ 
guest/regulations/reach/authorisation (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 76. See EUR. CMTYS., supra note 45, at 6 (explaining that “although hazard is 
the basis on which the decision is made to subject substances to the authorisation 
system, the authorisation themselves . . . are decided strictly on the basis of a 
consideration of risk”). 
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outweigh[] the risks.”77 The risks of alternative substances 
(“substitutes”) are also taken into account.78 
The complete and satisfactory fulfillment of the REACH 
registration requirement is a condition precedent to receiving 
marketing authorization for a given manufactured or imported 
substance, or substance-containing article, which is otherwise known 
as the principle of “[n]o data, no market.”79 In essence, the REACH 
registration/data-gathering requirement, consistent with the European 
Union’s Roman civil law precautionary principle,80 reflects a 
regulatory paradigm shift that reverses the burden of proof (both the 
burden of production and the burden of persuasion) from the 
 
 77. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra note 46, 
¶ 28; see REACH, supra note 2, art. 60(2)–(4) (providing that authorizations shall 
not be granted for substances meeting the criteria of REACH Article 57(a), (b), (c), 
or (f) for which a threshold cannot be determined; substances meeting the criteria 
of REACH Article 57(d) or (e); and substances identified in REACH Article 57(f) 
“having persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic properties or very persistent and 
very bioaccumulative properties”). 
 78. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra 
note 46, ¶ 28. 
 79. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 5. 
 80. See id. art. 1(3). The civil law precautionary principle is often referred to as 
“in dubio pro natura, a Roman law principle for environmental protection that 
asserts that in case of doubt, any decision should favour the protection of nature.” 
See Rolando Castro, Protection of Sea Turtles: Putting the Precautionary 
Principle into Practice, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: 
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE 117, 117 
(2005). “The concept of the precautionary principle is different in civil law and 
common law, which have different approaches to the relationship between science 
and law. In the USA the regulation is ‘science-based’ meanwhile, in Europe the 
rule of science is determined through a ‘policy-related’ way.” Maria Vittoria 
Lumetti, Presentation at an Int’l Comm’n for Electromagnetic Safety Conference: 
The Precautionary EMF Approach: Rationale, Legislation and Implementation 
(Feb. 2006); see François Ost, The Philosophical Foundation of Environmental 
Law: An Excursion Beyond Descartes (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.dhdi.free.fr/recherches/environnement/articles/ostenvlaw.pdf (last 
modified Oct. 14, 2004) (“[I]t is up to those undertaking any activity likely to 
transform the environment to demonstrate the absence of negative effects.”). 
“Generally speaking, the precautionary principle says that in dubio pro natura. If 
in doubt, decide in favour of the environment. . . . Ennaltavarautumisen periaate 
or varovaisuusperiaate (in Finnish), försiktighetsprincip (in Swedish), 
Vorsorgeprinzip (in German), principe de précaution (in French), principio de 
precaución (in Spanish).” MARKO AHTEENSUU, IN DUBIO PRO NATURA? A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND HEALTH RISK GOVERNANCE 1 n.1 (2008). 
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regulator to the manufacturer or importer on the basis of only a 
substance’s hazardous properties, irrespective of the actual risk that 
such substance poses to human health or the environment. 
B. REACH UNDERGOES CONTINUAL REVIEW AND 
CONSULTATION AT THE WTO 
The EU REACH had already triggered international trade 
concerns among WTO Member governments and non-EU industries 
by the time the European Commission first notified the TBT 
Committee of REACH’s proposed adoption.81 WTO Members have 
since continued to register their concerns82 at a record number of 
TBT Committee meetings, as recently as November 2011.83  
 
 81. See, e.g., WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the 
Meeting of 7 November 2003, G/TBT/M/31 ¶¶ 23–33 (Dec. 9, 2003); NAT’L 
FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC., ‘ENLIGHTENED’ ENVIRONMENTALISM OR 
DISGUISED PROTECTIONISM? ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EU PRECAUTION-BASED 
STANDARDS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 66–86 (2004); NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE 
COUNCIL, INC., EU REGULATION, STANDARDIZATION AND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE: THE ART OF CRAFTING A THREE-DIMENSIONAL TRADE STRATEGY 
THAT IGNORES SOUND SCIENCE 17–27 (2003); NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, 
INC., LOOKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN: THE GROWTH OF TRADE BARRIERS THAT 
IGNORE SOUND SCIENCE 82–111 (2003). 
 82. See LAWRENCE A. KOGAN, EXPORTING PRECAUTION: HOW EUROPE’S RISK-
FREE REGULATORY AGENDA THREATENS AMERICAN FREE ENTERPRISE 11–12, 40–
43 (2005) (pointing to several studies that demonstrate the losses these countries 
will sustain due to REACH); Lawrence A. Kogan, Exporting Europe’s 
Protectionism, 77 NAT’L INTEREST 91, 95 (2004) (remarking that REACH does not 
take into account exposure data and requires the “industry to jump through 
needless hoops”); Lawrence A. Kogan, Precautionary Preference: How Europe 
Employs Disguised Regulatory Protectionism to Weaken American Free 
Enterprise, 7 INT’L J. ECON. DEV. 65, 213 (2005); Lawrence A. Kogan, The Extra-
WTO Precautionary Principle: One European “Fashion” Export the United States 
Can Do Without, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 491, 493 (2008) (asserting 
that the EU has been targeting “the U.S. regulatory and free enterprise systems for 
fundamental restructuring”); Lawrence A. Kogan, The Precautionary Principle 
and WTO Law: Divergent Views Toward the Role of Science in Assessing and 
Managing Risk, 1 SETON HALL J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 77, 78 (2004) [hereinafter 
Kogan, Divergent Views Toward the Role of Science in Assessing and Managing 
Risk] (noting the “disparate public views [between the United States and the EU] 
toward the role of science in risk assessment and risk management”). 
 83. See Seventeenth Annual TBT Review, supra note 29. See generally WTO, 
Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the 
Meeting of 23 March 2004, G/TBT/M/32 (Apr. 19, 2004) 2–15 [hereinafter TBT 
Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23 March 2004]; WTO, Comm. on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 1 
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July 2004, G/TBT/M/33 (Aug. 31, 2004) 2–16 [hereinafter TBT Committee 
Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004]; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting 
of 4 Nov. 2004, supra note 46, at 3–23; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 22–23 March 2005, 
G/TBT/M/35 (May 24, 2005) 2–8; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 16–17 June 2005, G/TBT/M/36 
(Aug. 4, 2005) 2–9; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the 
Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 2 November 2005, G/TBT/M/37 (Dec. 22, 
2005) 2–7; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: 
Minutes of the Meeting of 15 and 17 March 2006, G/TBT/M/38 (May 23, 2006) 2–
14; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes 
of the Meeting of 7–9 June 2006, G/TBT/M/39 (July 31, 2006) 2–15; WTO, 
Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the 
Meeting of 9 November 2006, G/TBT/M/40 (Jan. 26, 2006) 2–15; WTO, Comm. 
on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 
21 March 2007, G/TBT/M/41 (June 11, 2007) 2–20 [hereinafter TBT Committee 
Meeting Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007]; WTO, Comm. on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 5 July 2007, 
G/TBT/M/42 (Aug. 6, 2007) 2–16; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 9 November 2007, G/TBT/M/43 
(Jan. 21, 2008) 2–23 [hereinafter TBT Committee Meeting Minutes for the 
Meeting of 9 November 2007]; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 20 March 2008, G/TBT/M/44 
(June 10, 2008) 3−24 [hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 
March 2008]; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the 
Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, G/TBT/M/45 (Sept. 9, 2008) 
2−38 [hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008]; 
WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of 
the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, G/TBT/M/46 (Jan. 23, 2009) 2−33 
[hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008]; 
WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of 
the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, G/TBT/M/47 (June 5, 2009) 2−33 [hereinafter 
TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009]; WTO, Comm. on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 25–
26 June 2009, G/TBT/M/48 (Sept. 29, 2009) 2−26 [hereinafter TBT Committee 
Minutes for the Meeting of 25–26 June 2009]; WTO, Comm. on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2009, G/TBT/M/49 (Dec. 22, 2009) 3−23 [hereinafter TBT Committee 
Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009]; WTO, Comm. on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 24–25 March 
2010, G/TBT/M/50 (May 28, 2010) 2−18 [hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for 
the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010]; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Note by the Secretariat: Minutes of the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, G/TBT/M/51 
(Oct. 1, 2010) 2−11 [hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–
24 June 2010]; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the 
Secretariat: Minutes on the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, G/TBT/M/52 (Mar. 
10, 2011) 2–11 [hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 
November 2010]; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the 
Secretariat: Minutes on the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, G/TBT/M/53 (May 26, 
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That REACH, thus far, has not been formally challenged at the 
WTO can perhaps be explained by reference to a number of factors:  
• The EU’s May 20, 2003, submission to the TBT Committee 
of an “early notification” under TBT Article 2.9.1 
acquainting Members with the proposed REACH 
regulation;84  
• The EU’s hosting of a public Internet-based consultation in 
200385 that received up to 6500 comments in response to the 
REACH proposal;86  
• The EU’s granting of a sixty-day extension to the original 
ninety-day REACH comment period;87  
• The EU’s willingness to respond in writing and in person to 
WTO Members’ concerns at the TBT Committee meetings88 
and to engage in private bilateral consultations with some 
WTO Members;89  
 
2011) 2−11 [hereinafter TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 
2011]; WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: 
Minutes on the Meeting of 15–16 June 2011, G/TBT/M/54 (Sept. 20, 2011) 2−62. 
 84. See WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting 
Held on 2 July 2003, ¶ 62 G/TBT/M/30 (Aug. 19, 2003). 
 85. See Commission Communication—Towards a Reinforced Culture of 
Consultation and Dialogue – General Principles and Minimum Standards for 
Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final 
(Dec. 11, 2002) 7 (“[The Interactive Policy-Making Initiative] is one of the tools 
that will help the Commission . . . respond more quickly and accurately to the 
demands of citizens, consumers and business.”); IPM: Interactive Policy Making, 
IDABC, http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 2008); 
see also REACH Regulation – Public Consultation, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/documents/reach/archives/consulta
tion/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (outlining the “essential features” of 
REACH). 
 86. See REACH Background: Internet Consultation on Draft Chemicals 
Legislation (the REACH System), EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
chemicals/reach/background/internet_cons_en.htm (last updated Sept. 14, 2012). 
 87. See EUR. CMTYS., supra note 45, at 1 (stating that the original ninety-day 
comment period, which commenced on the date of the EC’s formal TBT 
notification, January 21, 2004, would have expired on or about April 21, 2004, but 
for the sixty-day extension until June 21, 2004). 
 88. See id.; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 4 November 2004, 
supra note 46, ¶¶ 54–67; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 
2007, supra note 46, ¶¶ 23–59. 
 89. See EUR. CMTYS., supra note 45, at 1 (conveying “a series of bilateral 
meetings were held in Geneva between the Commission and some of the countries 
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• Considerable WTO Member government and non-EU 
industry lobbying;90  
• The EU’s willingness to incorporate at least some of the 
comments and criticisms received into a partial revision of 
REACH prior to its adoption;91  
• The passage of time deemed necessary for the purpose of 
accurately assessing whether the first applicable REACH 
provisions as adopted have been applied in a WTO-consistent 
manner irrespective of the EU’s own conclusions concerning 
whether they are WTO-compliant;92  
• A dedicated cadre of academic, civil society, and industry 
advocates/lobbyists who have labored to defuse accusations 
of REACH WTO non-compliance;93 and  
 
and organisations that have commented” on REACH); TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra note 46, ¶ 30. 
 90. See, e.g., Lawrence Kogan, Claims of Improper US Lobbying Quite a 
REACH, E.U. REP., May 2004, at 18 (plenary ed.); REACH: Intensive Lobbying on 
Eve of Parliament Hearing, EURACTIV, http://www.euractiv.com/pa/reach-
intensive-lobbying-eve-par-news-213161 (last updated May 4, 2007). 
 91. See What Is REACH?, ENVTL. CHEMOINFORMATICS, http://www.eco-
itn.eu/node/37 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (“REACH has been developed in a 
climate of transparency and consultation.”); see also Wojciech Kosc, Lukewarm 
Reception for Watered-down Regulation, GREEN HORIZON (May 17, 2007), 
http://www.greenhorizon-online.com/index.php/Insight/the-european-parliament-
votes-to-enact-comprehensive-legislation-but-reach-fails-to-please-industry-
lobbyists-and-green-organisations-alike.html (declaring that, despite the revised 
version, green organizations and industry lobbyists are not satisfied with the end 
product). 
 92. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra 
note 46, ¶¶ 34–35 (“REACH applied equally to EU and non-EU producers.”); see 
also TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 4 November 2004, supra note 46, 
¶¶ 23–24 (explaining that an “extensive impact assessment” was conducted to 
evaluate REACH). 
 93. See, e.g., HENRIK SELIN, EUROPEAN OVER-REACH? EFFORTS TO REVISE 
EUROPEAN UNION CHEMICAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 22 (2005) 
(concluding that REACH is “guided by EU’s commitment to sustainable 
development”); see also Christian Tietje & Sebastian Wolf, REACH 
REGISTRATION OF IMPORTED SUBSTANCES – COMPATIBILITY WITH WTO RULES 52 
(2005) [hereinafter Tietje & Wolf, REACH REGISTRATION OF IMPORTED 
SUBSTANCES], available at http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/Heft42.pdf 
(“Thus far it has not been decided whether . . . every regulatory intervention in the 
market which leads to altered consumer and user expectations to be illegal under 
WTO law.”); Christian Tietje & Sebastian Wolf, Legal Opinion WTO-legal 
Admissibility of a Possible Inclusion of Substances in Products from Third 
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• The EU’s likely comprehensive review of and deemed 
compliance with the Panel and Appellate Body decisions in 
the WTO Shrimp-Turtle case,94 pursuant to which the EU 
 
Countries to the REACH Registration Obligations (Article 6 REACH), GER. PAINT 
INDUS. ASSOC. (2005); Sarah Harrell, Beyond “REACH”? An Analysis of the 
European Union’s Chemical Regulation Program Under World Trade 
Organization Agreements, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 471, 472 (2006) (arguing that the 
United States will probably lose if it challenges REACH before the WTO); 
OKOPOL – Institut für Ökologie und Politik GmbH, Analysis of the 
Implementation of the Requirements of Article 7 Imported Products in REACH 
(Discussion Paper) (Analyse der Umsetzung der Anforderungen von Artikel 7 
Unter REACH Bei Importierten Erzeugnissen), (Sept. 2008) at 3–4, 
http://www.reach-info.de/dokumente/Anhaenge/diskussionspapier_behoerden 
workshop.pdf (concerning chemical substances in ‘articles’); HEIKE LÜSKOW ET 
AL., ANALYSIS OF THE REALISATION OF OBLIGATIONS FROM ARTICLE 7 AND 33 
UNDER REACH FOR IMPORTED ARTICLES, 18–19 (2010) (relaying that “specialist 
lawyers” scrutinized Article 7 of REACH and agree that it is WTO compliant); 
Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285 (2011); Bulldozing REACH – The Industry Offensive to 
Crush EU Chemicals Regulation, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY (2005), available at 
http://archive.corporateeurope.org/docs/lobbycracy/BulldozingREACH.pdf 
(criticizing the flawed studies used to combat REACH); MARCO CONTIERO, 
GREENPEACE, TOXIC LOBBY: HOW THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY IS TRYING TO 
KILL REACH 5 (2006), available at http://www.indymedia.be/files/ 
toxic%20lobby.pdf (arguing that we need REACH because of a lack of knowledge 
on the hazards of chemicals, the health risks of some of these chemicals, and the 
environmental risks some chemicals pose); ALICE PALMER, WORLD WILDLIFE 
FUND, REACH AND “PROPORTIONALITY” UNDER WTO RULES 5 (2004), available 
at http://www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/reach_prop_0604.pdf. 
 94.  See Panel Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.54–7.56, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) (highlighting, in 
part, the obligation within the GATT 1994 Article XX chapeau of every WTO 
Member planning to unilaterally impose extra-territorial (environmental) measures 
with potential trade-distorting effects to undertake good faith diplomatic efforts to 
negotiate with other WTO Members, including those that have raised objections to 
the proposed measure, for the purpose of concluding bilateral or multilateral 
agreements that address the perceived (health, environmental, etc.) threat in a more 
consensual manner, prior to enforcing said measure); Appellate Body Report, 
United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 
166–72, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Malaysia, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶¶ 119, 122, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 12, 1998) (affirming that measures 
must be applied equally to all Member States); John H. Knox, The Judicial 
Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 37 (2004) (explaining how the Appellate Body interpreted the chapeau as 
“giving it broad powers to strike a balance, or draw a ‘line of equilibrium,’ 
between the environmental interests protected by the specific exceptions in Article 
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arguably endeavored, in “good faith,” to engage in bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations to elevate evolving international 
chemicals management standards as it simultaneously sought 
to explain REACH to WTO Members.95 
C. SPECIFIC REACH-RELATED TRADE CONCERNS RAISED BY 
WTO TBT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 2004−2011 
As noted previously, at least thirty-four non-EU WTO Members 
have expressed specific trade concerns about the EU REACH 
regulation, pertaining mostly to its registration/data-gathering and 
notification obligations. These concerns are described below.  
1. REACH’s Hazard-Based Registration Requirement Is Overly 
Complex, Burdensome, and Costly  
At multiple TBT Committee meetings,96 WTO Member 
representatives of Argentina, Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, India, 
Thailand, and the United States alleged that REACH’s complex and 
detailed registration/data-gathering process requires the aggregation 
of massive amounts of data on a given chemical substance-based 
product97 without evidence of the risks it poses to human health or 
the environment.98 In their view, such treatment threatened to impose 
 
XX and the trade interests furthered by what it called the ‘substantive’ provisions 
of GATT”). 
 95. The EU is likely to emphasize that it had engaged in prior efforts to ensure 
that REACH was complementary to “international initiatives, such as the 
International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) HPV Program and the 
Globally Harmonized System (GHS)” and that “REACH [had] implemented a 
large number of the SAICM objectives (Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management).” See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 
March 2007, supra note 46, ¶ 37. “[T]he REACH proposal does not negatively 
affect the OECD Screening Information Data Set (SIDS) programme and the 
USA’s HPV programme.” EUR. CMTYS., supra note 45, at 7. 
 96. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 2–3 November 2010, supra 
note 83; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra 
note 83; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra note 
82; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004, supra note 83; TBT 
Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23 March 2004, supra note 83. 
 97. Substance-based products include substances, substance mixtures, and 
substance-containing articles. 
 98. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 76; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, 
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a “chilling effect”99 on the use, sale, and ultimate availability of any 
such substance.100 It would also impose significant burdens and costs 
upon non-EU manufacturers, formulators, and importers, especially 
SMEs, which could potentially render them noncompetitive in EU 
markets.101 They further emphasized that, although the ECHA 
regulation fees applicable to REACH compliance102 may have 
granted differential treatment to SMEs generally, they did not grant 
special and differential treatment to developing country SMEs.103  
2. EU Member States Engage in Inconsistent and Potentially 
Discriminatory Treatment of Substances (SVHCs) in Articles 
WTO representatives of Japan and the United States alleged at 
several TBT Committee meetings104 that the inconsistent treatment 
accorded by six EU Member States to imported SVHCs, including 
metal alloys, under REACH Article 7(2) was more burdensome and 
costly, and that it was also contrary to ECHA’s (and the EU 
Commission’s) stated interpretation of that provision.105 They also 
 
supra note 83, ¶ 89; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004, 
supra note 83, ¶ 46. 
 99. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra 
note 83, ¶ 112. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 40; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra 
note 83, ¶ 122; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004, supra 
note 83, ¶¶ 35–36, 44; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23 March 
2004, supra note 83, ¶ 31, 36–37. 
 102. See Commission Regulation 340/2008, arts. 3(4), 4(4), 5(4), 6(4), 7(1)–(2), 
8(3), 9(3), 10(2), 12, Annex I (tbl.2), Annex III (tbl.2), 2008 O.J. (107/6). 
 103. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 108; Commission Recommendation 2003/361, Concerning the 
Definition of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 2003 O.J. (L 124) 
Annex art. 2 (defining an SME). 
 104. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra note 
83; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra note 83; 
TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, supra note 83; 
TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, supra note 83. 
 105. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, supra note 
83, ¶ 38 (noting that Article 7(2) requires EU manufacturers and importers of 
articles to notify ECHA if articles containing more than 0.1% (by weight) of an 
SVHC placed on the candidate list are to be imported); EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, 
GUIDANCE ON REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTANCES IN ARTICLES § 2.2 (May 2008), 
http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13632/articles_en.pdf (setting forth the 
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sought clarification106 regarding how these inconsistent 
interpretations would affect non-EU manufacturers’ and importers’ 
REACH Article 33 supply chain communications obligation, and 
how ECHA would prevent EU Member State authorities from 
unilaterally halting importation and international trade flows of non-
EU products.107 Meanwhile, at other TBT Committee meetings,108 the 
WTO representatives of Chile, China, and the Russian Federation 
objected to uncertainty created109 by EU Member States (such as 
Germany) requiring the separate registration of each metal 
component of an alloy or mixture and the registration of semi-
finished steel slabs as “components” rather than as finished 
“articles,” contrary to a EUROFER trade association analysis110 with 
which ECHA had agreed.111 
3. REACH’s Monomer Registration Requirement Is Costly and 
Burdensome, Threatens IP, and Is Potentially Discriminatory 
WTO representatives of China, India, Japan, and the United States 
 
EU’s interpretation of Article 7(2)). 
 106. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 46; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 45; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 58. 
 107. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2009, supra 
note 83, ¶ 148–49. 
 108. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, 
supra note 83. 
 109. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 99. 
 110.  According to EUROFER’s reading of the ECHA Guidance on 
Requirements for Substances in Articles Version 1 1 (May 2008), “slabs, bars, 
billets and blooms made of steel alloys have article status under REACH” and thus 
could possibly be exempt from registration. See EUR. CONFEDERATION OF IRON & 
STEEL INDUS [EUROFER], EUROFER POSITION PAPER DETERMINING THE 
BORDERLINE BETWEEN PREPARATIONS/ARTICLES FOR STEEL AND STEEL 
PRODUCTS (2008) [hereinafter EUROFER POSITION PAPER], available at 
http://www.eurofer.org/index.php/eng/REACH/Documents-and-useful-web-links/ 
EUROFER-position-papers/Borderline-between-preparations-articles-for-steel-
and-steel-products (click on the first PDF). 
 111. See GUIDANCE ON REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTANCES IN ARTICLES, supra 
note 105, at 81–85; see also Letter from Andreas Herdina, Director for 
Cooperation, Eur. Chem. Agency, to Danny Croon, EUROFER (Sept. 2, 2009) 
(responding to issues raised by EUROFER on the application of REACH to steel 
and steel products). 
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questioned the logic and scientific necessity of the EU’s burdensome 
and costly requirement subjecting reacted monomers in polymers to 
registration under REACH Article 6(3) even though polymers 
themselves are exempt from registration under REACH Article 
2(9).112 Some of these objections had been raised despite the 
European Court of Justice’s July 2009 decision upholding the 
REACH monomer requirement in the face of an unsuccessful 
challenge brought by several European companies.113 The 
representatives were concerned that such registration costs and the 
risks posed to confidential and proprietary monomer manufacturing 
information, their intellectual property (“IP”), would make it more 
likely that non-EU manufacturers concerned about their IP would 
withdraw from the EU market114 and that non-EU distributors would 
switch to registration-compliant EC polymer suppliers who would 
consequently derive a competitive trade advantage from such 
rules.115  
4. Delayed and Confusing EU REACH Implementation Process 
Belies Lack of EU Institutional Capacity to Meet Regulatory Burdens 
WTO representatives of Australia, Chile, Switzerland, and the 
United States observed how the EU institutions vastly 
underestimated the volume of data that would be submitted incident 
 
 112. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 76, 79, 88; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 
June 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 42; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 
March 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 119. 
 113. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 Nov. 2010, supra note 
83, ¶ 104; Case C-558/07, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for the Envnt., Food and 
Rural Affairs, 2009 E.C.R. I-05783; Keith Nuthall, European Court Limits 
Monomers Controlled by REACH, PWR.COM (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.prw.com/subscriber/headlines2.html?id=1247477244; Nick Elliot, The 
EU’s ECJ Rejects First Legal Challenge to the Registration Requirements of the 
REACH Regulations, REED SMITH ENVTL. L. RESOURCE (July 27, 2009), 
http://www.environmentallawresource.com/tags/european-court-of-justice/. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) found compelling a prior advisory opinion 
rendered by the ECJ’s Advocate General. See KELLER & HECKMAN LLP, THE 
CASE BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE ON REGISTRATION OF 
MONOMERS IN POLYMERS UNDER REACH (2009), available at 
http://www.khlaw.com/showpublication.aspx?Show=2669. 
 114. KELLER & HECKMAN LLP, supra note 113. 
 115. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra 
note 83, ¶ 140. 
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to the REACH registration process and the number of requests made 
by non-EU stakeholders for clarification and technical assistance 
with respect to the REACH’s complex registration/data-gathering 
rules, including those relating to “only representatives.”116 They 
emphasized that the EU Commission and ECHA were therefore 
vastly underprepared to respond to such requests for purposes of 
ensuring compliance with and implementation of REACH, and to 
utilize such data in fulfillment of its underlying public policy 
objectives.117  
5. Non-EU Manufacturers Would Be Competitively Disadvantaged 
if Forced to Choose Between Importer and “Only Representative” 
Registration to Protect Their IP 
WTO representatives of Australia, Canada, Chile, and the United 
States alleged that REACH’s requirement that non-EU chemical 
substance-based products manufacturers must employ the services of 
either an EU-based importer (i.e., a customer) or an “only 
representative”118 to protect their intellectual property from EU 
competitors incident to registering their chemical substance-based 
products could place non-EU manufacturers at a “competitive 
disadvantage” in EU markets.119 They emphasized how the 
 
 116. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 55; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 46; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 64; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2008, supra note 83, ¶¶ 158–59. 
 117. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 55; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 45; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 
2008, supra note 83, ¶ 158. 
 118. “[An only representative is a] natural or legal person established outside the 
Community who manufactures a substance on its own, in preparation or in articles, 
formulates a preparation or produces an article that is imported into the 
Community may by mutual agreement appoint a natural or legal person established 
in the Community to fulfill, as his only representative, the obligations on importers 
under [Title II: Registration of Substances].” REACH, supra note 2, art. 8; see also 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 2.1.2 (explaining 
that an “only representative” is “established in the EU and appointed by a 
manufacturer, formulator or producer of an article established outside the EU to 
fulfil the obligations of importers (see section xx)”). 
 119. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 46; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 51; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 
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requirement imposed added costs and burdens, especially upon 
SMEs, which, unlike multinationals, are less likely to have a 
European presence120 or to know where to find a competent and 
reliable only representative,121 and which, consequently, are more 
inclined to navigate REACH alone or to abandon EU markets 
altogether.122  
6. REACH’s Mandatory Data-Sharing and SIEF Membership 
Potentially Places Non-EU Manufacturers  
at a Competitive Disadvantage 
WTO representatives of Canada, China, India, Japan, Thailand, 
and the United States described at several TBT Committee 
meetings123 how REACH’s SIEF participation requirement and 
REACH’s EU-based legal entity requirement potentially rendered 
non-EU chemical substance-based product manufacturers, especially 
those from developing countries,124 susceptible to exploitation and/or 
trade discrimination125 by EU-based companies operating the SIEFs 
 
2008, supra note 83, ¶ 160; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 
2008, supra note 82, ¶ 140. 
 120. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 153, 159, 176; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 
March 2008, supra note 83, ¶¶ 127–28. 
 121. ECHA was unwilling to provide such guidance. See DORIS THIEMANN, 
EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, THE ROLE OF AN “ONLY REPRESENTATIVE” ACCORDING TO 
THE REACH REGULATION 17 (2008), available at http://www.eurofer.org/ 
index.php/eng/Media/Files/The-role-of-an-Only-Representative-according-to-the-
REACH-Regulation; see also TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 
March 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 47; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 160. 
 122. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 48. 
 123. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 144; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 80; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 43; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 170; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 
March 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 170; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–
2 July 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 38; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 
July 2004, supra note 83, ¶¶ 41, 44. 
 124. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004, supra note 
83, ¶ 35. 
 125. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, supra note 
83, ¶ 38. 
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and the “voluntary” consortia that non-EU-based companies must 
join to fulfill their REACH information-sharing obligation.126 They 
also claimed that the absence of EU institutional oversight over the 
informal rules of the consortia127 and over SIEF governance and 
proprietary data-sharing128 and letter of access (“LoA”) negotiation 
protocols and procedures effectively provided lead SIEF EU-based 
registrants with control over the determination of testing costs, 
including vertebrate animal testing, and the costs of LoAs needed by 
non-EU SIEF participants to secure referral rights to robust study 
summaries for REACH registration purposes.129  
7. REACH’s Extra-Territorial Vertebrate Animal Testing 
Prohibition Imposes Unnecessary Burdens  
and Costs on Non-EU Manufacturers 
WTO representatives of Canada, China, and India expressed 
concerns about REACH’s extra-territorial imposition of the EU’s 
regional prohibition against vertebrate animal testing of chemical 
substances.130 These representatives observed that such a registration-
related obligation, when combined with the cost-intensive joint 
registration131 and SIEF information-sharing obligations, imposes 
unnecessary burdens and significant costs upon otherwise 
 
 126. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 51; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 183. 
 127. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004, supra note 
83, ¶ 44. 
 128. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 47; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 44–45; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 59. 
 129. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 146; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 80, 88–89; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 
June 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 43. 
 130. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 147; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 89; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004, 
supra note 83, ¶ 45. 
 131. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 45; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 60, 76; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 
2007, supra note 83, ¶ 26. 
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competitive non-EU chemical substance-based product 
manufacturers, especially SMEs, not otherwise subject to such a high 
cost structure in their home country jurisdictions.132 In addition, 
skepticism was expressed about whether the EU’s acceptance of the 
testing data provided by non-EU laboratories fulfilling ISO/IEC 
17025 General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and 
Calibration Laboratories133 would actually allow for the use within 
REACH registrations of data generated outside the EU.134  
8. REACH’s Delegation of Direct Enforcement and Penalty 
Responsibilities to EU Member States Yields Inconsistent and 
Potentially Discriminatory Treatment of Non-EU Manufacturers 
WTO representatives of China, Japan, Mexico, and the United 
States described how REACH’s delegation of registration 
compliance and enforcement responsibilities to EU Member States 
had resulted in non-uniform inspections, registration/data-gathering 
and presentation standards, and penalty impositions.135 They 
emphasized that these practices could potentially raise compliance 
burdens and costs for imports136 and consequently provide EU-based 
companies operating in those markets with a competitive trade 
advantage.137 For example, the United Kingdom and Poland had 
enacted different inspection procedures to confirm company 
compliance with REACH pre-registration requirements138 and, 
during one large-scale inspection, had demanded more information 
than was legally required under REACH.139 Meanwhile, one French 
 
 132. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1 July 2004, supra note 
83, ¶ 45. 
 133. Id. ¶ 46. 
 134. Id. ¶ 44. 
 135. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 150; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 50; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 171; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 134. 
 136. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra 
note 83, ¶ 176. 
 137. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 162–63. 
 138. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 57. 
 139. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
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law established excessively high civil monetary and criminal 
sanctions for REACH non-compliance140 that were arguably WTO-
inconsistent.141  
9. EU’s Adoption and Implementation of REACH May Not Satisfy 
EU’s WTO Obligation to Accord Special and Differential Treatment 
to Developing Countries 
During TBT Committee meetings convened between March 2007 
and March 2011, especially those immediately prior to the close of 
the first REACH pre-registration period for phase-in substances, 
fourteen developing country WTO Member governments alleged that 
the EU had failed to provide adequate REACH registration-related 
technical assistance.142 While eleven governments had framed the 
issue of technical assistance in terms of developing country “special 
and differential” circumstances,143 Argentina,144 Chile,145 and Cuba146 
 
note 83, ¶ 150. 
 140. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra 
note 83, ¶ 171. 
 141. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 55; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 73; see also Case C-265/10, Eur. Comm’n v. King of Belg., 2011 
E.C.R., available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ%3AC%3A2011%3A186%3A0008%3A0008%3Aen%3APDF (demonstrating 
which infringements of REACH result in a failure to fulfill that charter's 
obligations); REACH Penalties: Belgium Found Guilty, ACTIO BLOG (May 9, 
2011), http://www.actio.net/default/index.cfm/actio-blog/reach-penalties-belgium-
found-guilty/ (explaining that imposing particularly high REACH compliance fines 
can constitute a breach of REACH). 
 142. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 146; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 32. 
 143. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 97 (Venezuela); TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–
25 March 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 48 (El Salvador); TBT Committee Minutes for 
the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 192; TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, supra note 83, ¶¶ 146, 150, 156, 165, 167, 
169 (Qatar, Egypt, Botswana, Indonesia); TBT Committee Minutes for the 
Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, supra note 83, ¶¶ 35, 40, 52 (Mexico, China, South 
Africa); TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 9 November 2007, supra note 
83, ¶ 33 (Chinese Taipei); TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 
2007, supra note 83, ¶ 46 (Brazil). 
 144. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 142; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 39; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 
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discussed this issue most extensively. In their view: 1) the complex 
explanatory guides, websites, and other information developed by the 
EC as REACH pre-registration implementation tools were not 
helpful;147 2) ECHA’s and the EC’s possible capacity limitations148 
gave rise to delayed and unsatisfactory responses to non-EC and 
developing country questions and technical-assistance requests;149 
and 3) consequently, such EU assistance and guidance did not satisfy 
 
2010, supra note 83, ¶ 40; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 56; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 
25–26 June 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 92; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 
18–19 March 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 178; TBT Committee Minutes for the 
Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 155; TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 33; TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 110; TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 9 November 2007, supra note 83, ¶ 27. 
 145. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 55; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 47; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 64; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 161; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 
1–2 July 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 41; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 
March 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 132; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 9 
November 2007, supra note 83, ¶ 34; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 
21 March 2007, supra note 83, ¶ 49. 
 146. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 49; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 45; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 189; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 
2008, supra note 83, ¶ 48. 
 147. Argentina emphasized the barrier to trade and lack of transparency. See 
TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23 June 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 39; 
TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 
40; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra note 83, 
¶ 178. Chile described the regulation as complex and confusing, expressing similar 
concerns to Argentina. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 
June 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 55; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 64. Cuba further noted the difficulty compliance 
poses for developing countries. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–
4 November 2010, supra note 83, ¶ 96. 
 148. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 161 (Chile); TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 
2008, supra note 83, ¶ 32 (Argentina). 
 149. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra 
note 83, ¶ 178; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 155; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 32; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 110. 
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the EU’s WTO obligation to accord special and differential treatment 
to developing countries and their industries.150 
III.ANALYSIS OF RECENT WTO TBT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. OVERVIEW AND PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
During the past year, the WTO issued three decisions interpreting 
the nondiscrimination and unnecessary-obstacle-to-trade provisions 
of the TBT Agreement. In each of these “cases of first 
impression,”151 the complainants had alleged that behind-the-border 
NTMs, such as those related to public health and the environment, 
constituted NTBs.152 These three cases include: 1) United States—
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes 
(US—Clove Cigarettes);153 2) United States—Measures Concerning 
the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
(US—Tuna II (Mexico));154 and 3) United States—Certain Country of 
 
 150. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra 
note 83, ¶ 189; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 155 (Argentina). 
 151. See Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Production and 
Sale of Clove Cigarettes (“US-Clove Cigarettes”), ¶¶ 7.80, 7.81, 7.631, 
WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report]; 
Panel Report, United States — Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) 
Requirements, WT/DS384/R, WT/DS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter US — 
COOL Panel Report]. 
 152. See OECD TRADE POLICY STUDIES, supra note 22, at 13 (explaining that 
NTBs can serve important regulatory purposes; however, the measures must be at 
appropriate levels such that trade is not restricted more than necessary). 
 153. See US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 1.1, 2.6 
(challenging the U.S. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
(“FSPTCA”), the policy objective of which is to reduce youth smoking rates across 
U.S. communities); 21 U.S.C. § 387(g) (2009) (endeavoring to achieve this 
objective by imposing a ban on the production and trade of cigarettes and 
component parts, including the tobacco, filter, or paper, containing a flavor, herb, 
or spice that provides a characterizing flavor to the product). 
 154. See Panel Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter US — Tuna Panel Report]. In US—Tuna II (Mexico), Mexico 
challenged several U.S. measures collectively deemed a “technical regulation” for 
TBT Agreement purposes. See id. ¶ 7.24. These consisted of a U.S. federal statute 
(the U.S. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (“DPCIA”)), U.S. federal 
regulations implementing the DPCIA (50 C.F.R. 216.91–92), and the 2007 U.S. 
federal case ruling in Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 
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Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (US—COOL).155 All three 
Panel decisions were subsequently appealed and resulted in final 
“clarifying” Appellate Body rulings.156 Although these rulings have 
had mixed results for the governments involved—the United States 
losing important issues in all three cases—they provide valuable 
insights into how WTO tribunals perceive the evolving relationship 
between a sovereign WTO Member’s right to regulate and its 
simultaneous obligation to prevent the use of technical requirements 
as discriminatory or unnecessary barriers to trade. 
In general, a measure may be challenged in a WTO dispute 
settlement proceeding “as such,” “as applied,” or in both manners.157 
A measure may be evaluated “as such” by reviewing the measure as 
written—”on its face”—to see whether the text of the measure itself 
 
2007), (the “Hogarth Ruling”). See id. ¶ 2.1. The DPCIA’s objectives were to 
promote dolphin protection through encouragement of changed fishing areas and 
practices and to prevent against consumer deception caused by misrepresentative 
“dolphin-safe” labels being affixed to tuna products caught in a manner adversely 
affecting dolphins. See id. ¶¶ 7.407–7.408, 7.414. 
 155. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.61, 7.620. In US—
COOL, Canada and Mexico challenged several U.S. country-of-origin labeling 
(“COOL”) measures collectively deemed a “technical regulation” for TBT 
Agreement purposes, the objective of which was “to provide as much clear and 
accurate origin information as possible to consumers.” See id. ¶¶ 7.61, 7.620. They 
consisted of one federal statute (the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as 
amended by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (“Farm Bill 
2002”) and the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (“Farm Bill 2008”)); 
one federal agency (the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Agricultural 
Marketing Service (“AMS”)) final implementing regulation; two of USDA AMS’s 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (“FSIS”) interim final implementing 
regulations; related further implementing guidance, directives, and policy 
announcements; and a letter from the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to a member of 
industry recommending additional voluntary labeling. See id. ¶¶ 2.2–2.3, 7.9–7.10. 
 156. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15; 
Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter US — Tuna Appellate Body Report]; Appellate Body Report, United 
States — Certain Country of Origin Labeling (‘COOL’) Requirements, 
WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (June 29, 2012) [hereinafter US — COOL 
Appellate Body Report]. 
 157. See Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, ¶ 156, 
WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002); see also Appellate Body Report, United States 
— Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel 
Flat Products from Japan, ¶ 82, WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter US 
— Japanese Steel Appellate Body Report]. 
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violates WTO rules. Alternatively, or in addition, a measure may be 
evaluated “as applied” by reviewing the application of its text in 
practice, irrespective of whether the text itself is consistent with 
WTO law. The WTO analysis of a measure “as applied” initially 
focuses on two factors: 1) whether the measure’s application results 
in a legally binding obligation, such as a prohibition that bans the 
market authorization of foreign manufactured products unless certain 
preconditions are first satisfied; and 2) whether the facts demonstrate 
that the measure’s application is inconsistent with a provision of a 
WTO-covered Agreement (e.g., the TBT Agreement).158  
The discussion that follows is intended to serve as a preliminary 
template against which to apply the analytical framework that has 
been proposed for evaluating the EU REACH regulation introduced 
in the next section of this article. Practitioners should recognize that 
a significant amount of anecdotal, empirical, and statistical evidence 
is required to successfully challenge a disputed technical regulation 
at the WTO. When undertaking this type of investigation, it must be 
remembered that the objective of the TBT Agreement, the GATT 
1994, or any of the other applicable covered WTO agreements “is 
not to remove these measures but to ensure that they are set at an 
appropriate level to achieve legitimate objectives with minimum 
impact on trade.”159 
B. ELEMENTS OF A POTENTIAL CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER KEY 
PROVISIONS OF THE TBT AGREEMENT  
1. Does the Disputed Measure Qualify as a “Technical Regulation” 
Within the Meaning of TBT Annex 1? 
A given measure will be subject to the provisions of the TBT 
Agreement if it qualifies either as a “technical regulation” or a 
“standard,” as defined by TBT Annexes 1.1 and 1.2. TBT Annex 1.2 
provides that “technical regulations [are defined] as mandatory 
documents,” and standards as voluntary . . . documents.”160 TBT 
Annex 1.1 describes a technical regulation as a “[d]ocument which 
lays down [either] product characteristics or their related processes 
 
 158. See US — Japanese Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 157, ¶ 92–93. 
 159. OECD TRADE POLICY STUDIES, supra note 22, at 13. 
 160. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1.2. 
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and production methods, including the applicable administrative 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.”161 
a. Technical Regulation Three-Part Test 
A document must meet each of the following three criteria, 
“derived from the wording of the definition in Annex 1.1,” to fall 
within the definition of a technical regulation: 
First, the document must apply to an “identifiable” product or group of 
products. The identifiable product or group of products need not, 
however, be expressly identified in the document. Second, the document 
must lay down one or more characteristics of the product. These product 
characteristics may be intrinsic or they may be related to the product. 
They may be prescribed or imposed in either a positive or negative form. 
Third, compliance with the product characteristics must be mandatory.162 
The first criterion has been recognized as underlying a WTO 
Member’s core obligation under TBT Article 2.9.2, namely, to notify 
other members “of the products to be covered” by a proposed 
technical regulation.163 However, a document needn’t explicitly 
mention a product for that product to be identifiable. “The 
identifiable product coverage of a measure can also be determined 
according to the substance of the measure at issue.”164  
The second criterion has been interpreted as incorporating a rather 
broad scope of product characteristics. They can include any 
“definable ‘features’, ‘qualities’, ‘attributes’ or other ‘distinguishing 
mark’ of a product.”165 This means that characteristics can relate 
directly to the “features and qualities intrinsic to the product itself,” 
as well as indirectly to the means by which products are identified, 
presented, and made to appear.166 In addition, it is also helpful to 
 
 161. Id. Annex 1.1. 
 162. Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Trade Description of 
Sardines, ¶176, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) (quotations added) [hereinafter 
EC — Sardines Appellate Body Report]; see also Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, ¶¶ 66–70 WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC — Asbestos 
Appellate Body Report]; US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.58; US — 
COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.147. 
 163. See EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 70. 
 164. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.201. 
 165. EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 67. 
 166. See id. 
  
528 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
consider whether the provision that constitutes the essence of the 
measure addresses a product characteristic, and whether the 
obligations set out by the measure are closely related to an essential 
function.167 
For a measure to be considered “mandatory,” consistent with the 
third criterion, it must “lay down . . . set forth, stipulate or provide 
[the] characteristics,” (e.g., qualities or attributes) “of products in a 
binding or compulsory fashion” or “ha[ve] the effect of prescribing 
or imposing” them.168 Because a measure may “include both 
prohibitive and permissive elements,” it must therefore be “examined 
as an integrated whole, taking into account, as appropriate, the 
prohibitive and the permissive elements that are part of it.”169 In 
evaluating the mandatory nature of a given measure, it is also helpful 
to consider the following indicia:  
• Whether the measure is composed of classic legal instruments 
that are legally binding under the law of the home country 
jurisdiction;170  
• Whether the measure uses the word “shall” in laying down its 
requirements;171  
• Whether the measure is supported by an “enforcement” 
mechanism that foresees the possibility of imposing a 
fine/penalty in the event of noncompliance;172 and  
• Whether the measure consistently refers to its core 
requirement as a “mandatory” requirement.173 
For example, the Panel in US—COOL concluded that a series of 
U.S. measures imposing country-of-origin labeling (“COOL”) 
requirements for meat products consisting inter alia of statutory and 
 
 167. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.212. 
 168. EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶¶ 67–69. 
 169. Id. ¶¶ 64, 75. 
 170. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.157. 
 171. Id. ¶ 7.158. As the US—COOL Panel noted, the use of the word “shall” is 
indicative of mandatory compliance. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 
151, ¶ 7.160; EC — Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 194, 
n.111. 
 172. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.159. 
 173. Id. ¶¶ 7.160–7.161 (citing EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 162, ¶ 72). 
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regulatory instruments174 satisfied each of these criteria and, thus, 
qualified as a “technical regulation” within the meaning of TBT 
Annex 1. Notably, the United States did not indicate in its 
notification of appeal its intention to challenge this portion of the 
Panel’s decision.175 Concerning the first criterion, the Panel found 
that, although the COOL measure “identifie[d] inter alia beef and 
pork as part of the covered commodities, [its] country of origin 
labelling requirement [was] also applied to and thus enforceable 
against . . . upstream suppliers of meat products [which was] 
indispensable for retailers’ effective compliance with the . . . COOL 
[measure’s] main country of origin labeling obligation.”176 It also 
found that other provisions “explicitly reference[d] livestock in 
defining ‘beef’ as ‘meat produced from cattle’, and ‘pork’ as ‘meat 
produced from hogs.’”177 Consequently, the Panel ruled:  
[T]he COOL measure applies to an identifiable product or group of 
products within the meaning of [TBT] Annex 1.1 . . . namely (i) beef and 
pork, either as muscle cuts or in ground form; and (ii) livestock (i.e. cattle 
and hogs), which are the input products necessary to develop the beef and 
pork products explicitly covered by the COOL measure.178  
With respect to second criterion, the US—COOL Panel found that 
“country of origin labelling [was] the essence of the COOL measure” 
and “that the obligations set out by the COOL measure, including the 
information requirement . . . [were] closely related to this essential 
function.”179 Its conclusion was in accord with a prior WTO Panel 
that had ruled that “an explicit requirement to indicate country of 
origin on the label of a product is indeed a labelling requirement for 
purposes of the definition of ‘technical regulation.’”180  
 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 170–173. 
 175. See Notification of an Appeal by the United States, US — Certain Country 
of Origin (COOL) Labeling Requirements, WT/DS384/12, WT/DS386/11 (Mar. 
28, 2012); see also USTR to Appeal WTO Country of Origin Labeling Ruling, 
DELTA FARM PRESS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://deltafarmpress.com/markets/ustr-
appeal-wto-country-origin-labeling-ruling. 
 176. US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.205. 
 177. Id. ¶ 7.206. 
 178. Id. ¶ 7.207. 
 179. Id. ¶ 7.212. 
 180. Id. ¶ 7.213 (citing Panel Report, European Communities — Protection of 
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs, Complaint by Australia, ¶¶ 7.447–7.448, 7.452 WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 
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Lastly, the US—COOL Panel determined that the disputed COOL 
measure satisfied the third criterion because:  
• The measure was “composed of classic legal instruments that 
[were] legally binding in US law”;181  
• Its “core country of origin labelling requirement . . . us[ed] the 
word ‘shall’’’ and the “COOL statute also use[d] the word 
‘shall’ in laying down the requirement for ‘any person engaged 
in the business of supplying a covered commodity to a retailer’ 
to provide country of origin information to retailers”;182  
• “[T]he COOL measure [was] supported by an ‘enforcement’ 
mechanism” pursuant to which a ”‘violation’ of the above 
obligations by a retailer or by any other person engaged in the 
business of supplying a covered commodity to a 
retailer . . . [could result in] the Secretary of Agriculture 
imposing a ‘fine’”;183 and  
• “[T]he COOL statute refers to the core country of origin 
labelling requirement as ‘the mandatory country of origin 
requirement’” and “the 2009 Final Rule (AMS) contains the 
word ‘mandatory’ in its very title, and consistently refers to 
the essence of the COOL measure as ‘mandatory COOL.’”184 
2. Is the Disputed Technical Regulation Trade-Discriminatory and 
Thus Inconsistent with the National Treatment Obligation of TBT 
Article 2.1? 
a. Generally 
TBT Article 2.1 provides:  
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products 
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and 
to like products originating in any other country.185 
 
2005)). 
 181. Id. ¶ 7.157. 
 182. Id. ¶¶ 7.157–7.158. 
 183. Id. ¶ 7.159. 
 184. Id. ¶ 7.161. 
 185. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.1. 
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The WTO Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes emphasized 
that TBT Article 2.1 must be interpreted in light of the TBT 
Agreement’s text and its overall purpose.186 The Preamble to the 
TBT Agreement strongly suggests that “the object and purpose of the 
TBT Agreement is to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the 
objective of trade liberalization and, on the other hand, Members’ 
right to regulate.”187 In the Appellate Body’s view, the TBT 
Agreement’s “fifth recital reflects the trade-liberalization objective 
of the TBT Agreement by expressing the ‘desire’ that technical 
regulations, technical standards, and conformity assessment 
procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.”188 Further, the Preamble’s sixth recital suggests that 
“Members have a right to use technical regulations in pursuit of their 
legitimate objectives, provided that they do so in an even-handed 
manner and in a manner that is otherwise in accordance with the 
provisions of the TBT Agreement.”189 In other words,  
Members’ right to regulate should not be constrained if the measures 
taken are necessary to fulfill certain legitimate policy objectives, and 
provided that they are not applied in a manner that would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with 
the provisions of the Agreement.190  
Furthermore, the Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes 
recognized that the TBT Agreement, by virtue of its second recital,191 
is linked to the GATT 1994,192 which similarly strives to achieve a 
balance between Article III’s national treatment and other obligations 
and the general exceptions provision of Article XX.193 However, 
 
 186. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 173. 
 187. Id. ¶ 7.174. 
 188. Id. ¶ 7.92. 
 189. Id. ¶ 7.95 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. (emphasis added). 
 191. See id. ¶ 7.91. 
 192. See id. “The second recital of the preamble links the two Agreements by 
expressing the ‘desire’ ‘to further the objectives of the GATT 1994’ . . . .” Id. ¶ 
109. 
 193. See id. ¶¶ 7.96, 7.108. “The second recital indicates that the TBT 
Agreement expands on pre-existing GATT disciplines and emphasizes that the two 
Agreements should be interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner.” Id. ¶ 7.91. 
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TBT Article 2.1 has a much narrower focus than GATT Article III.194  
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement is recognized as containing both 
a national treatment and a most-favored nation treatment 
obligation.195 A technical regulation will be deemed inconsistent with 
the national treatment obligation of TBT Article 2.1 if it accords like 
“products imported from the territory of any Member . . . treatment 
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin 
and to like products originating in any other country.”196 The 
complainant bears the burden under TBT Article 2.1 of establishing 
prima facie that the treatment accorded to imported products is “less 
favorable” than that accorded “like” domestic products or “like” 
products originating in any other country.197 This burden is satisfied 
with a showing that the disputed measure is not even-handed.198  
b. ‘Like’ Products Four-Part Test 
The “likeness” of imported and domestic products should 
generally be determined on a case-by-case basis pursuant to four 
general criteria199: “(a) the properties, nature and quality of the 
products; (b) the end-uses of the products; (c) consumers’ tastes and 
habits—more comprehensively termed consumers’ perceptions and 
behavior—in respect of the products; and (d) the tariff classification 
of the products.”200  
 
 194. TBT Article 2.1 “applies only in respect of technical regulations . . . .” Id. ¶ 
7.97. “[T]echnical regulations are in principle subject not only to Article 2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement, but also to the national treatment obligation of…[GATT] Article 
III:4 . . . as ‘laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use’ of products.” Id. ¶ 7.100. 
 195. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 87; 
see also US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 267 (“The MFN 
treatment obligation prohibits discrimination through technical regulations among 
like products imported from different countries, while the national treatment 
obligation prohibits discrimination between domestic and imported like 
products.”). 
 196. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.1 (emphasis added); see also US — 
Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.74. 
 197. See US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 216 (citing US 
— Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 182). 
 198. See id. 
 199. See EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶¶ 102–03 
(recognizing, however, that Panels possess and should exercise the authority and 
discretion to examine all “relevant” evidence). 
 200. US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.121–7.123 
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However, prior to undertaking this examination, it is first 
necessary to identify the domestic and imported products that must 
be compared, which may in part be gleaned from the disputants’ 
references to, identification of, and/or description of the products.201 
The Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes advised Panels to 
construe the concept of “likeness” broadly to avoid excluding from 
comparison products that are in a sufficiently strong competitive 
relationship.202  
In US—Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body found that the 
likeness of imported and domestic products, within the context of 
TBT Article 2.1, should be determined based on the competitive 
relationship between and among the products, and not based on the 
legitimate objectives and purposes of the technical regulation, which 
can distort that competitive relationship.203 Nevertheless, the 
Appellate Body also concluded, “the regulatory concerns underlying 
a measure, such as the health risks associated with a given product, 
may be relevant to an analysis of . . . ‘likeness’ . . . [under both 
GATT 1994 Article III:4 and TBT Article 2.1] . . . to the extent they 
have an impact on the competitive relationship between and among 
 
(citing EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶¶ 101–03); see 
also Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), 
GATT B.I.S.D. 18S/97; US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 
15, ¶ 189. In Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body took note that both clove and 
menthol cigarettes were classified under the same six-digit HS Subheading 
2402.20. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 159 
(citing US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.239). 
 201. See US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.124–7.131, 
7.141. 
 202. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 116. 
 203. Id. ¶ 112. The Appellate Body reasoned that such an approach was justified 
for two reasons. First, “measures often pursue a multiplicity of objectives, which 
are not always easily discernible from the text or even from the design, 
architecture, and structure of the measure . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 113–15. Second, by focusing 
on the objectives of a measure rather than on the nature of the competitive 
relationship between and among imported and domestic products, Panels would 
effectively narrow Member States’ autonomy to regulate, as they would be 
compelled eventually to choose which from among a given measure’s objectives 
should prevail in a “likeness” or “treatment no less favorable” determination. Id. ¶ 
115. But see id. ¶ 117 (“[I]n concluding that the determination of likeness should 
not be based on the regulatory purposes of technical regulations, we are not 
suggesting that the regulatory concerns underlying technical regulations may not 
play a role in the determination of whether or not products are like.”). 
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the products concerned.”204 The first three of the four likeness criteria 
are discussed below. 
i. Compare the Physical Properties of Competing Products 
The physical characteristics of a product should be thoroughly 
examined to assess the extent to which products share common or 
display distinct physical properties that are likely to influence their 
competitive relationship in the marketplace.205 This means that, while 
each of the criteria must be separately analyzed, they can be and 
often are interrelated. For example, “the physical properties of a 
product may also influence how the product can be used, consumer 
attitudes about the product, and tariff classification.”206 “In EC – 
Asbestos, the Appellate Body found that, in examining whether 
products are like, panels must evaluate all relevant evidence, 
including evidence relating to the health risks associated with a 
product, which was the underlying [‘regulatory’] concern of the 
challenged measure in that dispute,”207 and which was ultimately 
found to influence consumer tastes and preferences.  
EC—Asbestos involved a disputed French prohibition against 
asbestos and products containing asbestos.208 Said measure blocked 
importation of Canadian chrysotile asbestos fiber tiles but exempted 
“certain existing materials, products or devices containing chrysotile 
fibre . . . that pose[d] a lesser occupational health risk than chrysotile 
fibre to workers handling those materials, products or devices” 
while “provid[ing] all technical guarantees of safety corresponding to 
the ultimate purpose of the use thereof.”209 The Appellate Body 
reversed the Panel’s finding that the banned Canadian tiles and the 
exempted French non-asbestos fiber PCG210 were “like” products 
within the meaning of GATT Article III:4 because of their perceived 
similar end-uses. The Appellate Body reasoned that the Panel had 
 
 204. Id. ¶ 119 (emphasis added) (citing EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, 
supra note 162, ¶ 113–14, 122). 
 205. See EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 114. 
 206. US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.151–7.153. 
 207. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 118 
(emphasis added). 
 208. See EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 1. 
 209. Id. ¶ 2. 
 210. See id. ¶ 16. PCGs collectively refers to polyvinyl alcohol fibres, cellulose, 
and glass fibres. See id. ¶ 84. 
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erred because it had failed to “evaluate all relevant evidence” and, 
thus, to fully take into account the physical properties of the 
chrysotile asbestos tiles, including their “molecular structure, 
chemical composition, and fibrillation capacity . . . .”211 In the 
Appellate Body’s view, this product characteristic was “important 
because the microscopic particles and filaments of chrysotile 
asbestos fibres [had been shown to be] carcinogenic in humans, 
following inhalation.”212 Such a finding could prove “the product 
toxic or otherwise dangerous to health.”213 Consequently, by 
“excluding the health risks associated with chrysotile asbestos fibres 
from its examination of the physical properties of that product,” the 
Panel had omitted “a highly significant physical difference” and “a 
defining aspect of the physical properties of chrysotile asbestos 
fibres.”214  
Furthermore, the Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos determined 
that, where evidence relating to the properties of compared products 
reflects that such products are quite physically distinct, the 
complainant bears a “higher burden” to overcome the “indication 
that [those] products are not ‘like’ . . . .”215 In that event, the 
complaining party must “establish that, despite the pronounced 
physical differences, there is a competitive relationship between the 
products such that all of the evidence, taken together, demonstrates 
that the products are ‘like’. . . .”216 As a result, Canada was required, 
but was unable, “to show, under the second and third criteria, that the 
chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibres [were] in such a competitive 
relationship.”217  
ii. Identify the End-Uses of Competing Products 
The “end-uses” of a product are often considered in relation to 
their influence on “consumer tastes and habits.” “End-uses” are 
defined by “the extent to which products are capable of performing 
 
 211. See id. ¶¶ 113–14. 
 212. Id. ¶ 114. 
 213. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 118. 
 214. EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 114–16 
(emphasis added). 
 215. Id. ¶ 118. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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the same, or similar functions,” whereas, “consumer tastes and 
habits” are defined as “the extent to which consumers are willing to 
use the products to perform these functions.”218 While consumer 
preference may result in the use of fewer than all of a product’s 
multiple functions, it does not affect the capability of the product to 
perform those other functions. In other words, an end-use 
(performance capability) of a product does not cease to exist for 
likeness determination purposes merely because consumers choose, 
as a matter of preference, not to pursue it.219 “[W]hat matters in 
determining a product’s end-use is that a product is capable of 
performing it, not that such end-use represents the principal or the 
most common end-use of that product.”220 In US—Clove Cigarettes, 
the Appellate Body counseled Panels against forming too narrow of a 
picture of the various end-uses of a product, as this could distort a 
product likeness determination. “[I]t is only by forming a complete 
picture of the various end-uses of a product that a panel can assess 
the significance of the fact that products share a limited number of 
end-uses.”221 
iii. Identify Consumer Tastes  
and Habits Regarding Competing Products 
The Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes found that, although 
end-uses and consumer tastes and preferences are, in principle, 
distinct likeness criteria that should be examined separately, they 
could nevertheless be interrelated.222 For example, the functional use 
of clove cigarettes could be, based upon consumer tastes, either to 
satisfy an addiction to nicotine or to create a pleasurable experience 
associated with the taste of the cigarette and the aroma of the smoke. 
 
 218. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 125 
(second emphasis added); see also US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra 
note 151, ¶ 7.191. 
 219. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 125. 
 220. Id. ¶ 131. 
 221. Id. ¶¶ 128–29. Since the US—Clove Cigarettes Panel had not looked 
beyond “smoking” as the common function between menthol and clove cigarettes, 
the Appellate Body concluded that the Panel had failed to perform a 
comprehensive enough review of potential “end-uses” to provide sufficient 
guidance on the issue of “likeness” (though such determination was not ultimately 
found to be fatal to the Panel’s “likeness” determination). See id. ¶¶ 129–32, 158. 
 222. See id. ¶¶ 125–26. 
  
2013] REACH REVISITED 537 
The Appellate Body therefore found that evidence relating to these 
uses could be mutually substituted and potentially fall under one or 
both criteria.223 The “substitutability” of products comprises one 
aspect of consumer tastes and habits.  
The Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes ruled that products 
need not be substitutable for all consumers, and they need not 
actually compete in the entire market.224 It found that it is sufficient 
to demonstrate that comparable products are highly substitutable for 
some consumers but not for others, with the inference being that they 
actually compete directly in at least one or more market segments.225 
However, in the Appellate Body’s view, the determination of 
whether competition needs to take place in the whole market or may 
be limited to a segment of the market, is to be considered separately 
from the determination of whether there is a necessary degree of 
competition in a given market segment required to satisfy the 
standards of “directly competitive or substitutable products” and 
“like products.”226  
The Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes noted how the 
Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos had ruled that “the health risks 
associated with chrysotile asbestos fibres [had] influenced the 
behaviour of both manufacturers (who incorporate fibres into another 
product) and ultimate consumers.”227 It also “noted that a 
manufacturer [could] not ignore the preferences of the ultimate 
 
 223. See id. ¶¶ 126–27. Furthermore, the Appellate Body in US—Clove 
Cigarettes found that the US—Clove Cigarettes Panel, by excluding adult smokers 
from its evaluation, had incorrectly confined its analysis of consumer tastes and 
habits only to young consumers and young potential smokers who were the target 
of the regulation, the objective of which was to reduce youth smoking. See id. ¶ 
137. In the Appellate Body’s view, “the Panel should have assessed the tastes and 
habits of all relevant consumers of the products at issue [to evaluate the degree of 
substitutability among these products].” Id. ¶¶ 137–39 (emphasis added). 
 224. In light of the US—Clove Cigarettes Panel’s limited analysis of consumer 
tastes and habits, the Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes considered the 
degree of substitutability necessary to ensure an overall finding of “likeness” 
between clove and menthol cigarettes under TBT Article 2.1. See id. ¶ 139. 
 225. See id. ¶ 142 (discussing Appellate Body Report, Philippines — Taxes on 
Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2011)). 
 226. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 143–
45, 157. 
 227. Id. ¶ 118, n.294 (emphasis added) (citing EC — Asbestos Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 162, ¶ 122). 
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consumers of a product and, [that] if the risks posed by a particular 
product [were] sufficiently great, the ultimate consumers [could] 
simply cease to buy that product.”228 
c. “Treatment No Less Favorable” Two-Part Test 
Once groups of “like” imported and domestic products have been 
identified, a disputed technical regulation must then be analyzed to 
determine whether it accords “less favorable treatment” to imported 
products than to “like” domestic products, taking into account the 
risk of nonfulfillment of the legitimate objective underlying the 
measure.229 The complaining party bears the burden of proof in 
establishing such treatment.230 The following subsections refer to the 
several elements of a “treatment no less favorable” analysis. 
i. Identify Comparable Product Scope of Imported  
and Domestic Products  
TBT Article 2.1 requires that a “treatment no less favorable” 
analysis broadly focus on comparing the “treatment accorded to 
products imported from the complaining Member . . . with that 
accorded to like domestic products and like products of any other 
origin.”231 At the very least, “domestic products [must] stand in a 
sufficiently close competitive relationship with the products 
imported from the complaining Member to be considered ‘like’ 
products” for purposes of the “treatment no less favorable” test of 
TBT Article 2.1.232 In addition, “the universe of domestic products 
that are like the products imported from the complaining Member” 
must also be ascertained, keeping in mind the “nature and extent of 
the competitive relationship between the products” in the regulating 
Member’s market.233  
According to the Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes, such a 
“universe” inquiry could, temporally speaking, extend back in time 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. See US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.249. 
 230. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 272; US — 
Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 216. 
 231. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 190 
(emphasis added). 
 232. Id. ¶ 191 (internal quotations added). 
 233. Id. ¶ 192. 
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to enable a Panel to consider evidence pre-dating the Panel’s 
establishment “to the extent such evidence informs the [P]anel’s 
assessment of the consistency of the measure at that point in time.”234 
It observed that “[n]othing in Article 2.1 enjoins a [P]anel[]” from 
taking this approach, especially “in the case of a de facto 
discrimination claim where a [P]anel must base its determination on 
the totality of facts and circumstances before it, including the design, 
architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application of the 
technical regulation at issue.”235  
ii. Compare All “Like” Imported Products  
with All “Like” Domestic Products to Determine Detrimental Less 
Favorable Treatment  
The Appellate Body in US—Clove Cigarettes recognized the 
unique nature of technical regulations as compared to other laws, 
regulations, and requirements in applying the “treatment no less 
favourable” standard of Article 2.1, which prohibits both de jure and 
de facto “less favorable treatment” for “like” imported products.236 It 
 
 234. Id. ¶ 206. 
 235. Id. The Appellate Body deemed such an approach valid because it would 
have effectively enabled the US—Clove Cigarettes Panel to consider evidence 
showing that the disputed U.S. measure had imposed a “chilling effect” upon 
foreign producers prior to its entry into force. Id. 
 236. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 175; 
US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.287, 7.299. The 
“treatment no less favorable” analysis under TBT Article 2.1 is largely consistent 
with that required by GATT Article III:4, while recognizing the unique nature of 
technical regulations as compared to “other laws, regulations and requirements.” 
Both provisions contain a national treatment obligation that draws no distinctions 
between de jure (direct, explicit in law) and de facto (indirect/having the effect of) 
discrimination. See Thomas Cottier & Mathias Oesch, Direct and Indirect 
Discrimination in WTO Law and EU Law 5 (NCCR Trade Regulation, Working 
Paper No. 2011/16, 2011), available at http://www.nccr-trade.org/fileadmin/user_ 
upload/nccr-trade.ch/hi/CottierOeschNCCRWP16.pdf. Under GATT Article III:4, 
a “treatment no less favorable” analysis “must be grounded in a close scrutiny of 
the ‘fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself’” and “on a careful analysis 
of the contested measure and of its implications in the marketplace . . . . [Such 
analysis] need not be based on the actual effects of the contested measure in the 
marketplace.” US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.438–7.439 
(emphasis added). In other words, “the absence of ‘actual trade effects’ of a 
measure does not prevent a Member from bringing a successful claim of violation 
under the covered agreements.” See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 
7.440 (emphasis added). 
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ruled that TBT Article 2.1 does not prohibit regulatory distinctions 
between products found to be “like,” provided that the group of 
“like” products imported from the complaining “Member is treated 
no less favourably than the group of domestic like products.”237 TBT 
Article 2.1 will tolerate any type of regulatory distinction between 
like products “as long as treatment accorded to the group of imported 
products is no less favourable than that accorded to the group of like 
domestic products.”238  
The Appellate Body reasoned that, since technical regulations, by 
their very nature, establish distinctions between products according 
to their characteristics and related process and production methods 
(“PPMs”), TBT Article 2.1 should not be interpreted to mean that 
just any regulatory distinction, particularly those based exclusively 
on product characteristics or related PPMs, provides less favorable 
treatment per se.239 Rather, “the ‘treatment no less favourable’ 
requirement of Article 2.1 only prohibits de jure and de facto 
discrimination against the group of imported products,” and it does 
not prohibit “detrimental impact on imports that stems exclusively 
from a legitimate regulatory distinction.”240 Where “the detrimental 
impact on imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate 
regulatory distinction, it follows that the challenged measure is not 
inconsistent with Article 2.1.”241 However, “where a regulatory 
distinction is not designed and applied in an even-handed manner—
for example, because it is designed or applied in a manner that 
constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination—that 
distinction cannot be considered legitimate and, thus, the detrimental 
impact will reflect discrimination prohibited under Article 2.1.”242 
According to the Appellate Body, a “treatment no less favorable” 
analysis should focus on whether “a measure modifies the conditions 
of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported 
 
 237. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 194 
(emphasis added). 
 238. Id. ¶¶ 193, 194 (quoting EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 162, ¶ 100). 
 239. See id. ¶ 169. 
 240. Id. ¶¶ 174–75, 181–82 (emphasis added); see also US — Tuna Appellate 
Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 215. 
 241. US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 216. 
 242. US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 293. 
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products.”243 This implies a broad scope of inquiry concerning the 
differential treatment in question that concentrates on whether the 
measure affects a “market” composed of many “like” products as 
opposed to individual like products. “[A] Member may draw 
distinctions between products which have been found to be ‘like’, 
without, for this reason alone, according to the group of ‘like’ 
imported products ‘less favourable treatment’ than that accorded to 
the group of ‘like’ domestic products.”244 However, as observed by 
the Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos, “[i]f there is ‘less favourable 
treatment’ of the group of ‘like’ imported products, there is, 
conversely, ‘protection’ of the group of ‘like’ domestic products.”245  
Lastly, the Appellate Body emphasized that a more extensive 
“treatment no less favorable” analysis will be required where a 
disputed technical regulation is origin-neutral on its face, such that it 
does not de jure discriminate but rather de facto discriminates against 
imports.246 The Article 2.1 inquiry in such cases will necessarily 
entail a careful scrutiny of “the design, architecture, revealing 
structure, operation, and application of the technical regulation at 
issue, and, in particular, [of] whether that technical regulation is 
even-handed, in order to determine whether it discriminates against 
the group of imported products.”247  
The Appellate Body in US—COOL, having determined that the 
disputed COOL measure did not discriminate de jure, emphasized 
the need 1) to examine the operation of such a measure in the 
particular market(s) in which it was applied,248 and 2) to ascertain 
whether the operation of the measure in such a market “has a de 
 
 243. US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.298 (second emphasis 
added); see US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 
177–79; US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.264, 7.268. 
 244. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 178, 193 
(first and third emphasis added). 
 245. Id. ¶ 178 (citing EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 
100). 
 246. See id. ¶¶ 182, 215; US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, 
¶¶ 229, 286 (“[T]he existence of a detrimental impact on competitive opportunities 
for the group of imported [products] vis-à-vis the group of domestic like products 
[will] not [always be] dispositive of less favourable treatment under Article 2.1.” 
(emphasis added)); US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 225. 
 247. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 182, 215 
(emphasis added). 
 248. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 269. 
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facto detrimental impact on the group of ‘like’ imported products.”249 
This means that “all the relevant features of the market, [including, 
but not limited to,] the particular characteristics of the industry at 
issue, the relative market shares in a given industry, consumer 
preferences, and historical trade patterns,” must be closely 
scrutinized.250 It also means that “any adverse impact on competitive 
opportunities for imported products vis-à-vis like domestic products 
that is caused by a particular measure may potentially be 
relevant . . . .”251 In other words, “[i]n every case, it is the effect of the 
measure on the competitive opportunities in the market that is 
relevant to an assessment of whether a challenged measure has a 
detrimental impact on imported products.”252 
In US—COOL, the Panel found that the COOL regulation did not 
de jure discriminate against imported meat products.253 It then 
undertook a “treatment no less favorable” analysis that scrutinized 
the design, architecture, revealing structure, operation, and 
application of the COOL measure to determine whether the COOL 
measure was de facto discriminatory. In doing so, it focused on, 
among other evidence, the economic and econometric studies 
submitted by the parties for purposes of gaining a broad 
understanding regarding whether the COOL requirements had 
imposed a priori a relatively higher compliance and cost burden 
upon imported Canadian and Mexican “like” meat products.254 Such 
data included information about relative trade volumes,255 market 
share,256 and COOL measure-related costs,257 specifically compliance 
costs and258 segregation costs.259  
Although the Panel observed that “the COOL measure [did] not 
 
 249. Id. ¶ 286 (second emphasis added). 
 250. Id. ¶ 269. 
 251. Id. ¶¶ 225, 286; US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 
15, ¶ 179 n.372 (noting that there must be a direct relationship between the 
disputed measure and its adverse impact on imported goods to support a “treated 
less favorably” assertion). 
 252. US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 270. 
 253. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.301. 
 254. See id. ¶¶ 7.303–7.488. 
 255. See id. ¶ 7.454. 
 256. See id. ¶ 7.474. 
 257. See id. ¶ 7.486. 
 258. See id. ¶ 7.303. 
 259. See id. ¶¶ 7.265–7.268, 7.322–7.325. 
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explicitly require segregation, let alone the segregation of domestic 
and imported livestock,” the regulation’s “labelling requirements for 
muscle cuts of meat, namely beef and pork, at the retail stage, i.e. ‘at 
the final point of sale to consumers,’” mandated the “labelling of 
meat based on the origin of an animal from which meat [was] 
derived.”260 Furthermore, it determined that, to “accurately label 
muscle cuts under the COOL measure, a covered retailer need[ed] to 
possess origin information on where livestock processing steps 
occurred. The retailer had to also determine origin under the COOL 
measure with regard to each muscle cut,” which could ”be obtained 
only from the upstream livestock and meat supply chain.”261 Based 
on its review of such data, the Panel concluded that the COOL 
regulation effectively imposed segregation of cattle and livestock and 
meat products produced therefrom and created a cost structure.262 
That cost structure had the effect of discriminating in favor of 
domestic suppliers, “particular[ly] in regard to muscle cuts,” by 
incentivizing the processing of exclusively domestic livestock at 
relatively lower cost and disincentivizing the handling of imported 
livestock.263  
The Panel ultimately determined that the COOL measure had 
imposed less favorable treatment on imported “like” muscle cuts 
than it had on domestic “like” muscle cuts. It explained that it had 
not reached its conclusion based on a detailed examination of “the 
actual trade effects of the muscle cuts and ground meat labels under 
the COOL measure,” but rather by “assessing segregation and the 
resulting cost implications of the COOL measure . . . .”264 In other 
words, it emphasized that it had arrived at its decision by focusing on 
“the fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself.”265  
The Appellate Body in US—COOL found that the Panel had 
“properly examined whether the COOL measure modifie[d] the 
conditions of competition in the US market to the detriment of 
 
 260. Id. ¶ 7.315. 
 261. Id. ¶ 7.316. 
 262. See id. ¶¶ 7.486–7.506. 
 263. See id. ¶¶ 7.420, 7.546; see also US — COOL Appellate Body Report, 
supra note 156, ¶ 287. 
 264. US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.438, 7.445. 
 265. Id. ¶ 7.438. 
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imported livestock.”266 It agreed with the Panel’s findings that: 1) the 
COOL measure had created a scenario that compelled U.S. livestock 
and meat market participants to make a choice between producing 
domestic livestock exclusively or producing domestic and imported 
livestock together, which resulted in most participants choosing the 
former; and 2) but for the COOL measure, the market participants 
would not have chosen as they had.267 Consequently, the Appellate 
Body upheld the US—COOL Panel’s conclusion that “the COOL 
measure . . . as applied in the US livestock and meat market” 
had ”modifie[d] the conditions of competition in the US market to 
the detriment of imported livestock” by “creating an incentive for US 
producers to segregate livestock according to origin, in particular by 
processing exclusively US-origin [domestic] livestock” and a 
“disincentive against handling imported livestock.”268 
In US—Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body found that the Panel 
had not examined the “‘architecture, structure and design’ of Section 
907(a)(1)(A) [U.S. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act (“FSPTCA”)], including the fact that it allow[ed] Indonesia to 
import and sell regular and menthol cigarettes in the United 
States.”269 It also found that the Panel had failed to clearly explain 
that the effect of banning non-menthol-flavored cigarettes was to 
impose costs on producers from other WTO Members, notably 
Indonesian producers, rather than upon domestic producers.270 Yet 
 
 266. US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 291. 
 267. See id. The Appellate Body reached this conclusion because it determined 
that the COOL measure was comparable to the Korean law that had established a 
dual retail system for beef, which required small retailers to sell either exclusively 
domestic beef or exclusively imported beef. In Korea — Various Measures on 
Beef, the Appellate Body had previously ruled that such a measure was 
inconsistent with GATT Article III:4 since it had a detrimental impact on imported 
beef. Id. ¶ 288 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea — Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 145–46, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 
2000) [hereinafter Korea — Beef Appellate Body Report]. It determined that the 
measure’s detrimental impact flowed not only from the legal necessity of making a 
choice, but also from the “direct practical effect” that such legal requirement had 
had in “denying competitive opportunities to imports.” Id. While private Korean 
entrepreneurs had chosen to sell domestic beef based “on their own calculations of 
comparative costs and benefits,” the Korean measure’s effects on imports were, 
nevertheless, found to be “the result of . . . governmental intervention.” Id. 
 268. US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 289, 292. 
 269. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 219. 
 270. See id. ¶¶ 219, 221 (pointing out that the only justification provided for the 
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the Appellate Body concluded that the Panel had not seriously erred 
in later finding that the disputed technical regulation was inconsistent 
with Article 2.1.271  
Apparently, the Appellate Body’s examination of the nature, 
design, and effect of the FSPTCA revealed that the provision, by 
design, “prohibit[ed] all cigarettes with characterizing flavours other 
than tobacco or menthol.”272 It also focused on the Panel’s factual 
record, which demonstrated “that ‘virtually all clove cigarettes’ that 
were imported into the United States in the three years prior to the 
ban came from Indonesia,” that “the ‘vast majority’ of clove 
cigarettes consumed in the United States came from Indonesia,” that 
during “the years 2000 to 2009, between 94.3 and 97.4 per cent of all 
[unbanned] cigarettes sold in the United States were domestically 
produced . . . , that menthol cigarettes accounted for about 26 per 
cent of the total US cigarette market,” and “that three domestic 
brands dominate[d] the US market for menthol cigarettes.”273 The 
Appellate Body concluded that, although the Panel failed to connect 
all of the dots to show that the disputed U.S. measure had resulted in 
detrimental treatment of Indonesian clove cigarettes that amounted to 
discrimination, the factual record spoke for itself. 274  
Moreover, the Appellate Body found, based on the factual record, 
that the detrimental impact of the FSPTCA on the competitive 
opportunities for imported Indonesian clove cigarettes did not derive 
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.275 It noted that, 
although the measure’s stated objective was to reduce youth 
smoking, menthol flavoring of the same character as that contained 
in the banned clove cigarettes, used to mask the cigarettes’ tobacco 
and otherwise harsh flavor to make smoking more pleasant, had 
remained present in the cigarettes not banned by the regulation.276 
The Appellate Body concluded that this inconsistency militated 
against a finding that the regulation’s “detrimental impact on 
 
conclusion that the ban would not affect domestic producers was that, at the time 
of the ban, only menthol cigarettes were on the U.S. market). 
 271. See id. ¶ 222. 
 272. See id. 
 273. Id. ¶¶ 222–23. 
 274. See id. ¶ 224. 
 275. See id. ¶ 225. 
 276. See id. 
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competitive opportunities for imported clove cigarettes stemmed 
from a legitimate regulatory distinction.”277  
In its view, had the United States been genuinely concerned about 
the health risks associated with youth smoking, it would have acted 
differently.278 For example, its regulation would not have focused as 
it did on peppermint or any other ingredient exclusively present in 
menthol cigarettes.279 Rather, it would have focused primarily on 
nicotine, the addictive ingredient in menthol cigarettes that was also 
present in regular cigarettes, the group of products likewise permitted 
under the disputed regulation.280 Consequently, the Appellate Body 
held that the disputed technical regulation violated TBT Article 2.1 
because it operated “in a manner that reflect[ed] discrimination 
against the group of like products imported from Indonesia.”281 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See id. (concluding that it was disingenuous for the United States to claim 
that menthol cigarettes had to remain on the market to avert catastrophic costs the 
U.S. healthcare system allegedly would bear as the result of treating “‘millions’ of 
menthol cigarette smokers affected by withdrawal symptoms” and due to the black 
market and smuggling that would have developed “to supply the needs of menthol 
cigarette smokers”). 
 281. See id. ¶¶ 227, 233 (emphasis added). In US—Tuna II (Mexico), the 
Appellate Body found that the Panel had “applied an incorrect approach to 
assessing whether the measure at issue [was] inconsistent with [TBT] Article 2.1” 
because it had failed to conduct an analysis of the design, architecture, revealing 
structure, operation, and application of the disputed DPCIA measure. See US — 
Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 225–27, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 
16, 2012). Such an analysis would have revealed that regulatory distinctions based 
on different “fishing methods” or “geographical location,” as well as “national 
origin” per se, can “be relevant in assessing the consistency” of the disputed 
DPCIA measure with Article 2.1. See id. ¶ 225. The Appellate Body reasoned that 
the Panel should have considered, inter alia, whether the disputed DPCIA measure 
had the effect of exerting pressure on Mexico to modify its fishing practices, 
although, “[t]his alone . . . would not be sufficient to establish a breach of Article 
2.1.” See id. ¶ 226. 
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3. Is the Disputed Technical Regulation Inconsistent  
with TBT Article 2.2 Because It Imposes an Unnecessary Obstacle  
to Trade That Is More Trade-Restrictive Than Necessary  
to Fulfill a Legitimate Objective Considering the Risks  
Non-Fulfillment Would Create? 
TBT Article 2.2 provides: 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted 
or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations 
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such 
legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the 
prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, 
relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and 
technical information, related processing technology, or intended end-uses 
of products.282 
The first sentence of Article 2.2 reflects the general principle set 
forth within both the TBT Agreement Preamble’s fifth recital and 
TBT Article 2.5, namely the “desire” that technical regulations “not 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade.”283 The second sentence of 
Article 2.2 sets forth an “obligation” to fulfill the general principle 
contained in the first sentence of Article 2.2.284 This obligation 
consists of several elements that raise a number of questions, which 
will be addressed below.285 
a. Is the Disputed Technical Regulation “Trade-Restrictive”? 
GATT 1994 jurisprudence reflects that the term “restriction” 
entails some kind of “limitation on action or a limiting condition 
or regulation,” and that the term “restrictive” implies some kind of 
impact of a measure on the “competitive opportunities available to 
imported products” rather than on the “trade” of imports.286 The 
 
 282. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2 (first emphasis added). 
 283. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.551 (emphasis added). 
 284. See id. ¶ 7.552. 
 285. See id. ¶¶ 7.554–7.557. 
 286. Id. ¶¶ 7.570–7.572 (citing Panel Report, India — Quantitative Restrictions 
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, ¶ 5.128, WT/DS90/R 
(Apr. 6, 1999)); see also Panel Report, India — Measures Affecting the Automotive 
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Panel in US—COOL found that the term “trade-restrictive” was 
sufficiently broad in scope and that its focus for purposes of TBT 
Article 2.2 should similarly be on “the competitive opportunities 
available to imported products” rather than on “the demonstration 
of any actual trade effects.”287 Because the COOL regulation was 
shown by complainants to have “affect[ed] the competitive 
conditions of imported livestock,” the US—COOL Panel 
concluded that the measure was “trade-restrictive” within the 
meaning of TBT Article 2.2. The Panel arrived at this conclusion 
without rendering a finding as to the “level” of trade-
restrictiveness.288  
The Appellate Body in US—Tuna II (Mexico) and US—COOL, 
however, observed that “[a]s used in Article 2.2 in conjunction with 
the word ‘trade’, [‘trade-restrictive’] means something having a 
limiting effect on trade.”289 The Appellate Body also found “that the 
reference in Article 2.2 to ‘unnecessary obstacles’ implies that 
‘some’ trade-restrictiveness is allowed . . . .”290 The Appellate Body 
in US—Clove Cigarettes adopted a similar approach to evaluating 
whether product distinctions established exclusively by a challenged 
technical regulation can be deemed to provide less favorable 
treatment to “like” products in violation of Article 2.1.291 Because it 
is in the nature of technical regulations both to establish product 
distinctions based on their characteristics or PPMs292 and to have 
effects on trade, the Appellate Body apparently concluded that not all 
distinctions and/or trade restrictions will be deemed to violate TBT 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2.293  
 
Sector, ¶ 7.269-7.270, WT/DS146/R (Dec. 21, 2001); Panel Report, Colombia — 
Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, ¶¶ 7.236, 7.241, 
WT/DS366/R (Apr. 27, 2009); Panel Report, Argentina — Measures Affecting the 
Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, ¶ 11.20, WT/DS155/R 
(Dec. 19, 2000). 
 287. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.572 (emphasis added). 
 288. See id. ¶ 7.575. 
 289. US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 319; see US — 
COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 375. 
 290. US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 375. 
 291. See US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 169. 
 292. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1.1; US — COOL Appellate 
Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 268. 
 293. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 268. 
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b. Does the Technical Regulation Pursue a “Legitimate” 
Objective? 
The objective of a technical regulation is distinguishable from the 
technical regulation itself, “including the alleged intent behind the 
enactment of the particular technical regulation,” since “it is the 
objective that leads to a Member’s determination to adopt a technical 
regulation” and it is typically the objective that precedes the 
establishment of the regulation to be adopted or maintained.294 TBT 
Article 2.3 confirms this distinction by providing that “[t]echnical 
regulations shall not be maintained if the circumstances or objectives 
giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed 
circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less trade-
restrictive manner.”295 This means that “‘circumstances’ or 
‘objective(s)’ are not identical to technical regulations and logically 
precede the adoption of technical regulations.”296 Furthermore, the 
TBT Agreement Preamble’s sixth recital not only explicitly 
recognizes every Member’s “right to regulate in order to pursue 
certain legitimate objectives,”297 but also “acknowledges the right of 
every WTO Member to establish for itself the objectives of its 
technical regulations.”298 
TBT Article 2.2 requires that complaining Members identify the 
objective pursued by the government sponsor of a disputed 
technical regulation on the basis of information they obtain prior to 
or during the dispute settlement proceeding.299 The Appellate Body 
has noted that the “TBT Agreement affords a complainant adequate 
opportunities to obtain information about the objectives of technical 
regulations or the specific considerations that may be relevant to 
the assessment of their appropriateness.”300 Typically, the objective 
of a disputed technical regulation can be identified in the 
“notification” that a Member submitted to the WTO TBT 
 
 294. US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.597–7.599, 7.602, 7.609, 
7.615, 7.617 (emphasis added). 
 295. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.3 (emphasis added). 
 296. US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.598–7.599. 
 297. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 94–95 
(emphasis added). 
 298. US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.584. 
 299. See id. ¶ 7.592. 
 300. Id. ¶ 7.593 (quoting EC — Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 
162, ¶ 277). 
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Committee pursuant to TBT Article 2.9, which enjoys a rebuttable 
presumption of truthfulness and good faith consistent with 
international law.301 
i. Is the Identified Objective Indeed the Objective  
of the Regulation? 
To discern whether a technical regulation’s stated objective is, 
indeed, the regulation’s actual objective, it is necessary to evaluate 
the regulation’s text as well as its design, architecture, and structure. 
In addition, the significance of statements made by various 
legislators during the legislative process surrounding a disputed 
measure may also be evaluated, although the Appellate Body has 
deemed such an inquiry unnecessary and unadvisable given the 
difficulties of ascertaining and second-guessing the intent behind a 
measure that has multiple objectives.302 
Although the Panel in US—COOL found that the COOL measure 
did not expressly state its objective, the Panel nevertheless concluded 
that said measure’s objective was to provide consumer information 
on origin, as the United States had declared, because it was “devoted 
exclusively to the labelling requirements on origin.”303 When 
reviewing COOL’s design and structure, the Panel noted its broad 
scope and product coverage.304 It also observed that the measure’s 
incorporation of exclusions for certain domestically produced food 
products and commodity ingredients, as well as small domestically 
located retail establishments and sales entities, was neither unusual 
nor exceptional, as such exceptions “might be justifiable for practical 
reasons and simply facilitate [its] implementation.”305 Furthermore, 
after having examined all of the evidence proffered by the parties 
concerning statements made by individual legislators, some of which 
revealed protectionist sentiments, the Panel concluded that, on 
 
 301. See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 2.9.1–2.9.2; US — COOL Panel 
Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.605–7.606. 
 302. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.686 (citing Appellate 
Body Report, Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶¶ 27–28, WT/DS8/AB/R 
(Oct. 4, 1996)); see also Appellate Body Report, Chile — Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, ¶ 62, WT/DS87/AB/R (Dec. 13, 1999). 
 303. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.680, 7.685. 
 304. See id. ¶ 7.684. 
 305. See id. (noting that complainants had alleged that such domestic exceptions 
reflected a trade protectionist intent). 
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balance, that evidence wasn’t helpful to its inquiry into the objective 
of the COOL measure.306 
ii. How Can a Member Determine Whether the Regulation’s 
Objective Is “Legitimate”? 
“[T]he legitimacy of a given objective must be found in the 
‘genuine nature’ of the objective, which is ‘justifiable’ and 
‘supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.’”307 A 
complaining WTO Member bears the burden of establishing that the 
objective of a disputed regulation is not legitimate within the 
meaning of Article 2.2.308 TBT Article 2.2 sets forth a non-exclusive 
open list of legitimate objectives, which include, inter alia, national 
security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; 
protection of human health or safety; animal or plant life or health; or 
the environment.309 This indicates that a wide range of objectives 
could potentially fall within the scope of legitimate objectives under 
Article 2.2 and that “a policy objective pursued by a technical 
regulation [need not] be specifically linked in nature to those 
objectives explicitly listed in Article 2.2.”310 
Although “consumer information” is not expressly listed as a 
“legitimate objective” in the text of Article 2.2, the Panel in US—
COOL determined that “consumers generally are interested in having 
information on the origin of the products they purchase” and that, 
consequently, “providing consumer information on origin is a 
legitimate objective within the meaning of Article 2.2.”311 It found 
that many WTO Members, including the complainants and third-
party amici, had “maintain[ed] some form of mandatory country of 
 
 306. See id. ¶¶ 7.686–7.691 (arriving at this conclusion, in part, because the 
legislation was enacted for a variety of purposes and because the panel was not in a 
position to second-guess legislative intent). 
 307. Id. ¶ 7.632 (second emphasis added). 
 308. See id. ¶¶ 7.629–7.631 (highlighting that, under the ordinary meaning of 
the term “legitimate,” a measure’s objective will generally be deemed legitimate if 
it is “conformable to law or principle,” “justifiable and proper,” or “conformable to 
a recognized standard type”). 
 309. See id. ¶¶ 7.632–7.634. 
 310. See id. ¶¶ 7.634, 7.637 (“[T]o [have] conclude[d] that consumer 
information and preventing consumer confusion [were] not legitimate objectives 
would [have] suggest[ed] that none of these regimes was adopted to achieve a 
legitimate objective.”). 
 311. Id. ¶¶ 7.650–7.651. 
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origin labelling for food and other products intended for human 
consumption” that “apply to food products at the retail level.”312 This 
“suggest[ed] that consumer information on country of origin [was] 
considered by a considerable proportion of the WTO Membership to 
be a legitimate objective under the TBT Agreement.”313  
The Panel also recognized that “Members have certain policy 
space in determining their objectives” and “may decide to adopt 
particular regulations even in the absence of a specific demand from 
their citizens, and may do so without in fact shaping consumer 
expectations through regulatory intervention.”314 In response to 
Canada’s subsequent appeal of this determination,315 the Appellate 
Body found that “the objective of providing consumers with 
information on origin as related to the objective of preventing 
deceptive practices” was not improperly linked to “the objective of 
consumer protection” because, in its view, “providing accurate and 
reliable information may protect consumers from being misled or 
misinformed.”316 Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the US—
COOL Panel’s finding that the COOL labeling measure’s objective 
of providing information to consumers about where livestock were 
born, raised, and slaughtered was a legitimate objective within the 
meaning of TBT Article 2.2.317  
c. Does the Technical Regulation Fulfill the Identified Objective(s)? 
The ordinary meaning of the word “fulfill” governs the analysis of 
whether the requirements of TBT Article 2.2 have been satisfied. It 
means that a measure must “carry out and perform” its underlying 
 
 312. Id. ¶ 7.637. 
 313. Id. ¶ 7.638. 
 314. Id. ¶ 7.649 (emphasis added). Apparently, the Panel, in considering 
evidence demonstrating that there had been consumer demand for and support of 
the COOL program incident to the legislative and administrative rule-making 
processes, acknowledged the risk that Members could also use such processes to 
shape consumer expectations. “Members, by shaping consumer expectations 
through regulatory intervention in the market, would be able to justify thereafter 
the legitimacy of that very same regulatory intervention on the basis of the 
governmentally created consumer expectations.” Id. ¶¶ 7.643–7.647 (citing EC — 
Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 7.127). 
 315. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 443–48. 
 316. Id. ¶ 451. 
 317. See id. ¶ 453. 
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objective.318 The Appellate Body previously construed the term 
“fulfill” in the context of GATT Article XX(b) to mean simply that 
“a measure makes a contribution to the objective pursued” and has 
“considered that a contribution exists when there is a genuine 
relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and 
the measure at issue.”319 This interpretation was adopted by the US—
COOL Panel for purposes of TBT Article 2.2.320 The Appellate Body 
has since clarified the meaning of the term “fulfill” in US—Tuna II 
(Mexico) and US—COOL. According to the Appellate Body, the 
determination of whether a measure “fulfills” its objective under 
Article 2.2 does not necessitate a finding that the measure “must 
meet some minimum threshold of fulfillment.”321 Rather, such a 
determination “is concerned with the degree of contribution that the 
technical regulation makes towards the achievement of the legitimate 
objective,” which ”may be discerned from the design, structure, and 
operation of the technical regulation, as well as from evidence 
relating to the application of the measure.”322  
In US—COOL, the Appellate Body concluded that, although the 
COOL measure did not completely satisfy the identified objective 
because its complex and confusing design and operation may have 
actually served to undermine that objective in some instances,323 the 
 
 318. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.692. 
 319. Id. ¶ 7.693 (emphasis added). 
 320. Id. ¶¶ 7.692–7.693 (noting, however, that panels are not required to apply a 
specific methodology when assessing whether a measure contributes to an 
objective). 
 321. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 461. 
 322. Id. (emphasis added). 
 323. See US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.695. The US—COOL 
Panel found that since the COOL regulation failed to convey meaningful origin 
information to consumers with respect to muscle meat products, the COOL 
labeling measure did not fulfill the underlying regulation’s identified objective, 
within the meaning of Article 2.2. See id. ¶¶ 7.719–7.720. “[The Panel found that] 
the different and complex categories of labels under the COOL measure and the 
operation of the COOL regime based on the commingling provisions render[ed 
the] origin information contained in [the ‘B’ and ‘C’] labels inaccurate and 
confusing.” Id. ¶¶ 7.713–7.715. While the “B” and “C” labels may have provided 
consumers with more information about country of origin of meat products than 
they had received previously under the pre-COOL regulatory regime, it did not 
help to provide as much clear and accurate meat origin information as possible. 
See id. ¶ 7.715. The complex and confusing design may have actually undermined 
COOL’s stated objective. For example, the different “B” and “C” categories of 
COOL labels for beef, lamb, and pork muscle cuts were found to be confusing and 
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measure did contribute to the overall objective of providing 
consumer information about the countries where the livestock from 
which meat was produced was born, raised, and slaughtered.324 
Because the Panel had not focused “on ascertaining the degree of 
contribution achieved by the [COOL] measure,” and had ignored its 
own findings in concluding that the COOL measure did not fulfill its 
objective, the Appellate Body in US—COOL held that the Panel 
erred both “in its interpretation of Article 2.2” and “in its analysis 
under Article 2.2,” and reversed the Panel’s finding on this issue.325  
In US—Tuna II (Mexico), the Panel found that the design and 
operation of the U.S. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information 
Act’s (“DPCIA”) “dolphin-safe” labeling provisions could 
potentially undermine their policy objective.326 For example, the 
labeling measure failed to ensure against the U.S. market being used 
to encourage fishing techniques that adversely affected dolphins 
outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific (“ETP”), as labels could be 
 
to not clearly convey the actual country of origin of the meat product as required 
under the COOL regulation. A label stating “Product of the US, Mexico” did not 
describe what “the US and Mexico” means as far as origin of the meat was 
concerned. The origin labels referred to and were differentiated based on 
information about the places where animals from which meat was derived were 
born, raised, and slaughtered. A meat product falling within the scope of categories 
“B” and “C” was required to carry a “B” or “C” label that indicated multiple 
countries of origin. The order in which the country name appeared on the label was 
determined by whether animals were raised in the United States (Label “B”) or 
whether they were imported right before slaughter (Label “C”). See id. ¶¶ 7.697–
7.702. Furthermore, the Label “B” and “C” descriptions of origin did not deliver 
origin information as prescribed by the measure or as consumers would understand 
it, because the final federal regulations (the 2009 Final Rule (AMS)) had permitted 
the interchangeable use of labels “B” and “C” for commingled categories of meat. 
If commingling were to take place at multiple stages of the meat production 
process (e.g., at the processing packing and/or retail levels), the resulting labels 
affixed to these products would be even less accurate in terms of the origin of such 
products as defined by the COOL regulation. See id. ¶¶ 7.702–7.704. Although the 
US—COOL Panel recognized that these COOL regulation flexibilities reflected the 
U.S. government’s effort to strike a balance between industry cost and consumer 
information concerns, it found that such implementation actually served to 
undermine the regulation’s legitimate objective. See id. ¶¶ 7.704, 7.711. 
 324. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 466 (holding 
that, for the COOL labeling requirement to fulfill the regulation’s overall 
objective, it would have to be capable of conveying clear and accurate information 
on origin). 
 325. See id. ¶ 468. 
 326. See US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.599. 
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affixed to tuna caught pursuant to methods other than “setting on 
dolphins”327 outside the ETP without a certification indicating that a 
dolphin may have been killed or seriously injured in the process.328 In 
addition, the labeling regulation could possibly encourage fishing 
fleets to secure access to U.S. markets by refocusing more of their 
future activities outside the ETP, where they would not be monitored 
to avoid the regulation’s restrictions altogether.329  
However, the Panel also found that the DPCIA’s “dolphin-safe” 
labeling provisions were “capable of protecting dolphins by ensuring 
that the US market [was] not used to encourage fishing practices that 
may kill or seriously injure dolphins only within the ETP.”330 
Consequently, the Panel concluded that the DPCIA “dolphin-safe” 
labeling provisions, as well as related “dolphin-protection” 
provisions,331 were at least partially able to fulfill their stated objective 
“of ensuring that consumers [were] not misled about whether tuna was 
harvested by a method that adversely affects dolphins.”332 The 
Appellate Body did not dispute these findings because they apparently 
reflected the degree, however minimal, to which the disputed 
measures contributed to their underlying objective.333 
 
 327. “[T]he fishing technique known as setting on dolphins [entails] intentional 
deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets.” Id. ¶ 2.3 n.2 
(referencing 16 U.S.C. § 1385(g)(1) (2009)); see also Dolphin-safe Labeling 
Standards, 50 C.F.R. § 216.91 (2009). In other words, “setting on dolphins” entails 
the “chasing and encircling [of] dolphins with a net in order to catch the tuna 
associating with them.” WTO Dispute Settlement, United States — Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 172 
n.355, DS381 (June 13, 2012); see also NOAA Form 370, Fisheries Certificate of 
Origin, http://swr.nmfs.noaa.gov/psd/noaa370.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) 
(“Section 5.B.2: DOLPHIN SAFE STATUS . . . Tuna harvested using a purse seine 
net outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), with valid documentation by 
the captain of the vessel certifying that no purse seine net was intentionally deployed 
on or to encircle dolphins during the fishing trip.” (emphasis added)). 
 328. See US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.597. 
 329. See id. ¶ 7.598 (finding that the measure permitted the “dolphin-safe” 
labeling of tuna caught by techniques adversely affecting dolphins outside the ETP 
while it simultaneously prohibited their use pursuant to the controlled conditions of 
the AIDCP [Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program] inside 
the ETP). 
 330. See id. ¶ 7.599 (emphasis added). 
 331. See id. ¶¶ 7.590–7.592, 7.599 (noting that the success of dolphin-protection 
provisions were dependent upon dolphin-safe provisions). 
 332. See US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.592 . 
 333. See US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 329. 
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d. Is the Technical Regulation More Trade-Restrictive Than 
Necessary to Fulfill the Objective(s) Concerned? 
The question of whether a measure is more trade-restrictive than 
“necessary” was previously addressed by the Appellate Body in the 
context of GATT 1994 Articles XX(b) and XI:2(a). In Korea—
Various Measures on Beef,334 the Appellate Body analyzed the trade 
restrictiveness of the challenged measure in the context of GATT 
Article XX and concluded that “the word ‘necessary’ refers . . . to a 
range of degrees of necessity,” depending on the connection in which 
it is used.335 “At one end of this continuum lies ‘necessary’ 
understood as ‘indispensable’; at the other end, is ‘necessary’ taken 
to mean as ‘making a contribution to.’”336 In China—Publications 
and Audiovisual Products,337 the Appellate Body similarly analyzed 
the “trade-restrictiveness” of the challenged measure in terms of 
“necessity” in the context of Articles XI:2(a) and XX(b).338 In citing 
its prior analysis in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres,339 the Appellate Body 
observed that the “necessity” of a measure depends on “the 
importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent of the 
contribution made by the measure to the achievement of the relevant 
objective, the measure’s trade restrictiveness,” and the availability 
of ”possible alternatives” with which the measure can be 
compared ”in the light of the importance of the interests or values at 
stake.”340  
The US—Tuna II (Mexico) Panel found this analysis helpful but 
concluded that it did not reflect the different context of TBT Article 
 
 334. See Korea — Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 267. 
 335. Id. ¶ 161. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China — Publications & 
Audiovisual Products Appellate Body Report]. 
 338. See China — Publications & Audiovisual Products Appellate Body Report, 
supra note 337, ¶¶ 241–42; Panel Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil — 
Retreaded Tyres Panel Report]. 
 339. China — Publications & Audiovisual Products Appellate Body Report, 
supra note 337, ¶ 241 (citing Brazil — Retreaded Tyres Panel Report, supra note 
338, ¶ 178). 
 340. China — Publications & Audiovisual Products Appellate Body Report, 
supra note 337, ¶ 241. 
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2.2. In the Panel’s view, “the aspect of the measure to be justified as 
‘necessary’ [in the context of TBT Article 2.2] is its trade 
restrictiveness rather than the necessity of the measure [itself] for the 
achievement of the objective.”341 Stated differently, “an assessment 
of whether any trade-restrictiveness arising under [a given] 
measure[] . . . is ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 2.2 must 
be understood as an enquiry into whether such trade-restrictiveness 
is required to fulfill the legitimate objectives pursued by the Member 
at its chosen level of protection.”342  
The Appellate Body in US—Tuna II (Mexico) concurred with and 
further refined the Panel’s analysis.  
In the context of Article 2.2, the assessment of “necessity” involves a 
relational analysis of the trade-restrictiveness of the technical regulation, 
the degree of contribution that it makes to the achievement of a legitimate 
objective, and the risks non-fulfilment would create. [A]ll [of] these 
factors provide the basis for the determination of what is to be considered 
“necessary” in the sense of Article 2.2 in a particular case.343  
Thus, in its view, “Article 2.2 does not prohibit measures that have 
any trade-restrictive effect”; rather, “Article 2.2 is . . . concerned 
with restrictions on international trade that exceed what is necessary 
to achieve the degree of contribution that a technical regulation 
makes to the achievement of a legitimate objective.”344 
i. Is There a Less Trade-Restrictive Alternative Available? 
To determine whether a disputed measure’s “trade-restrictiveness” 
is required to fulfill the measure’s legitimate objectives under TBT 
Article 2.2, it must be compared to other reasonably available 
alternatives. In this regard, the US—Tuna II (Mexico) Panel reasoned 
that, “[t]o the extent that a measure is capable of contributing to its 
objective, it would be more trade-restrictive than necessary if an 
alternative measure that is less trade-restrictive is reasonably 
available, that would achieve the challenged measure’s objective at 
the same level.”345 The complaining party bears the burden of 
 
 341. US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.460 (emphasis added). 
 342. Id. (first emphasis added). 
 343. US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 318. 
 344. Id. ¶ 319 (emphasis added). 
 345. US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.465 (emphasis added). 
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identifying a reasonably available alternative that is capable of 
achieving the objective pursued by the disputed measure at the same 
level of protection, taking into account the risks non-fulfillment 
would create.346 
The Appellate Body in US—Tuna II (Mexico) further refined this 
analysis. It explained that a number of factors must be evaluated to 
determine whether a technical regulation is “more trade-restrictive 
than necessary” within the meaning of Article 2.2. These factors 
include:  
(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure to the legitimate 
objective at issue; (ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and (iii) the 
nature of the risks at issue as well as the gravity of consequences that 
would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective pursued by the Member 
through the measure.347  
The Appellate Body also stated that “[i]n most cases, a 
comparison of the challenged measure and possible alternative 
measures should [also] be undertaken.”348 According to the Appellate 
Body, such a comparison should consider whether the proposed 
alternative measure: a) is “less trade restrictive”; b) “would make an 
equivalent contribution to the relevant legitimate objective, taking 
account of the risks non-fulfillment would create”; and c) “is 
reasonably available.”349 
ii. What Risks Are Engendered if the Available Less Trade-
Restrictive Alternative Cannot Equally Fulfill the Identified 
Objectives? 
When evaluating the trade-restrictiveness of a measure, “the risks 
that non-fulfillment would create” must also be taken into account.350 
This means that a Panel must consider “the likelihood and the gravity 
of potential risks (and any associated adverse consequences) that 
might arise in the event the legitimate objective being pursued would 
 
 346. See id. ¶ 7.468. 
 347. US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 322; see US — 
COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 471. 
 348. US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 322. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.466. 
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not be fulfilled.”351 In assessing such risks, the second sentence of 
TBT Article 2.2 permits the use of “relevant . . . available scientific 
and technical information, related processing technology, or intended 
end-uses of products,” among other tools.352 It also implies that “an 
alternative means of achieving the objective that would entail greater 
‘risks of non-fulfilment’ would not be a valid alternative, even if it 
were less trade-restrictive,” as is consistent “with the fact that each 
Member is entitled, as expressed in the preamble of the TBT 
Agreement . . . to define its own level of protection.”353  
In US—Tuna II (Mexico), the only one of the three TBT cases to 
undertake this analysis,354 the Panel concluded that Mexico had 
identified a reasonably available alternative measure that did “not 
seem to create greater risks to dolphins in the ETP than those 
accepted by the United States under the challenged measures in 
relation to other fishing techniques used outside the ETP.”355 It also 
concluded that the alternative measure identified by Mexico “would 
achieve a level of protection equal to that achieved by the US 
dolphin-safe provisions outside the ETP, as currently applied.”356 The 
 
 351. Id. ¶ 7.467. 
 352. Id. ¶ 7.466. 
 353. Id. ¶ 7.467. 
 354. The Appellate Body in US—COOL was unable to complete this legal 
analysis for purposes of determining “whether the COOL measure [was] ‘more 
trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill its legitimate objective.’” US — COOL 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 479. It reached this conclusion even 
though “the Panel’s factual findings suggest[ed] that the COOL measure ma[de] 
some contribution to the objective of providing consumers with information on 
origin[,] that it ha[d] a considerable degree of trade-restrictiveness[,] and that the 
consequences that may arise from non-fulfilment of the objective would not be 
particularly grave.” Id. In addition, although Canada and Mexico had proposed 
four alternative measures to the U.S. COOL measure, the Appellate Body found 
that the Panel had failed to make factual findings with regard to such labeling 
schemes and had “made only limited findings with respect to the COOL measure 
itself, in particular with respect to its degree of contribution to the United States’ 
objective.” Id. ¶¶ 480–81. 
 355. US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.618 (emphasis added). 
 356. Id. (emphasis added). In reaching these conclusions, the US—Tuna II 
(Mexico) Panel had taken into account “available scientific and technical 
information, related processing technology and the end-uses of tuna products.” Id. 
¶ 7.619. For example, it found that Mexico’s suggested alternative measure would 
allow for the coexistence of the U.S. and the AIDCP dolphin-safe labels in the U.S. 
market and would aim to convey to consumers “more detailed information about 
the dolphin-safe implications of the fishing methods employed to catch the tuna 
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Appellate Body in US—Tuna II (Mexico), however, determined that 
the Panel’s analysis “was based, at least in part, on an improper 
comparison.”357 It observed that, although the Panel referred to the 
proposed alternative measure identified by Mexico as the coexistence 
of the U.S. dolphin protection and consumer information measures 
and those of the Agreement on International Dolphin Conservation 
Program (“AIDCP”), the Panel actually compared the U.S. measures 
to the corresponding AIDCP measures.358  
According to the Appellate Body, a proper comparison would 
have revealed that “there [was] no difference between the [U.S.] 
measure at issue and the alternative measure identified by Mexico” 
with respect to “the conditions for labeling as ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna 
products containing tuna harvested outside the ETP.”359 Because the 
AIDCP conditions for fishing applied only inside the ETP, and the 
U.S. conditions for fishing applied only outside the ETP, it 
determined that the conditions for fishing outside the ETP were 
identical whether or not the proposed alternative measure was 
considered.360 A proper comparison would have also revealed that the 
U.S. measure and the alternative measure imposed different 
requirements with respect to conditions for fishing inside the ETP.361 
Under the proposed alternative measure, a “dolphin-safe” label could 
be affixed to tuna that had been caught in the ETP by “setting on 
dolphins” if it satisfied AIDCP label prerequisites.362 By contrast, 
under the challenged U.S. measure, a “dolphin-safe” label could be 
affixed to tuna harvested inside the ETP only “if it was caught by 
methods other than ‘setting on dolphins.’”363  
The Appellate Body found that the Panel had failed to focus on the 
 
contained in those products.” Id. ¶ 7.607. The Panel also found that these features 
would likely bring certain benefits. Id. ¶¶ 7.609–7.610. Based on these findings, 
the Panel concluded that the U.S. DPCIA measures were inconsistent with TBT 
Article 2.2 because, in relation to their stated objective, and compared to the 
proposed alternative measure, they were more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfill their legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would 
create. Id. ¶ 7.620. 
 357. US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 328. 
 358. See id. 
 359. Id. ¶ 329. 
 360. See id. 
 361. See id. 
 362. See id. 
 363. Id. 
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conditions inside the ETP when analyzing the extent of the 
contribution made by the proposed alternative measure to U.S. 
objectives, and to examine whether AIDCP label-compliant tuna 
products could achieve U.S. objectives within the ETP “to an 
equivalent degree” as the challenged U.S. measure.364 Ultimately, the 
Appellate Body concluded that the proposed alternative measure 
contributed to the U.S. measure’s consumer-information and 
dolphin-protection objectives “to a lesser degree than the [U.S.] 
measure at issue, because, overall, it would allow more tuna 
harvested in conditions that adversely affect dolphins to be labelled 
‘dolphin-safe.’”365 Consequently, the Appellate Body held that the 
Panel had erred in determining that the U.S. measure was “more 
trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill [its] legitimate objectives, 
taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create,” and it 
reversed the Panel’s ruling that the U.S. measure was inconsistent 
with Article 2.2.366 
4. Did the Technical Regulation’s Sponsor Fail to Take into 
Account Developing Country Needs When Preparing and Applying 
Such Measures, With a View to Ensuring That No Unnecessary 
Obstacles to Trade Were Created Within the Meaning  
of TBT Article 12.3? 
TBT Article 12.3 provides: 
Members shall, in the preparation and application of technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures, take account of the 
special development, financial and trade needs of developing country 
Members, with a view to ensuring that such technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing country Members.367 
Article 12.3 comprises part of TBT Article 12 (Special and 
Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members) and serves 
to implement the general obligation of WTO Members contained 
within Article 12.1 “to provide differential and more favourable 
 
 364. See id. ¶ 330. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. ¶ 331. 
 367. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 12.3. 
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treatment to developing country Members to this Agreement . . . .”368  
a. Developing Country “Special and Differential Needs” Three-
Part Test 
The Panel in US—Clove Cigarettes stated: 
The wording of Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement . . . require[s] . . . that 
three elements must be demonstrated in order to establish a violation of 
the obligation set forth in [TBT Article 12.3] . . . . [The complaining 
WTO Member] must demonstrate that: (a) [The complaining WTO 
Member] is a “developing country”; (b) [The complaining WTO Member] 
has “special development, financial and trade needs” that are affected by 
[the disputed measure]; and (c) [The regulating WTO Member] failed to 
“take account of” [the complaining WTO Member’s] special financial, 
development and trade needs.369  
Consistent with prior WTO jurisprudence, “the complainant 
bringing a claim under Article 12.3 . . . bears the initial burden to 
make a prima facie case that the [regulating WTO Member] did not 
‘take account of [the complainant’s] special development, financial 
and trade needs’ ‘in the preparation and application of’ [the technical 
regulation at issue].”370 
The first element of a TBT Article 12.3 claim can be satisfied by 
demonstrating that “the World Bank classifies [the complainant] as a 
developing country and that its status as a developing country 
Member of the WTO [has been] recognized.”371 A complainant can 
 
 368. Id. art. 12.1. 
 369. US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.620; see, e.g., US 
— COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 7.746 (noting that the United 
States argued that Mexico must demonstrate these factors under Article 12.3 of the 
TBT Agreement). 
 370. US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 7.774; see US — 
Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.620. 
 371. US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.623–7.624. For 
example, the World Bank, which classifies economies into several groupings by 
reference to gross national income (“GNI”) per capita (i.e., into “low income,” 
“middle income” (subdivided into lower-middle and upper-middle), or “high 
income”), acknowledges that “[l]ow-income and middle-income economies are 
sometimes referred to as developing economies.” See How We Classify Countries, 
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2012). The WTO, meanwhile, “recognizes as least-developed countries 
(LDCs) those countries which have been designated as such by the United 
Nations.” Least-Developed Countries, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
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satisfy the second element by “explaining the importance” of the 
products affected by the technical regulation at issue to its economy 
in terms of GDP, trade flows, employment, and manufacturing.372  
Panels have interpreted the third element of TBT Article 12.3 as 
imposing only one obligation: that Members “take into account” the 
special development, financial, and trade needs of developing 
country Members when preparing and applying technical regulations, 
standards, and conformity-assessment procedures.373 Prior WTO 
jurisprudence reflects that the phrase “take account of” “does not 
amount to a requirement for WTO Members to conform their actions 
to the special needs of developing countries, but merely to give 
consideration to such needs along with other factors before reaching 
a decision.”374 The phrase “take account of” does not require WTO 
Members to “document specifically in their legislative process and 
rule-making process how they actively considered the special 
development, financial and trade needs of developing country 
Members.”375 Nor does it specifically require WTO Members to 
“initiate such consultation.”376 
In US—COOL, the Panel ruled that the United States did not have 
 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 372. See, e.g., US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.628–
7.629 (noting that Indonesia satisfied the requirement of demonstrating that it “has 
‘special development, financial and trade needs’ that are affected by the technical 
regulation at issue” by estimating the number of citizens employed in the clove 
cigarette industry, the portion of gross domestic product accounted for by glove 
cigarette production, and its long history of exporting clove cigarettes to the United 
States). 
 373. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 7.762; US — 
Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶¶ 7.615–7.617. Accordingly, the 
phrase “with a view to” relates to the assessment that must be undertaken to 
determine whether a WTO Member has met this obligation. Such an assessment 
requires consideration of the Member’s relevant actions or inactions with respect 
to the disputed measure, to confirm whether they were fulfilled or carried out with 
the objective of ensuring that technical regulations, standards, and conformity 
assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to exports from 
developing country Members. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 156, ¶ 7.746. 
 374. US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.781 (emphasis added) 
(citing Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶¶ 7.1620–7.1621, WT/DS291/R (Sept. 29, 
2006)); see US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.646. 
 375. US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 7.787. 
 376. Id. ¶ 7.796. 
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any explicit affirmative obligation, “enforceable in WTO dispute 
settlement, to reach out and collect Mexico’s views during the 
preparation and application of the COOL Measure.”377 Rather, the 
United States was merely required to give active and meaningful 
consideration to “Mexico’s special development, financial and trade 
needs’ in the preparation and application of the COOL measure.”378 
The US—COOL Panel further concluded that Mexico was unable to 
demonstrate that the United States had failed to satisfy this 
obligation.379 In particular, the undisputed evidence revealed that the 
United States had actively reached out to Mexico on the following 
occasions: 1) at four or more opportunities during the development 
of the COOL measure, where interested parties and stakeholders 
were invited to submit formal comments on the COOL; 2) at a 
USDA briefing for embassy officials on one of the interim final380 
USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (“AMS”)381 rules; 3) at a 
meeting between the AMS administrator and Mexican Embassy 
officials scheduled to discuss COOL rulemaking; and 4) at meetings 
of the United States−Mexico Consultative Committee on Agriculture 
chaired by USDA and USTR officials to discuss COOL 
rulemaking.382  
In addition, the undisputed evidence also revealed that: 1) Mexico 
had submitted comments on key elements of the COOL measure on 
several occasions in the context of such consultations, and Mexico’s 
Secretary of Agriculture had received correspondence from the 
USDA Undersecretary confirming its comments had been received 
 
 377. Id. ¶ 7.790. 
 378. Id. (internal marks omitted). 
 379. See id. ¶ 7.791. 
 380. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
9 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.federalregister.gov/ 
uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (“Interim Final Rule: When an 
agency finds that it has good cause to issue a final rule without first publishing a 
proposed rule, it often characterizes the rule as a ‘interim final rule’ or ‘interim 
rule’. This type of rule becomes effective immediately upon publication. In most 
cases, the agency stipulates that it will alter the interim rule if warranted by public 
comments. If the agency decides not to make changes to the interim rule it 
generally will publish a brief final rule in the Federal Register confirming that 
decision.”). 
 381. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 382. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 7.792. 
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and would be “fully considered” in the development of a final rule;383 
2) the USDA Secretary dispatched a letter to the Secretary of the 
Mexican Association of Secretaries of Rural Development requesting 
additional input or comments on the COOL rulemaking as part of the 
Canada−Mexico Working Group;384 3) the United States modified 
the COOL measure by softening its record-keeping requirements and 
introducing commingling flexibilities, in response to concerns 
expressed by Mexico;385 and 4) the United States had extended 
invitations for public comments on proposed, interim, and interim 
final COOL rules between 2003 and 2008.386 Consequently, the US—
COOL Panel ultimately held that Mexico was unable to demonstrate 
that the United States had failed to “take account of [Mexico’s] 
special development, financial and trade needs” when preparing and 
applying the COOL regulation, within the meaning of TBT Article 
12.3.387  
In US—Clove Cigarettes, the Panel held that “Indonesia [had been 
unable to] demonstrate[] that the United States failed to ‘take account 
of’ Indonesia’s special financial, trade and development needs” when 
preparing and applying the clove cigarette ban.388 The undisputed 
evidence revealed: 1) a 2007 correspondence from the Indonesian 
Trade Minister to the U.S. Trade Representative expressing concern 
that the proposed U.S. legislation would significantly affect 
Indonesian clove cigarette exports if not adequately amended, and 
acknowledging a U.S. Senator’s efforts to address those concerns;389 
2) a 2008 correspondence from the U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to the Ranking Member of the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce recognizing the potential inconsistency of the 
draft legislation with U.S. trade obligations;390 3) a 2008 
correspondence between the Chairmen of the House Committees on 
Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means reflecting recognition 
 
 383. See id. ¶ 7.793. 
 384. See id. 
 385. See id. ¶ 7.794. 
 386. See id. ¶ 7.795. 
 387. Id. ¶ 7.799. Moreover, since Mexico had not established a violation of TBT 
Article 12.3, the Panel also held that Mexico had failed to demonstrate a violation 
of TBT Article 12.1, as well. Id. ¶ 7.803. 
 388. US — Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.648. 
 389. See id. ¶ 7.636. 
 390. See id. ¶ 7.637. 
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that the proposed ban had triggered trade concerns;391 4) a U.S. 
Presidential Statement of Administrative Policy indicating that the 
U.S. administration had serious trade concerns about the proposed 
ban;392 5) two 2009 correspondences between the Chairmen of the 
House Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce, 
noting the jurisdiction of the latter committee over the subject matter 
of the proposed import ban;393 and 6) a 2009 correspondence from 
the Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S. Senate Majority Leader 
noting one senator’s proposed language amendment considered by 
Indonesia as appropriate to address their trade concerns with the 
proposed import ban.394 In addition, the undisputed evidence also 
revealed that Indonesian officials had participated in several high-
level meetings with U.S. officials.395  
The US—Clove Cigarettes Panel found that these multiple 
“exchanges” “demonstrate[d] that Indonesia’s concerns [had been] 
‘taken into account’ by the United States,” even though “the United 
States ultimately decided not to exclude clove cigarettes from the 
scope of the ban . . . .”396 Consequently, the Panel ultimately held that 
Indonesia was unable to demonstrate that the United States had failed 
to “take account of the special development, financial and trade 
needs of Indonesia, in the preparation and application of” the clove 
cigarette ban, within the meaning of TBT Article 12.3.397 
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
WHETHER THE EU REACH REGULATION IS A 
NON-TARIFF BARRIER TO TRADE 
This section sets forth an analytical framework based on the prior 
section’s discussion of recent WTO TBT jurisprudence. It may be 
helpful in analyzing anecdotal evidence gathered about the design, 
structure, and operation of the EU REACH regulation’s 
 
 391. See id. ¶ 7.638. 
 392. See id. ¶ 7.639. 
 393. See id. ¶¶ 7.640–7.641. 
 394. See id. ¶ 7.642. 
 395. See id. ¶ 7.644. 
 396. Id. ¶¶ 7.645–7.646. In other words, “Indonesia ha[d] failed to demonstrate 
that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 12.3 of the TBT 
Agreement.” Id. ¶ 7.649. 
 397. Id. ¶ 7.649. 
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registration/data-gathering and notification provisions and their 
actual trade effects, for purposes of evaluating: 1) whether REACH 
discriminates against or provides “less favorable treatment” to “like” 
non-EU chemicals-based products and 2) whether REACH otherwise 
imposes unnecessary obstacles to trade upon non-EU chemicals-
based substances, mixtures, or articles such that it restricts trade in 
imports more than is necessary to achieve a legitimate public 
objective.  
This framework is subject to several caveats. First, it reflects only 
readily available anecdotal evidence; additional and more robust 
empirical and/or statistical evidence will likely be required to 
undertake a more thorough REACH TBT review. Second, arguably 
insufficient time has elapsed to permit a full analysis of and the 
drawing of definitive conclusions regarding the recent WTO TBT 
rulings, especially as they may be applied to a technical regulation as 
comprehensive and complex as REACH. Third, this framework will 
likely need updating to reflect ongoing REACH review and revision 
and the emergence of possible alternative regulatory models 
discussed in this article.  
A. TBT ANNEX 1 ANALYSIS OF REACH 
1. “Technical Regulation” Test 
TBT Annex 1.1 defines a “technical regulation” to include a 
“[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.”398 
The European Commission’s initial January 21, 2004, WTO TBT 
Committee REACH notification broadly states that it applies to 
“chemicals.”399 A review of Article 3 (definitions), Article 6 
(substances on their own or in preparations), and Article 7 
(substances in articles) identifies products subject or potentially 
subject to REACH registration/data-gathering and notification 
requirements. REACH differentiates among substances by 
characterizing some as SVHCs if they possess certain characteristics 
 
 398. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1.1 (emphasis added); see also 
discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 399. See Jan. 21, 2004, TBT Committee Notification, supra note 35, at 1. 
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of toxicity, bioaccumulation, and persistence.400 It singles out other 
substances containing monomers and those serving as 
intermediates.401 It distinguishes between substances in articles 
depending on whether they are intended or unintended to be 
released.402 Other of REACH’s many provisions are quite complex 
and unclear regarding substance, preparation, and product coverage. 
REACH does not specifically refer to substances unless they are 
placed on the SVHC “Candidate” or “Authorization” lists.403 
As noted above, a prominent characteristic triggering REACH 
registration/data-gathering and notification obligations for 
manufactured and imported chemical substances on their own, in 
preparations, and in articles is that the level (volume) at which they 
are manufactured and/or imported into the EU achieves an annual 
threshold (of one ton or more for substances and mixtures and of 
more than one ton for articles containing substances). Articles 6(1) 
and 7(1) of REACH employ yearly “volume” as a metaphor for 
health or environmental “hazard,” and thereby imbue manufactured 
or imported substances, preparations, and/or substance-containing 
articles achieving this trading volume as sharing the same product 
characteristic.404 
The REACH measure is a classic legal instrument known as a 
European Community “regulation” that serves as “the most direct 
form of EU law.”405 Once REACH was adopted by the European 
 
 400. See Authorisation, supra note 75, at 1. 
 401. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 6(2) (“For monomers that are used as on-
site isolated intermediates or transported isolated intermediates, Articles 17 and 18 
shall not apply.”). 
 402. See id. arts. 7(1)(b), 7(5)(b), Annex 1. 
 403. See Candidate List of Substances of Very High Concern for Authorisation, 
EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/addressing-chemicals-of-
concern/authorisation/substances-of-very-high-concern-identification/candidate-
list-of-substances-of-very-high-concern-for-authorisation (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012) (“The identification of a substance as Substance of Very High Concern and 
its inclusion in the Candidate List is the first step of the authorisation procedure.”); 
REACH SVHC List 2012: SVHC Testing, CHEM. INSPECTION & REGULATION 
SERV., http://www.cirs-reach.com/Testing/REACH_SVHC_List_SVHC_ 
Testing.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (“Some substances from the candidate list 
will be prioritized for authorization and be included in Annex XIV (‘SVHC 
authorization list’).”). 
 404. See REACH, supra note 2, arts. 6(1), 7(1). 
 405. See What Are EU Regulations?, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_regulation_en.htm (last updated June 
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Parliament and Council in December 2006, it had binding legal force 
and effect from the designated “effective date(s)” throughout every 
Member State on par with national laws.406 In addition, REACH uses 
the word “shall” in laying down requirements in a number of its 
provisions.407  
Furthermore, REACH is supported by an enforcement mechanism 
that foresees the possibility of imposing a fine or penalty in the event 
of noncompliance. For example, pursuant to Articles 125 and 126, 
REACH effectively delegates to EU Member State national 
authorities the tasks of REACH compliance enforcement, including 
through inspections, and of imposing REACH noncompliance 
penalties.408 REACH obliges the newly constituted ECHA to 
establish a Forum for Exchange of Information on Enforcement that 
serves to oversee and coordinate EU Member State policies in this 
regard.409 In addition, REACH imparts real decision-making 
authority to ECHA,410 which the European Commission has 
classified as a “regulatory agency” able to adopt “individual 
decisions which are legally binding on third parties . . . .”411 
Moreover, REACH consistently refers to its core requirement as a 
“mandatory” requirement.412  
 
25, 2012). 
 406. See Regulations, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ 
institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l14522_en.htm (last updated Aug. 12, 
2010). 
 407. See, e.g., REACH, supra note 2, arts. 6(1), 6(3), 7(1), 7(2), 7(4), 10, 11, 12, 
14, 29. 
 408. See id. arts. 125–26. 
 409. See id. arts. 76(1)(f), 77(4), 86. 
 410. Marco Bronckers & Yves Van Gerven, Legal Remedies Under the EC’s 
New Chemicals Legislation REACH: Testing a New Model for European 
Governance, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1823, 1827 (2009). 
 411. Communication—European Agencies – The Way Forward, COM (2008) 
final, at 7 (Mar. 11, 2008); see also Veerle Heyvaert, The EU Chemicals Policy: 
Towards Inclusive Governance? 8 (London Sch. of Econ. Law, Soc’y & Econ. 
Working Papers 7/2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1111968 (“[T]he REACH Regulation establishes the 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), which will function as both the designated 
supplier of scientific expertise and opinions to the Commission, and the chief 
administrator of the scheme.”). 
 412. See, e.g., REACH supra note 2, art. 5 (signaling through its title “No Data, 
No Market,” like many other articles, that “registration”/data gathering is the core 
obligation of REACH). 
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Based on REACH’s apparent satisfaction of all three of the 
aforementioned tests or factors, REACH would arguably qualify as a 
“technical regulation” within the meaning of TBT Annex 1.  
B. TBT ARTICLE 2.1 ANALYSIS OF REACH 
1. “Like” Products Test 
In light of recent WTO jurisprudence, a REACH “like” products 
analysis in the context of TBT Article 2.1 must first identify a 
sufficiently broad scope of products to be compared. This would not 
seem to pose any difficulty considering that REACH’s 
registration/data-gathering and notification requirements are quite 
broad and apply to all chemical substances on their own, in mixtures, 
and in articles achieving a minimum annual European manufacturing 
or import volume threshold of one ton or more for substances and 
mixtures, and of more than one ton for articles containing substances, 
unless otherwise exempted.  
A TBT Article 2.1 “like” products analysis of REACH would also 
entail an evaluation of the four criteria commonly referenced in 
WTO jurisprudence: physical product characteristics, product end-
uses, consumer taste and habits (perceptions and behavior), and tariff 
classification. However, practitioners should recognize that a WTO 
Panel possesses and has the duty to exercise the authority and 
discretion to examine all “relevant” evidence.413 Legal commentators 
have adopted a two-level approach to such analysis that is logically 
consistent with how REACH registration/data-gathering, 
notification, and communication obligations flow down the multiple 
levels and various tributaries of the global chemicals supply chain.414 
This approach looks beyond specific product characteristics, 
particular end-uses, and tariff classifications to identify two broad 
comparable groups of products with respect to REACH. One group 
includes REACH-registered and REACH non-registered articles 
containing chemical substances. The other group includes registered 
 
 413. See, e.g., US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 
118 (noting that in EC—Asbestos, the Appellate Body found that the Panel must 
evaluate all relevant evidence when determining whether products are like). 
 414. See, e.g., REACH, supra note 2, pmbl., ¶¶ 17, 25, 56, 57, 62, 70; arts. 3.17, 
3.26, 3.33, 6.3, 8.3, 31−36, 38.1, 56.2 (referencing the term “supply chain”); id. 
arts. 65–66 (referencing “downstream users”). 
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and non-registered chemical substances and/or mixtures. Each of 
these groups can be broken down further into subgroups of registered 
and non-registered articles containing SVHCs and non-SVHCs, and 
registered and non-registered chemical substances and/or mixtures 
themselves containing SVHCs and non-SVHCs.  
It must be emphasized that, for purposes of analyzing the WTO-
consistency of REACH’s registration/data-gathering and notification 
requirements under the TBT Agreement, articles containing chemical 
substances, chemical substances, and mixtures can each be conceived 
of as final “products” that can be sold and used at the industrial, 
commercial, and retail levels. It should also be noted that REACH 
can potentially impose duplicative registration and notification 
requirements on a given “product” as it assumes slightly different 
forms when used or otherwise employed by different economic 
actors at different levels of the supply chain.415 Practitioners may 
wish to look into this issue more closely when analyzing REACH 
under TBT Article 2.2. 
a. SVHCs in Articles: “Like” Product Analysis 
A REACH “like” product analysis should look initially to the 
competitive relationship between imported and domestic 
manufactured finished “articles” as affected by their underlying 
PPMs, which specify the use of particular chemical substance or 
mixture inputs that may affect a product’s physical properties or 
performance characteristics.416 REACH defines the term “article” as 
“an object which during production is given a special shape, surface 
or design which determines its function to a greater degree than does 
its chemical composition.”417 “This implies that the shape, surface or 
design must be deliberately determined and given during a 
production step,” which may “include the assembly of the 
components (which can themselves be articles) of a complex 
article.”418  
 
 415. See STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP, REACH: EXCESSIVE COSTS OR CRYING 
WOLF? 1 (noting the United Kingdom’s “One Substance – One Registration” 
(“OSOR”) proposal indicates that duplicate registrations are a real concern). 
 416. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 7 (requiring registration and notice of 
substances in articles). 
 417. Id. art. 3(3) (emphasis added). 
 418. GUIDANCE ON REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTANCES IN ARTICLES, supra note 
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REACH requires the registration of individual substances in 
articles if they are manufactured within or imported into the EU in 
annual volumes of greater than one ton and are “intended to be 
released under normally or reasonably foreseeable conditions of 
use.”419 In addition, individual substances in articles not intended for 
release can, nevertheless, be subject to registration if the ECHA 
suspects that a substance is being released from an article and that 
the release presents a risk to human health or the environment—as 
may occur with SVHCs.420  
Legal commentators have opined that REACH Article 7’s 
registration/data-gathering requirement falls within the scope of TBT 
Annex 1.1’s explicit coverage of product-related PPMs421 that can 
affect the performance or physical characteristics of the final 
product.422 These commentators have relied upon prior GATT 1994 
Article III:4 case law, particularly the Appellate Body ruling in EC—
Asbestos, to support the proposition that not only can a product’s 
physical and performance characteristics include the product’s 
potential to pose human health “risks” during normal or reasonably 
 
105, § 2.2 (emphasis added). 
 419. REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶ 16, art. 7(1)(a)–(b). 
 420. Id. pmbl. ¶ 16, art. 7(5)(b)(i)–(ii); see also GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION 
VERSION 1.6, supra note 47, § 4.1. 
 421. See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the 
WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 65 (2002) 
(explaining that analysts often divide PPMs into two categories: product-related 
and non-product-related; product-related PPMs are used to safeguard the consumer 
who uses the product, and non-product-related PPMs are “designed to achieve a 
social purpose that may or may not matter to a consumer”); JOHN POLAK, TRADE 
AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOL? GEN, ECOLABELLING AND TRADE 6, 7 
(June 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/symp03_ 
gen_ecolab_e.doc (discussing the debate over the use of NRP PPMs in 
ecolabelling criteria and whether they are covered by the TBT Agreement and 
explaining that developing countries generally favor the interpretation that they are 
not covered because they fear that TBT coverage would allow developed countries 
to use NPR PPMs as disguised environmental- and labor-focused trade barriers); 
Charles Benoit, Picking Tariff Winners: Non-Product Related PPMs and DSB 
Interpretations of “Unconditionally” Within Article I:1, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 583, 
590 (2011). 
 422. See, e.g., Tietje & Wolf, REACH REGISTRATION OF IMPORTED 
SUBSTANCES, supra note 93, at 48, 49 (suggesting the TBT Agreement is only 
applicable to registering obligations concerning substances used in the production 
process that are reflected in the specific characteristics of the end product); TBT 
Agreement, supra note 5, Annex. 
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foreseeable use, but it can also alter the competitive relationship 
between a product and otherwise competing products fulfilling 
similar end-uses to the extent such health “risks” affect manufacturer 
and consumer perceptions (“tastes”) and actual buying habits.423  
In EC—Asbestos, since the putative health risks surrounding 
chrysotile asbestos had become a key concern among French 
consumers, manufacturers, and regulators, the Appellate Body ruled 
that this was a decisive physical characteristic of the previously 
imported Canadian asbestos tiles, distinguishing them from 
competing French PGC fibers in the marketplace.424 As a result, the 
Appellate Body found that Canadian asbestos tiles and French PGC 
fibers were not “like” products and, consequently, that France’s ban 
of Canadian chrysotile asbestos tiles was not subject to the national 
treatment obligation of TBT Article 2.1.425  
These legal commentators have argued that REACH’s Article 7 
registration/data-gathering requirement has similarly altered the 
competitive relationship “in the field of chemicals” to the extent that 
manufacturers of products and articles have demonstrated a decided 
preference in favor of REACH-registered substances due to their 
own competitive position having been influenced by the demands of 
health-sensitive consumers and users.426 It would certainly seem to be 
an express de jure goal of REACH to promote the registration of 
input chemicals by all product and article manufacturers no matter 
where they are located and to compel manufacturers to substitute 
input chemicals deemed hazardous to human health or the 
environment.  
However, several important inquiries remain. Do the facts also 
suggest that it is REACH’s de facto goal, through imposition of 
Article 7’s registration/data-gathering requirement, to alter the 
fundamental conditions of competition between EU and non-EU 
article manufacturers’ articles to the detriment of non-EU-produced 
articles such that they are afforded less favorable treatment than 
 
 423. See Tietje & Wolf, REACH REGISTRATION OF IMPORTED SUBSTANCES, 
supra note 93, at 51–52 (explaining that the Appellate Body’s EC—Asbestos 
decision, which reversed the Panel’s finding, expressly stated that it was 
imperative to take aspects of health or environmental protection into account). 
 424. EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶¶ 122, 125. 
 425. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 426. Id. 
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otherwise “like” EU-produced articles? Does the REACH 
registration/data-gathering requirement serve as a bona fide PPM that 
can readily identify and distinguish truly harmful articles from non-
harmful articles? Or does the REACH registration requirement 
merely create the impression and raise expectations among 
consumers and industry that REACH-registered articles are safer 
than non-REACH-registered articles? Does a “yes” answer to any of 
these questions strongly suggest that REACH-registered and non-
REACH-registered articles containing substances are not “like” 
products within the meaning of TBT Article 2.1? 
It would appear that the application of REACH’s registration/data-
gathering and notification requirements to articles containing 
substances could be more easily defended by the European Union 
against a claim of trade discrimination of “like” products where the 
substances contained in articles qualify as SVHCs.427 SVHCs 
typically include those substances fulfilling the requirements of 
REACH Article 57 and which may have been placed on the 
“candidate” list for authorization pursuant to the evaluation 
procedure identified in REACH Article 59.428 Furthermore, EU 
manufacturers and importers of articles incorporating SVHCs in 
volumes of more than one ton per year in concentrations of greater 
than 0.1% weight by weight are required to notify ECHA, which 
determines whether those articles can enter the EU market.429 SVHCs 
are defined as bearing the following characteristic properties: 
carcinogenic;430 mutagenic;431 toxic;432 persistent, bioaccumulative, 
and toxic (“PBT”);433 and endocrine disrupting.434 There is a steadily 
 
 427. See REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶¶ 22, 29, 58, 63, 69, 70, 72, 74, 76; arts. 
55, 57−59, 76(1)(e) and evolving Annex XIV (mentioning substances of very high 
concern, or SVHCs). 
 428. EUR. CHEM. AGENCY, supra note 47, § 4.1. 
 429. REACH, supra note 2, art. 7(2). 
 430. See Eur. Comm’n, Risk Assessment Methodologies and Approaches for 
Genotoxic and Carcinogenic Substances, at 37 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scher/docs/scher_o_113.pdf. 
 431. Definition of Mutagen, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/ 
dictionary?cdrid=601170 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 432. Toxins, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ 
ency/article/002331.htm (last updated May 29, 2011). 
 433. About PTBs, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/pbt/pubs/aboutpbt.htm (last updated 
Apr. 18, 2011). 
 434. Endocrine Disruptors, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH SCIS., 
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growing body of scientific evidence of probability of harm to human 
health or the environment posed by these characteristics.435  
Because the REACH-identified intrinsic properties of SVHCs, 
unlike non-SVHCs, could be credibly found to pose high-level risks 
to human health or the environment, the EU could argue that 
REACH-registered articles containing SVHCs are not “like” non-
REACH-registered articles containing SVHCs whose intrinsic 
properties would not otherwise have been identified and notified to 
ECHA. As the Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos and US—Clove 
Cigarettes found, “physical properties that make a product toxic or 
otherwise dangerous to health . . . could . . . influence the 
competitive relationship between products in the marketplace . . . 
[and] . . . the health risks associated with a product could influence 
the preference of consumers . . . .”436 
However, would this not arguably depend on how broadly the 
process of “risk assessment” is defined for purposes of determining 
whether chemical substance inputs incorporated within a given 
article pose a probable rather than possible human health risk?437 
Indeed, one of the most significant evidentiary issues the Panel in 
EC—Asbestos addressed in evaluating the “necessity” of the French 
asbestos ban under GATT Article XX was the disputed credibility of 
the risk assessment performed by the French Government upon 
which the chrysotile asbestos ban was based. The Canadian 
Government had argued that such “risk assessment” had been “cast 
 
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/endocrine/index.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2012). 
 435. REACH, supra note 2, art. 57(a)–(f). 
 436. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 118–19. 
 437. Compare 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON 
HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 2310 (L. Brown ed., 1993) (“The ordinary meaning of 
‘potential’ relates to ‘possibility’ and is different from the ordinary meaning of 
‘probability’. ‘Probability implies a higher degree or a threshold of potentiality or 
possibility . . . The dictionary meaning of ‘potential’ is ‘that which is possible as 
opposed to actual; a possibility[.]’”), with id. at 2362 (“In contrast, ‘probability’ 
refers to ‘degrees of likelihood; the appearance of truth, or likelihood of being 
realized’, and ‘a thing judged likely to be true, to exist, or to happen[.]’”). See EC 
— Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 182 (describing the 
European Communities’ objections to the Canadian Government’s claim as a 
position that argued that it is not possible to claim “legitimate expectations” with 
respect to a measure taken to protect human life or health because they are 
excluded from the scope of Article XXIII). 
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[in] very real doubt . . . [by] the French and international scientific 
communities” because, among other reasons, it had not been “a 
product-by-product and use-by-use risk assessment . . . [and had] not 
even examine[d] . . . exposures to current chrysotile products.”438  
The Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos, however, found that the 
evidence before the Panel provided the Panel with “a more than 
sufficient basis to conclude that chrysotile-cement products . . . 
pose[d] a significant risk to human life or health.”439 Consequently, it 
rejected Canada’s allegation that there was only one way to correctly 
perform a risk assessment. “[W]e consider that, as with the SPS 
Agreement, there is no requirement under Article XX(b) of the 
GATT 1994 to quantify, as such, the risk to human life or health. A 
risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms.”440 
In doing so, the Appellate Body, like the Panel, essentially adopted 
the position advanced by the European Communities in response to 
Canada’s allegations.  
First neither GATT nor the TBT Agreement lay down any rule 
whatsoever on how to perform a risk assessment. Even the SPS 
Agreement, which is not applicable in this case and which contains 
specific provisions on risk assessment, does not require the performance 
of a risk assessment in the way suggested by Canada. Secondly, there are 
in fact no internationally agreed and binding rules on how to conduct a 
risk assessment for dangerous substances like asbestos. In addition, 
neither national nor international practice (e.g. by WHO, IARC, 
FAO/Codex Alimentarius, etc.) support the views of Canada on the two 
“guiding principles” . . . . Risk assessment . . . is a very complex and 
interactive process and no one particular technique or methodology is 
always appropriate for all cases.441  
 
 438. See EC—Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 8, ¶¶ 3.331–3.332 (explaining 
that Canada argued that the Panel erred in its finding because, among other 
reasons, it was based on a false premise that did not take into account the risk 
associated with substitute products and therefore was not a thorough or complete 
risk assessment). 
 439. Id. ¶ 166. 
 440. Id. ¶ 167. 
 441. Panel Report Addendum, European Communities — Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos — Containing Products, Annex II, ¶¶ 272–73, 
WT/DS135/R/Add.1 (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter EC — Asbestos Panel Report 
Addendum] (responding to “Question 7: Canada claims that France should have 
used two guiding principles to determine which chrysotile asbestos products 
should be used: (i) risk assessment product-by-product and use-by-use, and (ii) 
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The Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos, furthermore, agreed with 
the Panel’s rejection of Canada’s allegation that France lacked a 
scientifically established threshold for exposure. 
The Panel found, on the basis of the scientific evidence, that “no 
minimum threshold of level of exposure or duration of exposure has been 
identified with regard to the risk of pathologies associated with chrysotile, 
except for asbestosis.” The pathologies which the Panel identified as 
being associated with chrysotile are of a very serious nature, namely lung 
cancer and mesothelioma, which is also a form of cancer. Therefore, we 
do not agree with Canada that the Panel merely relied on the French 
authorities’ “hypotheses” of the risk.442 
Moreover, the Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos reaffirmed the 
Panel’s determination that France’s objective of “halt[ing] the spread 
of this risk which, considering the risk identified and its extent, could 
in principle justify strict measures.”443 According to the Appellate 
Body,  
[I]t is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the 
level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given 
situation. France has determined, and the Panel accepted, that the chosen 
level of health protection by France is a “halt” to the spread of asbestos-
 
demonstration of the feasibility and effectiveness of ‘controlled use’ for each 
product. Could the European Communities comment on these arguments?”). 
 442. EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 167; see also 
EC—Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 8, ¶ 8.202 (“[T]he experts confirm the 
position of the European Communities according to which it has not been possible 
to identify any threshold below which exposure to chrysotile would have no effect. 
The experts are also agreed that the linear relationship model, which does not 
identify any minimum exposure threshold, is appropriate for assessing the 
existence of a risk. We find therefore that no minimum threshold of level of 
exposure or duration of exposure or duration of exposure has been identified with 
regard to the risk of pathologies associated with chrysotile, except for asbestosis. 
Consequently, the possibility remains that low exposure over a fairly long period 
of time could lead to lung cancer or mesothelioma.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 8.188 
(“First of all, we note that the carcinogenicity of chrysotile fibres has been 
acknowledged for some time by international bodies. This carcinogenicity was 
confirmed by the experts consulted by the Panel, with respect to both lung cancers 
and mesotheliomas, even though the experts appear to acknowledge that chrysotile 
is less likely to cause mesotheliomas than amphiboles. We also note that the 
experts confirmed that the types of cancer concerned had a mortality rate of close 
to 100 per cent. We therefore consider that we have sufficient evidence that there 
is in fact a serious carcinogenic risk associated with the inhalation of chrysotile 
fibres.”). 
 443. EC — Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 8, ¶ 8.204. 
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related health risks.444  
In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Body, like the Panel, 
essentially adopted the position advanced by the European 
Communities, namely that “existing rules permit[ted] France to 
apply its own, customary and normal rules on risk assessment to 
asbestos . . . [especially where t]he methodology applied by France 
[was] similar, if not identical, to the one usually applied 
internationally and actually used by WHO and the IARC in the case 
of asbestos.”445  
At least one legal commentator has closely examined a number of 
WTO cases involving claims brought under the SPS Agreement446 
where the traditional quantitative risk-assessment approach has long 
been vigorously challenged by an alternative holistic “qualitative” 
risk-assessment approach.447 This commentator’s findings strongly 
suggest that the WTO, in the context of the SPS Agreement, has 
finally shifted from the quantitative risk-assessment model 
 
 444. EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 168. 
 445. EC — Asbestos Panel Report Addendum, supra note 441, Annex II, ¶ 278. 
 446. See Alessandra Arcuri, Food Safety at the WTO After ‘Continued 
Suspension’: A Paradigm Shift? (Rotterdam Inst. of Law & Econ. (RILE) Working 
Paper Series No. 2010/04, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633390 (examining a number of SPS cases to discern a 
pattern of WTO jurisprudence with respect to the interpretation of key SPS 
Agreement terms, including “risk assessment”); see generally Lawrence A. Kogan, 
World Trade Organization Biotech Decision Clarifies Central Role of Science in 
Evaluating Health & Environmental Risks for Regulation Purposes, 2 GLOBAL 
TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 149 (2007) [hereinafter Kogan, WTO Clarifies Role of 
Science in Evaluating Health & Environmental Risks], available at 
www.itssd.org/Publications/GTCJ_04-offprints_Kogan[2].pdf (examining Panel 
Report, EC — Measures Affecting the Approval & Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006)); Understanding the 
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm (1998) (“The SPS 
Agreement, while permitting governments to maintain appropriate sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection, reduces possible arbitrariness of decisions and 
encourages consistent decision-making. It requires that sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures be applied for no other purpose than that of ensuring food safety and 
animal and plant health. In particular, the agreement clarifies which factors should 
be taken into account in the assessment of the risk involved. Measures to ensure 
food safety and to protect the health of animals and plants should be based as far as 
possible on the analysis and assessment of objective and accurate scientific data.”). 
 447. Kogan, Divergent Views Toward the Role of Science in Assessing and 
Managing Risk, supra note 82, at 78–88. 
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championed by industry, economists, and legal-economic scholars448 
toward a holistic qualitative risk model championed by philosophers 
of science, cognitive psychologists, political scientists, and lawyers449 
who apparently favor incorporating the European Union’s Roman 
civil law precautionary principle within risk assessments.450 This 
commentator attributes such a “paradigm shift” to the likely greater 
influence of the latter stakeholder group over WTO jurists and 
suggests that it “arguably implies that WTO Members (as long called 
for by the Member States and instrumentalities of the European 
Union) can more easily include cultural and socio-economic 
 
 448. See Arcuri, supra note 446, at 6 (contending that the quantitative-risk logic 
group is a knowledge-based group mainly fueled by economists and legal-
economic scholars that focuses on a narrow idea of risk as the probability of an 
event occurring). 
 449. See id. at 7 (“[T]he holistic-risk logic group emphasizes that risk 
assessment is value–laden and that risks can be properly defined ‘only within 
particular political and cultural contexts’. For this group, risk is a multi-faceted 
concept where the probability of a hazardous event occurring is not the only 
relevant feature; other considerations, such as the voluntary/involuntary, 
equitable/inequitable spread, and the novelty nature of the hazards, are important 
and contribute to define risk. Science is perceived as complex, entrenched with 
uncertainties and its results determined by the endorsement of certain value 
judgments; in this context some authors explicitly endorse the notion of post-
normal science. Within such a framework, public participation is considered 
central to risk analysis, where a deliberative approach to risk governance appears 
to be partly the logical consequence of such a vision of risk and science.”). 
 450. See id. at 5 n.10 (citing several treatises discussing various frameworks 
and perspectives for employing or otherwise implementing the precautionary 
principle in administrative and constitutional law); see also Kogan, WTO 
Clarifies Role of Science in Evaluating Health & Environmental Risks, supra 
note 446, at 151–55 (discussing Panel Report, EC — Measures Affecting the 
Approval & Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006), and distinguishing between the “precautionary 
approach” standard found within SPS Agreement Articles 5.1 and 5.7 and the 
European Union’s Roman civil law precautionary principle while quoting the 
decision in Appellate Body Report, EC — Measures Concerning Meat & Meat 
Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 121–24, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 
1998)); see also Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes Around, Comes Around: How 
UNCLOS Ratification Will Herald Europe’s Precautionary Principle as U.S. 
Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 83–167 (2009) (arguing that U.S. accession 
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) would 
require the enactment of federal implementing legislation and/or engender the 
issuance of presidential executive orders and memoranda that would have the 
effect of altering U.S. federal environmental laws and regulations by 
incorporating within them the European Union’s Roman civil law precautionary 
principle). 
  
580 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
considerations in the process of setting their food safety 
standards.”451  
Additional evidence arguably reflects that this change at the WTO 
tribunal level is largely indicative of the ongoing efforts of these 
same WTO member governments at a more fundamental level to 
reform the international “standards, guidelines,” and 
“recommendations” (principles of risk analysis)452 developed by the 
several “relevant international organizations” explicitly recognized 
and referenced within the text of the WTO SPS Agreement.453 The 
intended purpose of these bodies is to facilitate the development and 
international harmonization of “science-based” SPS measures and, 
consequently, to ensure that national or regional SPS measures 
otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the SPS Agreement and 
the GATT 1994 need not be scientifically “justified” (i.e., shall “be 
deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of 
this Agreement and of GATT 1994”) provided they “conform to 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations” such as 
those promulgated by said bodies.454 
These findings are important because, if the more precise 
definition of “risk assessment” contained in SPS Agreement Annex 
(A)(4)455 has conclusively changed in the context of food safety for 
 
 451. Arcuri, supra note 446, at 22. See also Pamela A. Vesilind, Continental 
Drift: Agricultural Trade and the Widening Gap Between European Union & 
United States Animal Welfare Laws, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 223, 250 (2011) 
(suggesting that the Appellate Body has shown a willingness to apply the holistic-
risk logic in determining whether a rational relationship exists, as opposed to the 
stricter quantitative-risk logic). 
 452. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations on Agriculture – A Resource Manual, ch. III, Module 12, § 
12.1.1, art. 1.4.1.1; § 12.1.3, art. 1.4.1.3; § 12.2.3, art. 1.4.2.3; § 12.2.4, art. 1.4.2.4 
(relating to Qualitative Risk Assessment), available at http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/003/x7354e/x7354e12.htm. 
 453. SPS Agreement, supra note 12, Annex A(3)(a)–(d). 
 454. SPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 3(2). 
 455. See Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Dispute Settlement Panel of the 
World Trade Organization, EC: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, at 7, WT/DS291-93 (Apr. 30, 2004) (“Only the SPS agreement, 
and no other WTO agreement, imposes on its Members an obligation to base 
regulations on scientific evidence, regardless of whether there is discrimination. 
This so-called ‘sound-science’ obligation means a higher justificatory burden on 
all WTO Members wishing to regulate GMOs and permits complaining parties to 
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purposes of applying the stringent standards of SPS Agreement 
Articles 5.1 and 5.2,456 it will also likely change for purposes of 
assessing health risks in the less scientifically circumscribed context 
of the TBT Agreement—i.e., when undertaking a “like” product 
analysis under TBT Article 2.1 of non-food products (e.g., cigarettes) 
or of the non-food aspects of food products (e.g., the environmental 
or country-of-origin aspects of non-product-related PPM labeling 
measures).457 
ECHA has arguably reflected such “evolved” thinking in two 
recent versions of its registration guidance document. The most 
recent version of the document released in May 2012 enhances the 
prior version’s discussion of the necessary procedure for preparing a 
CSR as part of a registration technical dossier for substances 
manufactured within or imported into the EU in volumes of ten tons 
or more per year.458 A CSR is described as entailing the preparation 
of a hazard assessment, an exposure assessment, and a risk 
characterization.459 References to “qualitative” or “semi-quantitative” 
risk assessment appear in the exposure-assessment and risk-
characterization stages, the stated goal of which is to establish that 
chemical substances pose zero risk to human health or the 
environment, consistent with REACH’s objective of ensuring a high 
level of protection of human health and the environment as called for 
by the EU precautionary principle.460  
 
challenge such regulations on the basis of the underlying scientific evidence and 
reasoning. The centrality of these concepts is widely recognized.”); see also 
Arcuri, supra note 446, at 9 (interpreting the definition of Annex A(4) to the SPS 
Agreement to mean that the calculation of probability is not necessary for risk 
assessments concerning food-borne risks, a distinction that reflects the assessment 
for quarantine risk responding to quantitative risk logic while the assessment for 
food-borne risks responds to the holistic logic). 
 456. SPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 5(1)–(2). 
 457. See Charnovitz, supra note 421, at 65 (“Non-product related PPMs are 
designed to achieve a social purpose that may or may not matter to a consumer.”). 
 458. GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 5.3. 
 459. Id. §§ 5.3.1.1.1, 5.3.1.2, 5.3.1.3, tbl.5, pts. (A)–(B). 
 460. See id. § 5.3.1.3 (“The risk characterization shall be carried out for each 
exposure scenario for both the human health and the environment and the results 
and discussion reported in section 10 if the CSR. As the purpose is to prove that 
the risks are controlled it is expected that the results of the risk characterization 
should not indicate a risk.”) (emphasis added); see also REACH, supra note 2, 
pmbl., ¶¶ 9, 69, art. 1(3). 
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This perceived paradigm shift at the WTO would arguably make it 
easier for the EU to distinguish REACH-registered articles deemed 
harmful on the basis of a flexible qualitative or semi-quantitative risk 
assessment that focuses on potential human health and environmental 
hazards without necessarily examining probable exposure scenarios 
from non-REACH-registered articles evaluated outside the EU 
pursuant to a strictly quantitative risk-assessment protocol that 
focuses instead on actual or probable substance exposure scenarios. 
This result would be obtained because the relatively lower hazard 
threshold for assessing product harm would enable the EU to 
characterize REACH-registered articles as no longer being 
“substitutable” by non-REACH-registered articles within the 
meaning of TBT Article 2.1. 
Lastly, because the perceptions consumers would have of SVHCs 
versus non-SVHCs would likely be different once their respective 
physical properties, including the health risks they engender, have 
been identified via the REACH-registration process, the EU could 
more easily defend on grounds of “non-substitutability” (“non-
likeness”) its distinct treatment of REACH-registered articles 
containing SVHCs vis-à-vis articles containing non-SVHCs, whether 
or not REACH registered.  
b. Non-SVHC Substances on Their Own and in 
Preparations/Mixtures: “Like” Product Analysis 
A REACH “like” product analysis could also focus on the 
relationship between groups of REACH-registered non-SVHCs and 
groups of non-REACH-registered non-SVHCs. These include non-
SVHCs sold and used for any commercial, consumer, or industrial 
purpose including as an industrial intermediate that no longer 
resides in the final manufactured or processed product, given the 
registration requirement for monomers but not polymers.461 
REACH’s registration/data-gathering requirement applies to all 
manufactured or imported non-SVHCs not incorporated within 
articles, if sold or used on their own or in preparations/mixtures in 
annual volumes of one ton or more. The registration burden 
imposed on non-SVHCs increases thereafter depending on the 
extent to which a substance’s annual manufacturing or import 
 
 461. REACH, supra note 2, art. 6. 
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volume exceeds the minimal annual volume threshold.462  
Unlike SVHCs, the EU institutions rely almost entirely on 
REACH’s volume-based registration requirement to distinguish non-
REACH-registered non-SVHCs from REACH-registered non-
SVHCs, especially those with intrinsic characteristics that are not 
readily identifiable as “highly dangerous” or “hazardous” from a 
registration dossier.463 As previously noted, REACH uses volume as 
an “across-the-board” “proxy for exposure” and risk to both people 
and their environment464—i.e., as a virtual administrative 
presumption of harmfulness. Therefore, ECHA, EU Member State 
national authorities, and registrants are not required to undertake an 
exposure-based risk assessment or preliminary risk-screening 
exercise with respect to such substances until more information 
becomes available in REACH’s subsequent evaluation and 
authorization stages.  
In the absence of any truly harmful or “hazardous” intrinsic 
characteristics or evidence of risk of exposure, however, the EU 
 
 462. See Stefan Baumgarten, ECHA Updates List of Pre-Registered Substances 
Under Reach, ICIS (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/03/27/ 
9204015/echa-updates-list-of-pre-registered-substances-under.html. 
 463. See EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
“RISK” AND “HAZARD,” FED. INST. FOR RISK ASSESSMENT (E. Ulbig et al. eds., 
2010), available at http://www.bfr.bund.de/cm/350/evaluation_of_ 
communication_on_the_differences_between_risk_and_hazard.pdf (“The term 
‘hazard’ refers to the inherent property of a substance (or a situation) to cause an 
adverse effect. In this context for example the International Programme on 
Chemical Safety (IPCS) defines a ‘hazard’ as the: Inherent property of an agent or 
situation having the potential to cause adverse effects when an organism, system, 
or (sub) population is exposed to that agent. (IPCS 2004, 12) Generally speaking 
‘risk’ is deemed to be the possibility of the occurrence of a harmful event. . . . The 
IPCS definition of risk is broader and is also used in this report: The probability of 
an adverse effect in an organism, system, or (sub) population caused under 
specified circumstances by exposure to an agent. (IPCS 2004, 13) This definition 
highlights the fact that the difference between ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’ like in exposure. 
A risk exists when there is exposure to a ‘hazard’, in a nutshell: risk = (hazard, 
exposure).”) (emphasis added). 
 464. See ADAM D. K. ABELKOP ET AL., Regulating Industrial Chemicals: 
Lessons for U.S. Lawmakers from the European Union’s REACH Program, IND. 
SCH. OF PUB. & ENVTL. AFFAIRS 22 (2012), available at http://www.indiana.edu/ 
~spea/faculty/pdf/REACH_report.pdf (explaining that the current timetables for 
registration under REACH emphasize a registrant’s production volume and stating 
that the consideration of production volume as a valid surrogate for exposure and 
risk to human health and the environment is a questionable assumption to make). 
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would arguably find it difficult to defend any distinct treatment it 
might accord to non-REACH-registered non-SVHCs vis-à-vis 
REACH-registered non-SVHCs against a claim of trade 
discrimination on the grounds that they are not “like” products. 
Unlike with SVHCs, an importer’s violation of REACH Article 5’s 
“no data, no market” rule in respect to non-SVHCs may not be 
automatically perceived by consumers and commercial and industrial 
users along supply chains as reflecting that non-REACH-registered 
non-SVHC imports are less “safe” than domestically produced 
REACH-registered non-SVHCs.  
In addition, unlike SVHCs, it may not also be true that an Article 5 
violation would induce changes in consumer and user buying habits. 
Even if such changes could be induced, it is arguable that they would 
be government-driven, consequently rendering their credibility as 
bona fide expressions of market preference for registered non-
SVHCs highly suspect since the choice of product “substitution” 
would have been removed.465 A REACH “like” product analysis of 
non-SVHCs, therefore, must consider whether the EU has run afoul 
of the EC—Sardines Panel’s admonition against the use of 
government-induced consumer distinctions capable of creating 
“‘self-justifying’ regulatory trade barriers.”466  
2. “Treatment No Less Favorable” Test 
If a REACH “like” products analysis reveals the existence of 
“like” EU and non-EU “chemical substance-based products”—
articles, substances, or mixtures—practitioners should seek to 
determine whether the REACH registration/data-gathering and 
notification requirements accord less favorable treatment to such 
non-EU “like” products, within the meaning of TBT Article 2.1.  
Recent jurisprudence indicates that a TBT Article 2.1 “treatment 
no less favorable” analysis of REACH should aim to compare 
“groups” of “like” products in a competitive relationship. If 
necessary, practitioners should consult with their non-EU clients for 
 
 465. See Tietje & Wolf, REACH REGISTRATION OF IMPORTED SUBSTANCES, 
supra note 93, at 51–53 (assessing whether the REACH registration criteria for 
substances in articles give rise to different competitive positions for the relevant 
products and asserting that it is strongly dependent on whether considerations 
regarding potential hazards to health and the environment affect these positions). 
 466. EC — Sardines Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶ 306. 
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purposes of assembling further evidence establishing that a 
sufficiently close competitive relationship exists between identifiable 
groups of EU and non-EU chemical substance-based products both 
prior to REACH’s adoption and during its pre-registration and 
notification-implementation phases. As the Appellate Body in US—
Clove Cigarettes noted, evidence could arguably extend as far back 
in time as the legislative debates and Internet consultations that led to 
the adoption of the prior and current versions of REACH in order to 
demonstrate that REACH has long cast a “chilling effect” on non-EU 
chemical substance-based products in the EU market, especially 
those comprising or containing SVHCs.467 It must be shown not only 
that REACH has imposed differential treatment of “like” imported 
chemical substance-based products, but also that such differential 
treatment altered the fundamental conditions of competition in the 
EU market to such an extent that it disadvantaged and discriminated 
against “like” imported chemical substance-based products.  
This type of analysis should begin with an assessment of whether 
REACH’s text de jure discriminates between “like” imported and 
domestic chemical substance-based products, and if not, whether 
these REACH requirements operate in a way that de facto 
discriminates against such “like” products. Because REACH’s 
registration/data-gathering and notification provisions do not 
expressly discriminate against imported chemical substance-based 
products, this analysis must focus on the design, architecture, 
revealing structure, operation, and application of such provisions. 
While it is not necessary to focus on REACH’s actual economic 
effects in the EU marketplace, available econometric data may be 
helpful in showing how these REACH provisions operate and if they 
are capable of altering the fundamental conditions of competition 
between “like” chemical substance-based products to the economic 
disadvantage of non-EU chemical substance-based imports.  
Prior TBT Committee meeting minutes strongly suggest that 
REACH’s registration/data-gathering and notification provisions 
could, in certain situations, potentially discriminate against “like” 
 
 467. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 9 November 2007, supra note 
83, ¶ 28 (describing questions and concerns of WTO members with regard to the 
REACH regulation and its implementation, including the “chilling effect” of 
having a substance placed on the authorization candidate list). 
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non-EU chemical substance-based products in EU markets. 
Practitioners are advised to review each of the following scenarios 
with their non-EU clients to assess whether any new probative 
evidence is available that would further substantiate these claims.  
a. Potential EU Member State Discrimination Arising from Article 
Registration, Including Those Containing SVHCs 
The minutes of TBT Committee meetings convened during 2008–
2010 reveal that several WTO Members had discussed how six EU 
Member State national authorities had intentionally interpreted the 
term “article” inconsistently with ECHA guidance documents so that 
REACH’s registration/data-gathering and notification requirements 
would then apply at the sub-article level.468 It was reported that such 
activities had occurred with respect to two different groups of non-
EU chemicals-based product imports: articles containing SVHCs and 
semi-finished steel products.469  
In the first case, the United States and Japan had alleged that such 
treatment could potentially result in the segmentation of their 
chemical substance-based articles into distinct sub-articles, in the 
SVHC composition of some such sub-articles exceeding the 
maximum 0.1% weighted threshold, in the triggering of the REACH 
Article 7(2) notification requirement, in the time-consuming and 
costly evaluation of such chemical substance-based sub-articles 
pursuant to REACH Article 7(5), and, consequently, to the potential 
inclusion of these incorporated chemical substances (designated as 
“SVHCs”) on the REACH “candidate list.” They expressed concern 
that such designation would, in turn, result in a more in-depth and 
 
 468. See EU REACH – Dissenting Member State Views on SVHCs in Articles, 
59 SPARKLE, Aug. 19, 2011, available at http://www.intertek.com/ 
uploadedFiles/Intertek/Divisions/Consumer_Goods/Media/PDFs/Sparkles/2011/sp
arkle595.pdf (explaining the non-legally binding ECHA Guidance on 
Requirements for Substances and Articles and noting that several Member States 
have a dissenting view that regards articles within a “complex” article as a 
collection of several individual articles within an article); see also France Begs to 
Differ on SVHC, MOLECULE NEWSLETTER, June 2011, at 1, available at 
http://www.ecomundo.eu/fr/pdf/The_molecule_1.pdf (reporting that the French 
initiative to differ from the commonly accepted definition of an article under 
REACH “raised eyebrows everywhere”). 
 469. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 99; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 38. 
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costly evaluation pursuant to REACH Article 59(1) that could 
possibly end in the restriction or banning of such article(s) within 
said EU Member State markets, pursuant to the provisions of 
REACH Title VIII.470  
Furthermore, the United States and Japan sought clarification 
regarding how this inconsistency in interpretation at the EU regional 
and Member State levels would affect the further obligation of non-
EU manufacturers and importers to communicate such SVHC 
presence to downstream supply chain users, pursuant to REACH 
Article 33.471 Apparently, these WTO Members expressed genuine 
concern that such EU Member State activities could potentially 
create a relatively higher cost structure for chemicals-based product 
imports that would place those products at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the domestically manufactured “like” products 
of EU competitors and, consequently, alter the fundamental 
conditions of competition for such products within Member State 
national markets.472  
These WTO Member concerns, which are arguably related to EU 
Member States’ delegated responsibility to evaluate SVHCs 
identified by ECHA, are not necessarily unfounded.473 According to 
at least one legal commentator, the ability of ECHA, a central 
element of REACH,474 to curtail objectionable and potentially trade-
discriminatory EU Member State behavior may be hamstrung by EU 
 
 470. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 99; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 38. 
 471. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra note 
83, ¶ 45; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, supra 
note 83, ¶¶ 58. 
 472. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra note 
83, ¶¶ 148–51. 
 473. EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON DOSSIER AND SUBSTANCE 
EVALUATION § 1.3.2 (2007) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON DOSSIER AND SUBSTANCE 
EVALUATION], available at http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/ 
evaluation_en.pdf; see Bronckers & Van Gerven, supra note 410, at 1832 
(asserting that the Member States must evaluate the substances themselves while 
the ECHA plays a coordinating and supervisory role). 
 474. See Eurostat, supra note 55, at 31 (explaining the essential conditions for 
the implementation of REACH and naming the establishment of the European 
Chemicals Agency as one central element). 
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Member State influence.475 For example, ECHA’s REACH Article 
51 dossier evaluation “decision-making process [has been] found to 
be largely dominated by the Member States,” which are “able to 
exert considerable control over the Agency through [ECHA’s] 
Management Board . . . .”476 In addition, this process may lead to 
Commission interference.477 Therefore, the commentator “concluded 
that the Chemicals Agency is subject to considerably tighter Member 
State (and Commission) control” than is generally recognized.478  
Indeed, in June 2011, the French Government, supported by 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, published 
legally binding guidelines directing chemical substance-based 
product companies to report SVHCs that exceeded the 0.1% 
threshold with respect to each product component.479 These 
governments embraced this position despite its inconsistency with 
official ECHA guidance interpreting REACH Article 7(2) to require 
notification only if the entire product exceeds the SVHC threshold.480 
As reported by Bloomberg BNA, the French guidelines were 
“sharply at odds with official EU guidance and could [potentially] 
raise compliance costs and image problems for French importers and 
manufacturers” and, by implication, also for the importers and 
manufacturers from the other countries cited. 481  
 
 475. See Bronckers & Van Gerven, supra note 410, at 1827 (“[F[or many 
decisions ECHA remains under the direct supervision of the Member States. This 
is apparent from the important role played within ECHA by the so-called Member 
State Committee, whose members are appointed by the Member States and who are 
not subject to a rule that they may not accept instructions from the Member 
States.”) (emphasis added). 
 476. TANJA EHNERT, UNIV. OF MAASTRICHT, THE EUROPEAN CHEMICALS 
AGENCY – BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE MERONI DOCTRINE? 62 (2008), available at 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/3928.pdf. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. 
 479. See Rick Mitchell, French Interpretation of REACH Reporting Rules Could 
Hurt Competitiveness, Hike Costs, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.bna.com/french-interpretation-reach-n12884902434/ (reporting that 
five other member states support France’s new guidelines for reporting the 
presence of substances of very high concern in products under REACH, which are 
at odds with official EU guidance). 
 480. See id. (reporting that the French system applies to each individual product 
component, while ECHA’s system only applies “if the entire product exceeds the 
SVHC threshold”). 
 481. Id. 
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Moreover, such treatment could also potentially violate 
international trade rules if, as was alleged, France had failed to abide 
by an EU directive requiring the EU Commission to be notified 
about technical regulations and standards when they are proposed—
before they have been adopted.482 The directive’s apparent objective 
was to prevent foreseeable trade barriers from arising from proposed 
EU regional technical regulations and standards, consistent with TBT 
Article 2.9.483 France explained that, since its guidelines were only 
“opinions” and did not rise to the level of “technical regulations,” it 
was not obligated to notify the Commission about their adoption.484 
Practitioners should factor into their Article 2.1 analysis whether the 
EU Commission is capable of adequately addressing this situation 
without emboldening other EU Member States to proceed in “like” 
fashion. 
In the second case, BRICS nations and developing country WTO 
Members relayed to the TBT Committee how several EU Member 
States’ had treated semi-finished steel products as alloys—substance 
mixtures composed of individual substances—subject to the 
burdensome and costly substance pre-registration requirements of 
REACH Article 6, rather than as finished products subject to Article 
7’s relatively less burdensome and costly articles pre-registration 
requirements.485 These members had alleged that such EU Member 
State treatment could potentially place non-EU chemicals-based 
product imports at a competitive disadvantage.486 This decision 
conflicted with ECHA’s recent detailed guidance documents on 
 
 482. See, e.g., Directive 98/34/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 June 1998 Laying Down a Procedure for the Provision of 
Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1998L0034: 
20070101:EN:PDF. 
 483. See UK DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, GUIDANCE FOR OFFICIALS 
AVOIDING NEW BARRIERS TO TRADE: DIRECTIVE 98/34/EC (AS AMENDED BY 
DIRECTIVE 98/48/EC) 3 (2009) (U.K.), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/ 
assets/biscore/corporate/docs/a/02-1434-avoiding-new-barriers-to-trade (setting 
forth a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations). 
 484. Mitchell, supra note 479. 
 485. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3–4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 99; see discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
 486. See discussion supra Part II.C.5. 
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substances in articles.487 It also ran counter to ECHA’s written accord 
with the EUROFER trade association’s assessment that semi-
finished steel products should be treated pursuant to a special 
borderline case analysis tailored specifically to metals processing.488 
Once again, WTO Member governments were most concerned that if 
such EU Member State behavior were permitted to continue, it 
would encourage similar actions to the detriment of imports.489  
It may be possible to characterize these unilateral and ECHA-
inconsistent EU Member State actions as more than ordinary 
regulatory distinctions imposed to pursue a legitimate public 
objective, i.e., as de facto discrimination, within the meaning of TBT 
Article 2.1. However, practitioners will first need to secure 
supporting documentation from their non-EU clients demonstrating 
that such actions were intentionally designed or implemented, or 
otherwise had the effect through their operation of indirectly altering 
the fundamental conditions of competition between “like” product 
groups of REACH-registered and REACH non-registered chemical 
substance-based products by administratively imposing an added 
cost structure upon non-EU-based product imports.  
 
 487. GUIDANCE ON REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTANCES IN ARTICLES, supra note 
105, tbls.1–16; id. app. 2.1, Aluminum Processing as an Example of Metal 
Processing; see id. at Note to Reader (informing readers that the consulted national 
authorities did not completely support the ECHA guidelines and therefore warning 
companies that they may find that enforcement practices diverge with respect to 
some aspects of the guidelines). See generally Meike Wolf, European Comm’n, 
Functioning of Directive 98/34/EC (2008), at 4, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CACM_EU/Negotiations/IIround_directive9834EC_
e.pdf (explaining the functioning of Directive 98/34/EC by examining the 
objectives and scope of application of the Directive, underlying principles, related 
definitions, results of the procedure, and statistics). 
 488. See EUROFER POSITION PAPER, supra note 110, at 4 (recognizing the 
ECHA guidance’s acknowledgement of the Iron and Steel industries’ position on 
the borderline between preparations/articles for steel and steel products, which is 
the same as that expressed in the position paper); see also GUIDANCE ON 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTANCES IN ARTICLES, supra note 105, at 10 (providing 
indicative questions to better determine whether an object is an article in difficult 
cases such as semi-finished products). See generally Letter from Andreas Herdina, 
supra note 111, at 1–2 (addressing issues raised in a letter to the Chairman of the 
ECHA Management Board regarding the application of the rules found in the 
Guidance on Requirements for Substances in Articles to steel and steel products). 
 489. See, e.g., TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23 March 2004, 
supra note 83, ¶ 36. 
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b. Potential EU Member State Discrimination Arising from  
REACH Registration-Related Compliance Inspections and 
Enforcement Penalties 
Under REACH, ECHA is responsible for undertaking IT-based 
registration “completeness checks” to ascertain that all the required 
elements of the registration dossier are present and that the 
registration fee has been paid.490 REACH also holds ECHA 
responsible for undertaking dossier evaluations, or “compliance 
checks,” to ensure dossier compliance with REACH registration 
requirements and examination of testing proposals to ensure against 
unnecessary animal tests.491 However, REACH is relatively silent 
regarding how incomplete or inadequate registration dossiers should 
be addressed where registrants fail to supply the additional 
information that ECHA has demanded.492 Given REACH’s 
delegation of responsibility for registration and evaluation of 
compliance enforcement to EU Member State inspections493 and 
penalties,494 ECHA’s authority in this situation is effectively limited 
to drawing compliance failures to Member State enforcement 
authorities’ attention and requesting that such failures be investigated 
and subject to enforcement.495 
Minutes from TBT Committee meetings convened from 2008–
2011 reflect WTO Member discussions about how REACH’s 
delegation of inspection and penalty responsibilities to EU Member 
State national authorities had resulted in non-uniform, 
nontransparent, and costly REACH-related inspection procedures;496 
 
 490. REACH, supra note 2, art. 20(2). 
 491. Id. arts. 40–42; GUIDANCE ON DOSSIER AND SUBSTANCE EVALUATION, 
supra note 473, §§ 1.3.1, 1.3.1.1, 1.3.1.2, 2.2.4.1. 
 492. REACH, supra note 2, arts. 40–41; see also EU Member States 
Investigating Poor Quality Dossiers, CHEMICAL WATCH (May 9, 2012), 
http://checmicalwatch.com/11040 (citing the UK’s Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (“DEFRA”) for three mechanisms to use to address 
incomplete or inadequate registration dossiers). 
 493. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 125 (stating that Member States must set up 
and maintain official controls and other supplementary activities designed to fit the 
circumstances). 
 494. See id. art. 126 (stating that Member States’ penalties for infringement of 
REACH provisions “must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive”). 
 495. EU Member States Investigating Poor Quality Dossiers, supra note 492, at 
2. 
 496. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of November 2008, supra 
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extra-REACH (and perhaps, ultra vires497) registration/data-gathering 
and presentation evidentiary standards imposed during the course of 
investigations;498 and excessively high penalties in the event of 
noncompliance.499 WTO Members emphasized how such impositions 
could potentially result in distinct and less favorable treatment being 
accorded to groups of “like” non-EU chemical substance-based 
products to their detriment, with the consequent administrative 
burdens, costs, and market access delays inuring to the benefit and 
trade advantage of European-based competitors operating in those 
national markets.500 While ECHA lacks direct enforcement authority 
over REACH registration and evaluation-related compliance issues, 
it is responsible for establishing and overseeing the Forum for 
Exchange of Information on Enforcement (the “Forum”) for 
purposes of coordinating Member State enforcement activities.501 
 
note 83, ¶¶ 162−63; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18−19 March 
2009, supra note 83, ¶¶ 171, 176; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 57; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 
24–25 March 2011, supra note 83, ¶ 150. 
 497. See EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, Introduction to MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR 
REACH AND CLP INSPECTIONS, ¶¶ v–vi (2011) [hereinafter MINIMUM CRITERIA 
FOR REACH AND CLP INSPECTIONS], available at http://www.echa.europa.eu/ 
documents/10162/13577/mcri_minimum_criteria_reach_inspections_2011_en.pdf 
(stating that the document seeks to establish guidelines, not replace Member State 
systems of inspection); see also TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3, annex 1.7 
(providing for the handling of technical regulations at lower levels of government 
and also in non-government bodies). 
 498. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 150; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 57; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 
2009, supra note 83, ¶ 176 (Belgium and Netherlands). 
 499. See, e.g., TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18−19 March 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 176 (France, United Kingdom). 
 500. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of November 2008, supra 
note 83, ¶¶ 162–63. 
 501. REACH, supra note 2, art. 76(1)(f); see EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, RULES OF 
PROCEDURE FOR THE FORUM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON ENFORCEMENT 
art. 1(1)–(2), Doc. MB/36/2011 final (2011) [hereinafter RULES OF PROCEDURE 
FOR THE FORUM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON ENFORCEMENT], available at 
http://www.echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/forum_procedures_rules_en.p
df (stating that the Agency shall comprise the Forum to coordinate a network of 
Member States authorities responsible for enforcement of the regulation); see also 
REACH, supra note 2, art. 77(4)(b)–(f) (detailing the tasks of the Forum and 
specifying that it propose, coordinate, and evaluate enforcement projects and joint 
inspections; coordinate exchange of inspectors; identify enforcement strategies and 
best practices in enforcement; develop methods for local inspectors; and develop 
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ECHA’s prescribed role is to recommend and loosely coordinate the 
enforcement activities, including inspections, to be undertaken 
directly by each Member State’s national authority or inspectorate.502 
EU Member States, rather, are held individually responsible for 
directly enforcing registrants’ REACH registration compliance 
obligations.503 To this end, Member State national authorities have 
adopted administrative enforcement measures, monitoring 
procedures, and controls504 and have enacted national legislation that 
impose penalties to ensure REACH registration compliance.505 A 
recent ECHA Forum strategy document reflects that a Member State 
national authority’s inspection program must now “include 
procedures for both planned, proactive inspections, as well as 
reactive, ad hoc investigations in case of complaints,” and it must 
provide for follow-up actions were an incident or accident “event” to 
occur.506 It also indicates that, since the most important aim of the 
enforcement process is the protection of human health and the 
environment, any differences or inconsistencies between the 
particular inspection and investigation methodologies employed by 
enforcing national authorities will be tolerated as long as effective 
REACH compliance is achieved.507  
 
an electronic information-exchange procedure). 
 502. REACH, supra note 2, arts. 77(4)(b)–(d), 125; see RULES OF PROCEDURE 
FOR THE FORUM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON ENFORCEMENT, supra note 
501, art. 2(1)(b)–(c) (laying out tasks the Form should undertake in relation to 
Article 77(4) of REACH and Article 46(3) of CLP); see also Enforcement Forum, 
EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://www.echa.europa.eu/web/guest/about-us/who-we-
are/enforcement-forum (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (displaying ECHA’s role in 
establishing enforcement forums for Member States’ national inspectorates). See 
generally National Inspectorates, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://www.echa.europa 
.eu/web/guest/regulations/enforcement/national-inspectorates (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012) (providing links to the individual countries’ national inspectorates). 
 503. See Enforcement, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://www.echa.europa.eu/web/ 
guest/regulations/enforcement (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 504. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 125. 
 505. See id. art. 126. 
 506. EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, STRATEGIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATION 
(EC) NO. 1907/2006 CONCERNING THE REGISTRATION, EVALUATION, 
AUTHORISATION & RESTRICTION OF CHEMICALS (REACH) & OF REGULATION 
(EC) NO. 1272/2008 ON THE CLASSIFICATION, LABELING AND PACKAGING OF 
SUBSTANCES AND MIXTURES (CLP) 11 (2011), available at 
http://www.echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/strategies_enforcement_reach
_2011_en.pdf. 
 507. Id. at 10 (“Generally, enforcement includes inspections, investigations, 
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WTO Member concerns about potential EU Member State trade 
protectionism can be traced, in part, to the lack of EU-wide 
inspection standards and effective coordination between the ECHA 
Forum and EU Member State national customs authorities. During 
late 2009 and early 2010, for example, the trade press reported how 
certain EU Member State enforcement strategies revealed that some 
national inspectors “[had] been targeting major companies,” while 
others, such as the UK, had endeavored to “target priority substances 
and companies” that were suspected of REACH registration 
noncompliance.508 The trade press attributed this inconsistency to the 
variable methods EU Member States used to integrate customs 
authorities into REACH enforcement programs.509 It is also 
commonly recognized that national customs authorities possess 
“extensive powers [enabling them to] order companies introducing 
products and containers into the EU to demonstrate [REACH] 
compliance” prior to securing customs approval.510  
However, in the absence of REACH-related compliance 
documentation “that can be easily shown to appease customs 
authorities,” it was feared that such authorities would be encouraged 
to act “upon the request of other authorities targeting specific 
products or importers, or to possibly take proactive measures which 
could easily lead to arbitrary decisions to block imported 
products.”511 Furthermore, more recent trade reporting has 
emphasized how EU Member State enforcement policies “differ 
greatly depending on their actual REACH & CLP implement[ation] 
progress.”512 For example, “Greek and Danish customs have severe 
inspections on pre-registration credentials and REACH Compliance 
import certificate[s],” while “the Dutch customs agency tend[s] to 
 
formal enforcement action (such as issuing enforcement notices or instituting legal 
proceedings) and compliance promotion as well as communication with all the 
relevant stakeholders.”). 
 508. See Early Lessons to Be Learned from REACH Enforcement, CHEM. 
WATCH (Dec. 2009/Jan. 2010), http://chemicalwatch.com/3042/legal-spotlight-
early-lessons-to-be-learned-from-reach-enforcement. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Id. 
 511. Id. 
 512. Recent Update of REACH Enforcement Activities, REACH24H 
CONSULTING GRP. (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.reach24h.com/en/knowledge-
base/eu-reach/item/558-recent-update-of-reach-enforcement-activities.html. 
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review on a regular basis Only Representative qualifications[,] and 
the German customs [agency] combines risk-related market 
surveillance with the REACH & CLP compliance inspections.”513 
A March 2010 EU Commission–funded report that evaluated 
whether EU Member States had fulfilled their obligation to impose 
effective and proportionate penalties for REACH noncompliance 
offences revealed similar results, concluding that “[t]he overall level 
of harmonisation of the sanctions for infringement of REACH across 
the EU Member States and the EEA countries [was] quite low.”514 In 
particular, the report set forth the following specific findings:  
• EU Member State enforcement regimes varied extensively 
between criminal, civil, and administrative law approaches, 
from country to country, based on national legal cultural 
background;515  
• A number of countries identified a quite extensive list of 
specific REACH noncompliance offenses,516 whereas others 
employed more general terms reflecting the main obligations 
under REACH,517 or “catch-all” provisions included through 
more general references to REACH violations;518  
• EU Member States imposed various types of civil penalties, 
including monetary fines, injunctions (including market 
withdrawal), prison sentences, and public name-and-shame 
methods, as well as criminal penalties, including monetary 
fines, imprisonment, and other orders;519  
 
 513. Id. 
 514. EUR. COMM’N, Executive Summary to REPORT ON PENALTIES APPLICABLE 
FOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REACH REGULATION IN THE 
MEMBER STATE (Mar. 2010), at vi [hereinafter REPORT ON PENALTIES APPLICABLE 
FOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REACH REGULATION IN THE 
MEMBER STATE], available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/ 
pdf/report%20REACH%20penalties.pdf. 
 515. Id. at i–ii, 50. 
 516. Belgium (federal level), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom 
employed this approach. Id. at ii. 
 517. Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
and Sweden employed this approach. Id. at ii–iii. 
 518. Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, and Norway employed this 
approach. Id. at iii. 
 519. Id. at iii, 32. 
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• Administrative and criminal fines, as provided for in 
legislation, varied from country to country with most being 
within the range of €50,000 and €1,000,000 for first-time 
REACH offenses, while six EU Member States impose 
substantially higher maximum administrative and criminal 
fines,520 and four others choose not to provide the amounts of 
fines within their legislation;521 and  
• It was too early to conclude whether the enforcement 
measures employed had been effective, considering that 
REACH is still in the early stages, notwithstanding that 
certain comparisons have already been made.522  
Although the European Commission portrayed the penalty report 
as “provid[ing] a useful input into better understanding the different 
REACH enforcement approaches and legal specificities in the 
Member States,” it apparently did not warmly embrace its 
findings.523  
European Commissioner Bjorn Hansen’s May 2012 public 
comments strongly suggest that the EU Commission acknowledges 
how variations in Member State sanctions regimes can possibly 
result in “considerable distortions” such as forum shopping.524 His 
comments also likely reflect Commission recognition that it must do 
more to ensure that such enforcement discrepancies actually “avoid 
[creating] potential market distortions.”525 They may even indicate 
Commission concern that such distortions can potentially lead to 
WTO-inconsistent trade and market access barriers, especially 
 
 520. Six EU Member States impose substantially higher maximum 
administrative and criminal fines upon first infringement on natural as well as on 
legal persons: Belgium (€1.1 million administrative, €55 million criminal); 
Germany (€1 million criminal); Ireland (€3 million criminal); Poland (€4.7 million 
criminal); Portugal (€2.5 million administrative); United Kingdom (UNLIMITED 
criminal). Id. at iv, 34. 
 521. These countries are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway. Id. at iv. 
 522. Id. at 69 (stressing that the enforcement of REACH remains in the nascent 
stage of its development). 
 523. REACH Enforcement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
chemicals/reach/enforcement_en.htm 
 (last updated Sept. 14, 2012). 
 524. REPORT ON PENALTIES APPLICABLE FOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE REACH REGULATION IN THE MEMBER STATE, supra note 514, at 1. 
 525. EU Member States Investigating Poor Quality Dossiers, supra note 492, at 
2. 
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considering how multiple ministries within some EU Member States, 
such as Latvia and Poland, “control activities relating to the trade of 
chemical substances.”526  
Arguably, the ECHA Forum’s March 2011 release of minimum 
EU-wide REACH inspection criteria527 can reasonably be interpreted 
as an attempted response to the penalty report’s recommendation that 
ECHA “ensure a minimum of consistency between the various 
sanction regimes in the Member States through cooperation and 
consultation mechanisms.”528 However, the ECHA Forum’s first 
five-year report on REACH’s operation,529 which revealed a rather 
extensive pattern of REACH noncompliance, demonstrated that 
greater efforts are needed.530 
In light of the above, practitioners should confer with their clients 
for purposes of gathering evidence of potentially inconsistent and 
arbitrary EU Member State REACH compliance-related monitoring, 
investigatory, and enforcement activities. A viable trade 
discrimination claim could potentially be brought if it can be shown 
that divergent EU Member State competent authority determinations 
of REACH registration non-compliance are undertaken in an 
“uneven-handed manner,” resulting in imported chemical substance-
based products being accorded less favorable treatment than “like” 
EU products, and that such less favorable treatment is sufficiently 
detrimental to affect the fundamental conditions of competition for 
such products in specific EU markets.531  
 
 526. REPORT ON PENALTIES APPLICABLE FOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE REACH REGULATION IN THE MEMBER STATE, supra note 514, at 61. 
 527. MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR REACH AND CLP INSPECTIONS, supra note 497. 
 528. REPORT ON PENALTIES APPLICABLE FOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE REACH REGULATION IN THE MEMBER STATE, supra note 514, at 1. 
 529. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 127 (stating that these reports should 
include common issues agreed to by the Forum and that the reports will be made 
available to the Agency and the Forum). 
 530. See generally EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, COORDINATED FORUM REACH 
ENFORCEMENT PROJECT ON REGISTRATION, PRE-REGISTRATION AND SAFETY DATA 
SHEETS—FACTS REPORT (2011), available at http://www.echa.europa.eu/ 
documents/10162/13577/ref-1_prolongation_facts_report_en.pdf (detailing how 
non-compliance persists despite the many inspections that the report discusses). 
 531. See, e.g., TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 162–63 (demonstrating many non-Member States’ concerns 
about varied treatment in enforcing REACH obligations). 
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c. Potential “Only Representative” (“OR”) Discrimination 
Other REACH provisions can also serve to indirectly disadvantage 
“like” chemical substance-based imports in EU markets because of 
how they affect the cost structure of such products. For example, 
REACH Article 3 prohibits the submission of substance and article 
registrations directly by non-EU exporters—natural or legal 
persons—of chemical substance-based products.532 Likewise, ECHA 
registration guidance clearly states that only EU-based manufacturers 
and importers—legal entities established in the EU—can register 
chemical substance-based products under REACH.533  
The Article 3 prohibition could potentially be found de facto 
discriminatory as applied to SMEs lacking a European presence on 
several grounds. First, such prohibition exposes the intellectual 
property, including proprietary and confidential business 
information, of SME exporters that must be submitted as part of a 
registration technical dossier to the risk of appropriation by EU 
competitors.  
Second, even if those exporters choose instead to open an EU 
office or to hire a REACH-recognized EU-based OR to maintain the 
confidentiality of their IP for registration purposes, as permitted by 
REACH Article 8(1), that option would necessarily entail significant 
added costs. Those costs would likely render the exporters’ chemical 
substance-based products less competitive than “like” EU-based 
chemical substance-based products, which can be registered directly 
by EU manufacturers. The cost of securing ORs can become quite 
expensive, especially for non-EU SME fragrance or paint 
manufacturers, because a “non-Community manufacturer” can 
appoint only one OR per exported substance, and “finished” 
fragrances and paints may consist of many substances, including 
SVHCs.534 As one EU Commission–sponsored study strongly 
 
 532. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 3(9), 3(11). 
 533. See GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 2.12.1; 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6, supra note 47, §§ 1.5.2.1, 1.5.3.1, 
1.5.3.3, 1.5.3.4. 
 534. GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6, supra note 47, § 1.5.3.4; see 
5th Meeting of the Competent Authorities for the Implementation of Regulation 
(EC) 1907/2006 (REACH) at 3, Eur. Comm’n Doc. CA/51/2008 (Oct. 7, 2008) 
(providing that, when a non-community manufacturer sends information to an 
importer regarding the OR, that importer becomes known as a downstream use of 
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suggests, the cost to a non-EU SME of retaining an OR to 
administrate its REACH registration obligations, while less than the 
cost of hiring dedicated REACH compliance personnel at between 
€25,000–€50,000, could potentially exceed €10,000.535  
Third, in the absence of any EU standards for OR competency, 
there is little or no assurance that selected ORs could adequately 
protect non-EU SMEs’ IP and other interests. One recently released 
report evaluating REACH’s implementation revealed that “there is 
no agreed functional description of what the expected role of an OR 
is or should be and absence of an accreditation mechanism.”536 Large 
fragrance formulators with market presence and influence, by 
contrast, would likely find it easier to secure the cooperation of their 
non-EU substance suppliers to ensure their assumption of 
responsibility for substance registrations via the hiring of their own 
ORs.537 Fourth, non-EU SME exporters of chemical substances and 
preparations had previously found it difficult to secure information 
from ECHA and REACH national HELP desks about EU-based 
 
that OR); see also VERBAND DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE E.V., MODEL 
AGREEMENT FOR A CONTRACT BETWEEN AN ONLY REPRESENTATIVE AND A NON-
COMMUNITY MANUFACTURER PURSUANT TO ART. 8 REACH (July 2008), 
available at http://wko.at/up/enet/chemie/VCI_Mustervertrag_Alleinvertreter_ 
en.pdf (outlining a legal agreement between an only representative and a non-
Community manufacturer that provides, among other things, for a party to 
reimburse the OR for any costs that arise from the OR’s activities as long as they 
fall within the agreed budget). 
 535. See CTR. FOR STRATEGY & EVALUATION SERVS., INTERIM EVALUATION: 
FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION 
OF REACH 39, 105 (2012) [hereinafter INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF 
THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH], 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/ 
review2012/market-final-report_en.pdf; id. at 40, tbl. box 4.1; see also REACH 
Registration – Joint Submission, CHEM. INSPECTION & REGULATION SERV., 
http://www.cirs-reach.com/reach/REACH_Registration_Joint_Submission.html 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (establishing that fees charged by the Chemical 
Inspection and Regulatory Service (“CIRS”) consultancy to advise the whole 
registration process and prepare the individual part of registration dossier in 
IUCLID 5 can be as much as €4,000 per substance). 
 536. INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, app. A – Case 
Studies, Case Study 8, at 60, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ 
chemicals/files/reach/review2012/market-annex_en.pdf. 
 537. See, e.g., James Calder, R.E.A.C.H.—Is Now the Time to Relax?, 
INSIDECOSMECEUTICALS.COM (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.insidecosmeceuticals 
.com/articles/2011/02/r-e-a-c-h-is-now-the-time-to-relax.aspx. 
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ORs, which further burdened such companies and added to their EU 
market cost structure.538  
Practitioners are advised to consult with their non-EU 
manufacturing clients to secure documentary evidence of the costs 
they incurred to retain ORs in order to register the substances they 
export to the EU region. In some respects, a non-EU substance 
manufacturer’s choice between registering its substances via a newly 
hired OR or a potentially disloyal EU-based importer is tantamount 
to having no choice at all. Indeed, in operation, this aspect of 
REACH is arguably akin to a “local agent” requirement, the effect of 
which may be trade-restrictive, but not necessarily trade-
discriminatory.539  
The evidence, therefore, must show how the economic IP risks of 
working with an EU “importer” and the costs of working with one or 
more ORs, together with the costs and burdens of registration itself, 
can indirectly serve to drive non-EU SME chemical substance-based 
products manufacturers out of the EU market, or to drive EU and 
non-EU product/article manufacturers from their current non-EU 
sources of chemical inputs to more economically efficient and 
reliably REACH-compliant EU chemicals manufacturers and 
formulators. In addition, the evidence must also show that these 
REACH provisions can, consequently, operate to alter the 
fundamental conditions of competition in the EU chemicals market 
to the detriment of non-EU SME manufacturers.540  
 
 538. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.c. 
 539. See, e.g., EU Statement: 1st Trade Policy Review of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (Jan. 25–27, 2012), http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/wto/ 
documents/press_corner/eu_statement_saudia_arabia_tpr.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012) (outlining an EU complaint about the restrictive nature of either a “legal 
obligation or practical necessity to use local agents”); see also, e.g., Saifur 
Rahman, WTO Urges UAE to Liberalise Trade Regime, GULFNEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 
2012), http://gulfnews.com/business/economy/wto-urges-uae-to-liberalise-trade-
regime-1.1002822; Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Body, World 
Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Qatar, at § II ‘TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT REGIMES,’ WT/TPR/S/144 (Jan. 24, 2005) ¶ 33 (detailing 
requests by WTO members to the government of UAE to do away with 
requirements for the hiring of local agents while increasing “the transparency, 
accountability, and effectiveness of government administration”). 
 540. Furthermore, depending on the robustness and sufficiency of the evidence, 
it may also be possible to show that these REACH provisions operated in an 
indirect manner that was tantamount to imposing a “local content requirement,” 
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d. Potential SIEF Discrimination 
The minutes of TBT Committee meetings convened during 2004 
and 2008–2011 reflect WTO Member discussions about how the lack 
of EU institutional oversight regarding matters of SIEF governance 
and data sharing, and LoA negotiation protocols and procedures, had 
placed non-EU stakeholders, especially SMEs, at a potential 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their EU-based competitors.541 
They alleged that EU-based SIEF lead registrants and consortium 
organizers had assumed effective control over the determination and 
allocation of testing costs and the costs of letters of access for data 
sharing charged to non-EU SIEF participants to secure referral rights 
to robust study summaries required to satisfy their REACH 
registration obligations.542  
REACH mandates the formation of SIEFs to facilitate data sharing 
and the submission of joint pre-registrations among manufacturers 
and importers of the same phase-in or non-phase-in substance.543 
SIEFs must also be accessible to downstream data holders, users, and 
other stakeholders.544 Although SIEFs are based in the EU, they are 
not legal entities545 and, therefore, are ineligible to submit 
 
contrary to GATT 1994 Article III:4 and paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List 
Annex to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMS 
Agreement”). “[L]ocal content requirements are not allowed as these will afford 
foreign products less favourable treatment than those produced domestically. In 
analysing the Illustrative List it becomes clear that it not only clarifies GATT 
Article III:4 but that it also sets out a non-exhaustive list of what measures are per 
se inconsistent with GATT Article III:4.” Paul Kruger, The Impact of WTO Law on 
Foreign Investment: The Walmart/Massmart Merger 7–8 (Tralac Trade Ctr. 
Working Paper No. S12WP03, Feb. 2012), (emphasis added) available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/02/S12WP032012-Kruger-Impact-WTO-law-
foreign-investment-WalmartMassmart-merger-FIN.pdf. 
 541. See discussion supra Part II.C.6. 
 542. See discussion supra Part II.C.7; see also GUIDANCE ON DATA SHARING 
VERSION 2.0, supra note 56, §§ 1.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.5.3, 3.4.2.2 (noting costs of testing 
and letters of access are supposed to be negotiated fairly, transparently, and 
without discrimination). 
 543. See GUIDANCE ON DATA SHARING VERSION 2.0, supra note 56, § 3.2.2. 
 544. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 29(1). 
 545. Uwe Wolfmeier, CEFIC, What to Bear in Mind When Becoming a Lead 
Registrant (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/ 
_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=5245; see Programme: REACH Lead Registrants 
Workshop, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY (Sept. 11, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=4604 
(noting the legal challenges associated with SIEF formation). 
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registrations under REACH.546 The primary aim of a SIEF, which 
serves to regroup “all pre-registrants of the same substance,”547 is to 
prevent duplicative studies, especially those that require vertebrate 
animal testing.548 Because SIEFs were creatures of the pre-
registration period and had no prescribed legal form, SIEF pre-
registrants were free to organize themselves as was necessary to 
carry out their SIEF objectives of data sharing, classification, and 
labeling and their joint submission of data obligations for both phase-
in and non-phase-in substances.549 For example, SIEF pre-registrants 
could have either established one or more formal contractually or 
rules-based “consortiums” or simply acted as independent parties in 
loose, informal cooperation with one another. They could have then 
agreed upon a set of formal SIEF operating rules and procedures to 
govern the SIEF’s activities during the 2008–2018 pre-registration 
period for phase-in substances.550 “The designation of the lead 
registrant as well as the SIEF management is under the responsibility 
of the SIEF participants.”551 
REACH SIEF participants consist of “potential registrants” and 
“data holders.” “Data holders can . . . only provide data to active 
members (potential registrants) of the SIEF and request cost sharing 
for the data supplied[;] . . . [they do not] have an active role in 
deciding on the studies to be included in joint submissions nor on the 
classification and labelling proposals.”552 Data holders can include 
only “[m]anufacturers and importers of phase-in substances in 
quantities of less than 1 tonne per year who have not pre-registered[,] 
[d]ownstream users who may be in possession of data . . . [and] 
 
 546. “Only a natural or legal person established in the EU can be a registrant.” 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 2.1.2.1 
(emphasis added). 
 547. GUIDANCE ON DATA SHARING VERSION 2.0, supra note 56, § 8.2. 
 548. REACH, supra note 2, art. 29(2)(a). 
 549. See GUIDANCE ON DATA SHARING VERSION 2.0, supra note 56, §§ 1.2.6, 
3.2.6.2, 8 (listing numerous examples of points that SIEF participants may want to 
include in an agreement laying out the functioning of the SIEF). 
 550. See id. §§ 1.2.6, 8, 8.2 (allowing that the SIEF participants can seek the 
services of third parties, such as a trade or sector association, a consultant or law 
firm, or other such service providers when detailing the terms of their cooperation). 
 551. Id. § 3.2. The joint submission will be made by a lead registrant elected by 
the other potential registrants of the same substance. See REACH, supra note 2, 
art. 11(1)–(2). 
 552. GUIDANCE ON DATA SHARING VERSION 2.0, supra note 56, § 3.2.3.2. 
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[o]ther third parties holding information on phase-in substances.”553 
Potential registrants can include EU manufacturers and importers of 
phase-in substances or articles containing phase-in substances and 
the EU “only representatives” of non-EU manufacturers of phase-in 
substances; they can also include such parties where they have filed 
on a “late pre-registration” basis.554  
At least one European legal commentator has concluded that non-
EU manufacturers are “weakly placed in relation to SIEFs as they 
themselves cannot be directly present but only through their 
importers or only representatives.”555 This same commentator also 
noted how non-EU manufacturers may also be potentially exploited 
and placed at a competitive disadvantage by participating in 
REACH-focused voluntary consortia putatively governed by binding 
contractual agreements.556 At least one Chinese regulatory consulting 
firm providing REACH registration advisory and OR services to 
Chinese and U.S. exporters of chemical substance-based products to 
the EU has had a similar experience. It found that non-EU companies 
“do not have any power to negotiate the price of letter[s] of access,” 
which “makes them very vulnerable as they need to pay whatever 
price [is] charged by [the] lead registrant or consortium.”557  
Indeed, non-EU manufacturers have incurred SIEF and consortia 
LoA costs for data sharing approaching €1 million or more and have 
encountered significant SIEF and consortium management fees. For 
example, Synthetic Amorphous Silica (“SAS”) consortium charges 
€1 million administrative fees to SIEF members representing a 
cumulative fee charged to each SIEF participant for the period 
spanning from 2010 to 2018.558 This fee does not even include data 
 
 553. Id. 
 554. Id. § 3.2.3.1. 
 555. Nicolas Gardères, REACH and the Risks of Anticompetitive Agreements, 
CHEM. TODAY (July/Aug. 2009), at 22, available at http://chemistry-
today.teknoscienze.com/pdf/garderes_reach09.pdf. 
 556. See id. at 22–23 (suggesting that the non-EU manufacturers should at least 
be able to participate as associate members and should also attend and take part in 
consortium meetings). 
 557. CIRS Receives Interviews from the European Commission DG Enterprise 
& Industry About the Impact of REACH on the Competitiveness of the General 
Chemical Industry and Non-EU Firms, CHEM. INSPECTION & REG. SERV. (July 4, 
2011), http://www.cirs-reach.com/news/CIRS_Receives_Interview_From_ 
European_Commission_DG_Enterprise_and_Industry.html. 
 558. See SAS Consortium, Criteria Applied by the SAS for REACH Consortium: 
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fees, or dossier and CSR fees.559 While the available REACH Article 
30(3) data-sharing dispute procedure offers non-EU SIEF 
participants possible redress where the owner of a vertebrate animal 
study560 “refuses to provide the proof of the costs of that study or the 
study itself,” such procedure can require the retention of counsel and, 
consequently, the incurrence of significant additional costs and 
time.561 
Practitioners are advised to consult with their non-EU 
manufacturer clients, especially SMEs, to ascertain whether their 
experiences with REACH-related SIEFs and consortia have been 
sufficiently one-sided and disproportionate as to indicate the indirect 
imposition of a relatively higher product cost and compliance 
structure not borne by their EU competitors.562 Because SIEF 
governance policies and procedures and consortia contractual terms 
may appear neutral per se and even escape EU Commission antitrust 
scrutiny,563 the evidence must demonstrate that they can potentially 
 
Calculating the Cost of a Letter of Access (LoA): Short Form of the Cost 
Calculation for Internet Publication (Sept. 9, 2012), at 2, available at 
http://www.reach-sas.org/documents/Cost%20Calculation%20SASFORREACH 
%20Consortium.pdf (detailing the inclusions in the cost such as dossier updates, 
the service of a legal advisor, communication within the SIEF, and other 
maintenance and management costs). 
 559. Id.; see CHEM. INSPECTION & REGULATION SERV., 2010 REACH 
REGISTRATION REPORT (2010), available at http://www.cirs-
reach.com/REACH/2010_REACH_Registration_Statistics_and_Report_CIRS.pdf 
(giving numbers for the potential costs of data and dossier preparation at €4 
million while confirming that administrative fees do not usually include these 
numbers). 
 560. Such studies are to be shared pursuant to Article 30(1) during the 
preparation of a joint registration dossier or following its submission. See REACH, 
supra note 2, art. 30(1). 
 561. See GUIDANCE ON DATA SHARING VERSION 2.0, supra note 56, § 3.4.2.1. 
 562. See EUR. ASSOC. OF CRAFT, SMALL & MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERS., POSITION 
PAPER: PROBLEMS FOR SMES ARISING FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REACH 
AFTER TWO YEARS OF ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE (2009), available at 
http://www.ueapme.com/IMG/pdf/0910_pp_REACH_problems.pdf (supporting 
the position that the share of costs in a SIEF or consortia should be fair and not 
discriminate against non-EU manufacturers). 
 563. See REACH, supra note 2, pmbl., ¶ 48; see also REACH Consortia Without 
Breaching Competition Law, CHEM. WATCH (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://chemicalwatch.com/1793/legal-spotlight-reach-consortia-without-breaching-
competition-law (noting that membership issues are not merely an antitrust issue 
and that different rules can apply to different members as long as they are 
essentially proportionate and acceptable from an antirust standpoint); Craig 
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operate in an uneven-handed and de facto discriminatory manner that 
results in an overall higher cost structure for, and consequential 
distinct treatment of, non-EU manufactured chemical substances in 
the EU marketplace. Furthermore, the evidence adduced must show 
that such distinct treatment has altered the fundamental conditions of 
competition in the EU marketplace for “like” groups of EU- and non-
EU manufactured chemical substances to the detriment of the non-
EU client’s products in that market.  
C. TBT ARTICLE 2.2 ANALYSIS OF REACH 
1. Technical Regulation’s “Trade-Restrictiveness” 
Recent WTO jurisprudence indicates that a TBT Article 2.2 
“unnecessary obstacles to trade” or “no more trade-restrictive than 
necessary” analysis of REACH must first focus on whether its 
disputed registration/data-gathering and notification provisions are 
“trade-restrictive.” This article’s prior discussion of these REACH 
provisions clearly reflects that they have affected the competitive 
opportunities available to non-EU-imported chemical substance-
based products within EU markets.564 Consequently, REACH’s 
registration/data-gathering and notification provisions may be 
considered to be trade-restrictive within the meaning of TBT Article 
2.2 without regard to either their specific level of “trade-
restrictiveness” or their actual trade effects.  
2. Technical Regulation’s “Objective” 
Once this initial determination has been made, a TBT Article 2.2 
analysis must next identify REACH’s policy objective(s), 
recognizing the European Union’s right, as a WTO Member, to 
establish that objective(s) for itself. Typically, a regulation’s 
 
Simpson, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, SIEFS AND CONSORTIA: COOPERATION 
UNDER REACH 16–17 (2007), available at http://www.steptoe.com/ 
assets/htmldocuments/REACH_presentation_November_2007.pdf (detailing the 
measures that all consortium members will take to avoid violating EC antitrust 
laws); Craig Simpson, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, SIEFS AND DATA SHARING: 
PRACTICAL ISSUES 12–18 (2007), available at http://www.steptoe.com/ 
assets/htmldocuments/Simpson_-_SIEFs_and_data_sharing.pdf (explaining why 
consortium members should be wary of violating EC antitrust laws and again 
laying out how to avoid doing so). 
 564. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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objective precedes the establishment of the regulation to be adopted 
or maintained. The evidence reveals that the EU white paper on a 
regional chemicals strategy setting forth the framework that led to 
the adoption of REACH expressly lists “[p]rotection of human health 
and the environment” as the primary objective of such strategy.565 In 
addition, the TBT notifications the EU submitted to the WTO TBT 
Committee concerning REACH in advance of and subsequent to its 
adoption, and which enjoy a rebuttable presumption of truthfulness 
and good faith, state that the objective of the REACH regulation is 
the protection of human health and the environment.566 An 
examination of the text of numerous REACH provisions furthermore 
reveals that the principal objective is to ensure a high level of 
protection of human health and the environment.567 The EU 
Commission has also suggested that REACH is intended to reduce 
vertebrate animal testing.568 This is more properly characterized as a 
tertiary, incidental objective.569 
Finally, a review of REACH’s design, architecture, and structure 
indicates that it was designed and structured with the purpose of 
achieving its principal objective of ensuring a high level of 
protection of human health and the environment. Arguably, the 
provisions of REACH evidence this objective by:  
• Requiring that all existing substances are tested within a 
prescribed period of time and thereafter properly assessed for 
their impact on human health and the environment;570  
 
 565. See Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a Future Chemicals 
Policy, §§ 2.2, 2.3, COM (2001) 88 final (Feb. 27, 2001). 
 566. Jan. 21, 2004, TBT Committee Notification, supra note 35, at 2. 
 567. See, e.g., REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 7, 69, 71, 76, 80, 86, 112, 
131; arts. 1(1), 31(4), 37(3), 58(2), 87(4), 123, 138(2)(b), 138(9), Annex II. 
 568. See Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a Future Chemicals 
Policy, supra note 565, at 7 (calling for a balance between protection of human 
health and the protection of laboratory animals); see, e.g., REACH, supra note 2, 
pmbl. ¶¶ 37, 40, 47, 64; arts. 13, 25(1), 117(3), 138(9). 
 569. See EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), UK DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/chemicals/reach/ (last visited Oct. 
30, 2012) (describing the limits on animal testing as companion requirements when 
putting together testing proposals to get information on substance registrations that 
had been missing). 
 570. See Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a Future Chemicals 
Policy, supra note 565, at 7–8 (requiring tests within five years, followed by 
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• Reversing the burden of proof and imposing on industry the 
responsibility of ensuring that the chemicals they place on the 
market are safe for their intended uses and of providing 
knowledge about chemicals by a) generating and assessing 
data, b) assessing the risks of the use of the substances, and c) 
providing adequate information about the risks to 
downstream users;571  
• Holding “producers of preparations and other downstream 
users” responsible for “assess[ing] the safety of their products 
for the part of the life cycle to which they contribute, 
including disposal and waste management”;572  
• Subjecting SVHCs to an authorization procedure pursuant to 
which use-specific permission will be required “before they 
can be employed in particular uses,” provided evidence 
demonstrates that such a use presents only a negligible risk or 
if such risk is deemed acceptable based on various socio-
economic factors;573 and  
• Requiring the substitution of SVHCs where suitable 
alternatives can be reasonably found.574 
3. “Legitimacy” of Technical Regulation’s Objective 
Bearing in mind the right of every WTO Member to regulate in 
order to pursue certain legitimate objectives, a TBT Article 2.2 
analysis must next evaluate whether the objective identified is 
“legitimate.” An objective’s legitimacy can generally be found in the 
“genuine nature” of the objective and its justification, as reflected in 
relevant supporting public policies or other social norms. One 
relevant mutually supporting European regional public policy and 
 
assessments of the impact the substance will have on human health). 
 571. REACH, supra note 2, tit. II: arts. 5–7, 10, 12–14, 17–-18 and tit. IV: arts. 
31–34. 
 572. Id. tit. III: arts. 25–30; see Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a 
Future Chemicals Policy, supra note 565, § 2.2 (explaining the expansion of 
responsibility to other entities within the manufacturing chain). 
 573. REACH, supra note 2, tit. VII: arts. 55–60; Commission White Paper on 
the Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, supra note 565, § 2.3. 
 574. REACH, supra note 2, tit. VII: arts. 60–63; see Commission White Paper 
on the Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, supra note 565, § 2.3 (highlighting 
the importance of this objective in making sure that a substance is safe for its 
designed use). 
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emerging social norm that REACH is intended to help achieve by 
ensuring a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment with respect to chemicals is the concept of “sustainable 
development.”575 Sustainable development also serves as the policy 
basis for a number of U.N.-based multilateral environmental treaties 
pertaining to chemicals, to which the EU is a named and active 
party.576 In addition, the legitimacy of REACH’s primary objective is 
included in the open list of “legitimate objectives” found within the 
text of TBT Article 2.2 itself: “Such legitimate objectives are, inter 
alia . . . protection of human health or safety; . . . or the 
environment . . . .”577  
Consequently, it would appear, based on recent WTO 
jurisprudence, that REACH’s primary objective of ensuring a high 
level of protection of human health and the environment is a 
“legitimate” objective within the meaning of TBT Article 2.2. 
Moreover, REACH’s incidental objective of reducing animal testing 
can also be found within the non-exclusive list of “legitimate” 
objectives set forth in the text of TBT Article 2.2: “protection of . . . 
animal or plant life or health . . . .” As noted by the Panel in US—
Tuna II (Mexico),  
[A] measure that aims at the protection of animal life or health need 
not . . . be directed exclusively to endangered or depleted species or 
 
 575. See Sustainable Development, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/ (last updated Feb. 23, 2012) (calling for the 
EU and each of its Member States to link their sustainable development strategies 
more closely); EUR. COMM’N, ENVIRONMENT FACT SHEET: SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pubs/pdf/ 
factsheets/sust_dev.pdf (defining sustainable development as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”); see also Commission White Paper on the 
Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, supra note 565, § 2.2 (pointing to the 
overarching goal of sustainable development). 
 576. See REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶ 4 (mentioning the implementation plan 
adopted by the Johannesburg World Summit); see also Press Release, Office of 
Legal Affairs, Sustainable Development Treaty-Signing Event Concludes at UN 
Headquarters: Representatives of 48 States Affirm Support for Sustainable 
Development-Related and Other Multilateral Legal Instruments, U.N. Press 
Release L/T/4370 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/ 
unis/pressrels/2002/lt4370.html (showcasing UN member states’ recent support for 
sustainable development treaties, including at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development). 
 577. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2. 
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populations, to be legitimate. Article 2.2 refers to “animal life or health” 
in general terms, and does not require that such protection be tied to a 
broader conservation objective.578  
4. Technical Regulation’s “Fulfillment” of Its Legitimate Objective 
Once REACH’s actual objective has been identified and its 
legitimacy verified, the next step in a TBT Article 2.2 analysis of 
REACH is to determine whether REACH “fulfills” this objective. 
The Appellate Body in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, US—Tuna II 
(Mexico), and US—COOL have construed the term “fulfill,” in the 
context of GATT 1994 Article XX and TBT Article 2.2, as requiring 
that a measure make a “contribution” capable of achieving the 
objective pursued.579 This determination is focused primarily on the 
degree to which the technical regulation contributes to the 
achievement of the legitimate objective as discerned from the 
measure’s design, structure, and operation, as well as from evidence 
relating to its application.580 A measure will be deemed to make a 
contribution to an underlying objective if it can be demonstrated that 
there is “a genuine relationship of ends and means between the 
objective pursued and the measure at issue,” informed by an 
examination of the regulation per se and how it operates in 
practice.581  
The Appellate Body’s analysis in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres is 
relevant to determining the degree to which the REACH regulation’s 
 
 578. See US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.437. 
 579. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 149, WT/DS332AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil — 
Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report] (stressing that the Panel’s analysis had to 
consider both the immediate effects of an Import Ban as well as the possibility that 
the Ban will actually lead to a reduction in “the exposure to the targeted risks”); 
US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 315–17 (stating that 
fulfillment of an objective by a technical regulation depends on how much that 
regulation helps to actually achieve that objective, and an adjudication panel 
should consider the regulation’s overall contribution); US — COOL Appellate 
Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 461–66 (speaking approvingly of the US—Tuna 
II Adjudication Panel’s determination of the contribution made by a technical 
regulation and then applying that same method in its own determination in the 
present case). 
 580. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶ 461 (citing US 
— Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 315–17). 
 581. Brazil — Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 579, ¶ 145; 
US — COOL Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 7.693. 
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complex and burdensome registration/data-gathering and notification 
provisions, which reflect the EU’s “chosen high level of 
protection,”582 have contributed to the achievement of REACH’s 
legitimate objective to protect human health and the environment.583 
In Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body distinguished 
between the objective of Brazil’s retreaded tire ban—“the reduction 
of the ‘exposure to the risks to human, animal or plant life or health 
arising from the accumulation of waste tyres’”—and Brazil’s 
“chosen level of protection” for achieving that objective—“‘the 
reduction of the risks of waste tyre accumulation to the maximum 
extent possible.’”584 It acknowledged that Brazil, as a WTO Member, 
was entitled to adopt and implement measures that sought a high 
level of protection of health and the environment via risk elimination 
or reduction in an effort to achieve the tire ban’s legitimate objective 
of health and environmental risk exposure reduction.585 Ultimately, 
the Appellate Body concluded that Brazil’s comprehensive 
regulatory schema was capable of materially contributing to the 
achievement of the objective of reducing the potential exposure to 
risks arising from the accumulation of waste tires.586  
Although the Appellate Body in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres assessed 
the Brazilian measure’s contribution as “a function of the nature of 
the risk, the objective pursued, and the level of protection sought,” its 
analysis arguably did not adequately address the distinction between 
a “risk” and a “hazard.”587 “A risk exists when there is exposure to a 
 
 582. In other words, the EU’s chosen high level of protection was the 
elimination or reduction of health and environmental hazards posed by chemical 
substance-based products. See GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION Sept. 2011 Draft, 
supra note 48, § 5.3.1.3. “The risk characterisation shall be carried out for each 
exposure scenario for both the human health and the environment and the results 
and discussion reported in section 10 of the CSR. As the purpose is to prove that 
the risks are controlled it is expected that the results of the risk characterisation 
SHOULD NOT INDICATE A RISK” (emphasis added). Id. 
 583. REACH, supra note 2, art. 1(1). 
 584. Brazil — Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 579, ¶ 144 
(emphasis added). 
 585. See id. ¶ 144. 
 586. See id. ¶¶ 154–55 (stressing that the Import Ban under consideration should 
be analyzed as part of the comprehensive strategy that Brazil designed and 
implemented with the goal of eliminating the negative impacts of waste tires). 
 587. Id. ¶ 145. 
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‘hazard’ . . . .”588 The Brazilian tire ban endeavored to reduce 
potential health and environmental risk exposures engendered by the 
accumulating, burning, and landfilling of retreaded tires. However, it 
did not do so by managing those particular exposure risks. Rather, it 
sought to eliminate ab initio the underlying hazards posed by 
retreaded tires based on their intrinsic characteristics that could 
potentially but not necessarily give rise to such exposure risks.  
The Appellate Body apparently agreed with the Panel’s decision 
“to conduct a qualitative analysis of the . . . Import Ban[‘s] . . . 
contribution to the achievement of its objective,” since the Appellate 
Body had not previously required “that such a contribution be 
quantified . . . .”589 Similarly, in EC—Asbestos, the Appellate Body 
permitted France to apply its own, customary and normal rules of 
qualitative rather than quantitative risk assessments to determine 
whether imported chrysotile asbestos tiles had posed a risk to human 
health.590 These determinations would appear to confirm in the TBT 
context what some legal commentators have already observed in the 
SPS context, namely the WTO’s gradual shift from the traditional 
 
 588. See EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
“RISK” AND “HAZARD,” supra note 463, at 7–8 (“The term ‘hazard’ refers to the 
inherent property of a substance (or a situation) to cause an adverse effect. In this 
context for example the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS) 
defines a ‘hazard’ as the: Inherent property of an agent or situation having the 
potential to cause adverse effects when an organism, system, or (sub) population is 
exposed to that agent. (IPCS2004, 12) . . . The IPCS definition of risk is broader 
and is also used in this report. . . The probability of an adverse effect in an 
organism, system, or (sub) population caused under specified circumstances by 
exposure to an agent. (IPCS 2004, 13) This definition highlights the fact that the 
difference between ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’ lies in exposure. A risk exists when there is 
exposure to a ‘hazard’, in a nutshell: risk= (hazard, exposure).”); see also INT’L 
PROGRAMME ON CHEM. SAFETY, WORLD HEALTH ORG., IPCS RISK ASSESSMENT 
TERMINOLOGY 1, 27–28 (2004), available at http://www.inchem.org/ 
documents/harmproj/harmproj/harmproj1.pdf (explaining that the terms “risk” and 
“hazard” are both significant in describing risk assessors, but each term when 
combined with other important expressions represents a distinct concept). 
 589. See Brazil — Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 579, ¶¶ 
146–47 (“In our view, the Panel’s choice of a qualitative analysis was within the 
bounds of the latitude it enjoys in choosing a methodology for the analysis of the 
contribution.”). 
 590. See EC — Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 162, ¶¶ 27, 167–68 
(noting a risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms, and that 
the Panel accepted France’s determination to protect against health risks by 
restricting use of chrysotile asbestos). 
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quantitative risk-assessment model toward a more holistic semi-
quantitative/qualitative risk model.591  
REACH practitioners should consider whether the regulation’s 
objective of protecting human health and the environment from 
potential exposure to risks posed by chemical substance-based 
products can be achieved via REACH’s onerous registration/data-
gathering and notification requirements, which are primarily aimed 
at identifying and reducing the underlying hazards associated with 
such substances. When determining the degree to which these 
provisions contribute to the achievement of REACH’s principal 
legitimate objective, practitioners should direct their attention to the 
following factors:  
• The basis for requiring and the nature—amount, type, quality 
(quantitative vs. qualitative)—of the data to be submitted as 
part of a chemical substance registration;  
• The capacity of—the financial and human capital resources 
available to—the relevant EU institutions to efficiently gather 
and process said information; and  
• The likelihood that such information can be meaningfully 
disseminated and communicated as intended—to transmit 
hazard information through chemical substance-based 
product supply chains and to the public via the Internet. 
a. Basis for Registration Data 
The EU Commission’s chemicals strategy white paper reveals that 
the central motivation behind REACH’s registration/data-gathering 
requirement is the EU Commission’s prior lack of knowledge about 
the properties and the uses of the thousands of substances 
manufactured within and imported into the EU.592 This information 
was said to reside primarily with industry and was generally difficult 
 
 591. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a (defining the three-part test for a 
technical regulation that is subject to the TBT Agreement as including an 
identifiable group of products, characteristics related to the products, and 
mandatory compliance with the product characteristics). 
 592. See Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a Future Chemicals 
Policy, supra note 565, at 6 (reporting that although existing substances account 
for 99% of total volume of all substances on the market, there is deficient 
information known about these substances under the current system). 
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to obtain, save for a slow and resource-intensive government-
initiated risk-assessment process.593 REACH’s registration/data-
gathering requirement is intended to generate the necessary 
information concerning manufactured or imported substances that 
would enable manufacturers and importers to assess the risks related 
to such substances and to develop and recommend appropriate risk-
management measures.594  
b. Quantity, Quality, and Types of Required Pre-Registration Data 
REACH requires manufacturers and importers “to collect all 
available existing information on the properties of the substance for 
registration purposes, regardless of the tonnage manufactured or 
imported.”595 Such information includes “test data (in vivo and in 
vitro)[,] non-test data from alternative methods[,] and information on 
manufacture, uses, risk management measures and resulting 
exposures.”596 The standard information requirements with respect to 
a given substance differ depending on annual volumes. For a 
substance with an annual volume of one ton or more, information 
regarding its physicochemical, toxicological, and ecotoxicological 
properties must be provided.597 For a substance with an annual 
volume of ten tons or more, the same information plus additional 
 
 593. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 4 November 2004, supra 
note 46, ¶ 24 (describing that REACH was implemented to resolve the difficulty of 
risk identification and the absence of an effective instrument to address 
problematic substances under the EU Chemicals Management system); see also 
Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, supra 
note 565, at 6 (explaining the ineffectiveness of having authorities conduct risk 
assessment when enterprises are the entities responsible for production, 
importation, and use of substances). 
 594. See GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 1.2; 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION VERSION 1.6, supra note 47, § 1.2 (noting that the 
registration system requires manufacturers and importers to gather information and 
submit a dossier on the substances they work with so they can use this data 
themselves for risk management). 
 595. REACH, supra note 2, Annex VI, Step 1; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION 
May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 3.1.1; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 
Draft, supra note 48, § 3.1.1. 
 596. REACH, supra note 2, Annex VI, Step 1; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION 
May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 3.1.1; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 
Draft, supra note 48, § 3.1.1. 
 597. REACH, supra note 2, Annex VII, col. 1. 
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toxicological and ecotoxicological information must be provided.598 
For a substance with an annual volume of 100 tons or more, the same 
information, plus additional information on the physicochemical 
properties of the substance and toxicological and ecotoxicological 
information, must be provided.599 For a substance with an annual 
volume of 1,000 tons or more, the same information, plus additional 
toxicological and ecotoxicological information, must be provided.600 
All relevant and available information must be documented in both a 
technical dossier and, for substances manufactured or imported in 
quantities of ten tons or more per year per registrant, in a CSR.601  
The technical dossier must include:  
• General information for the identification of the registrant 
and the substance to be registered;602  
• Substance classification and labeling information;603  
 
 598. Id. Annex VIII, col. 1 (noting there are “specific rules according to which 
the required standard information may be omitted, replaced by other information, 
provided at a different stage or adapted in another way”); GUIDANCE ON 
REGISTRATION May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, tbl.2; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION 
March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, tbl.2. 
 599. REACH, supra note 2, Annex IX, col. 1; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION 
May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, tbl.2; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 
Draft, supra note 48, tbl.2. 
 600. REACH, supra note 2, Annex X, col. 1; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION May 
2012 Draft, supra note 48, tbl.2; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, 
supra note 48, tbl.2. 
 601. GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, tbl.2; 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 5.1 (“The 
information needs to be reported in [International Uniform Chemical Information 
Database (“IUCLID”)] format, and submitted to ECHA via REACH-IT . . .”). 
 602. See REACH, supra note 2, Annex VI (including contact information of the 
registrant and location of the registrant’s production); see also GUIDANCE ON 
REGISTRATION May 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 5.2.1; GUIDANCE ON 
REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 5.2.1 (stressing the 
identification step as crucial for REACH because it enables the substance to be 
recorded accurately). 
 603. See generally Commission Regulation 453/2010, pmbl. ¶ 4, art. 1(1)–
1(2),2010 J.O. (L 133) [hereinafter Commission Regulation 453/2010] 
(“Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC will be replaced over a transitional 
period . . . from 1 December 2010 and 1 June 2015, although [during that time] 
classification of substances according to both Directive 67/548/EEC and [CLP] 
Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 is required.”); GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION May 
2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 5.2.2; GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 
Draft, supra note 48, § 5.2.2 (requiring that classification and labeling be 
submitted according to the criteria in Directive 67/548/EEC until December 2010 
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• Manufacture and use(s) information;604  
• All relevant available information on substance 
physicochemical, toxicological, and ecotoxicological intrinsic 
properties in the form of study summaries or robust study 
summaries, with robust study summaries being provided 
when a chemical safety report is required, i.e., for substances 
above ten tons per year;605 and  
• Guidance on safe use.606  
The CSR must include:  
• A chemical safety assessment of the substance’s 
physicochemical, human health, and environmental dangers 
and an assessment of whether the substance is PBT “or very 
persistent and very bioaccumulative” (“vPvB”);607  
• A qualitative or quantitative exposure assessment if the 
hazard assessment leads to a hazard classification or 
categorization;608 and  
• A risk characterization that “prove[s] that the risks are 
 
when the CLP Regulation criteria should take effect). 
 604. See REACH, supra note 2, Annex VI, § 3 (explaining required information 
like tonnage manufactured, used, or imported, and a brief description of the 
process employed in the manufacture and production of articles); see also 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 5.2.3 
(underlining that the registrant can decide how detailed his submission of 
manufacture and use information is, but there are certain items that need to be 
included). 
 605. See GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 5.2.4 
(issuing robust study summaries “facilitate[s] the evaluation work to be done by 
ECHA and eventually Member States in the frame of substance evaluation and 
may potentially avoid the need for them to request further information”). 
 606. See REACH, supra note 2, Annex VI, § 5 (including first-aid measures, 
firefighting measures, accidental release measures, handling and storage, and 
transport information); see also GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, 
supra note 48, § 5.2.5 (noting that information must be consistent with a safety 
data sheet where it is needed). 
 607. See GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, §§ 
5.3.1–5.3.1.1.4 (clarifying that the hazard assessment will be conducted on all the 
information contained in the technical dossier and describing the vPvB assessment 
process). 
 608. See id. § 5.3.1.2 (demonstrating that the exposure assessment consists of 
(1) the generation of exposure scenarios, which evaluates how the substance is 
used throughout its life cycle and how its exposure is controlled vis-à-vis humans 
and the environment, and (2) the exposure estimation). 
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controlled . . . [and that] should not indicate a risk.”609  
Given the massive amount of information required as part of the 
pre-registration process, REACH has been referred to “as a central 
information system” that “entails an all-encompassing approach.”610 
It is arguable that since the REACH registration/data-gathering 
requirement pulls in too much information, much of which is 
irrelevant to addressing health and environmental risks, it actually 
serves to undermine the regulation’s ability to convey useful 
information that contributes to the fulfillment of its underlying 
objective. For example, one recently released report found that 
REACH’s  
contribution . . . in the development of new knowledge has been rather 
limited . . . [because] the huge amount of information generated to date by 
REACH [was not] of use in developing new substances or new uses for 
existing substances . . . . One explanation often provided by industry 
representatives and experts is that, so far, REACH registration has mainly 
covered substances for which most of the relevant information was 
already available . . . .611 
c. ECHA’s and EU Member States’ Capacity to Process/Use Pre-
Registration-Related Data 
Ever since REACH was first proposed as a chemicals strategy in 
2001, the European Commission and Parliament have estimated that 
REACH’s registration requirements would affect approximately only 
30,000 substances.612 Notwithstanding these estimates, on December 
 
 609. See id. § 5.3.1.3 (stating that the risk characterization will be conducted 
with regard to both human health and the environment). 
 610. See Eurostat, supra note 55, at 29 (instructing that, while it is fair to 
presume multiple legislative efforts improve the environment and human health, 
REACH should be understood as more comprehensive). 
 611. See INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at VI, 90–91 
(reporting that the majority of firms surveyed believed the information acquired 
from REACH has not had any contribution in knowledge development). 
 612. See Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a Future Chemicals 
Policy, supra note 565, at 15–16, 28, 31 (explaining the REACH system will be 
composed of the registration of 30,000 substances and estimating a cost of €2.1 
billion for the testing of 30,000 substances over eleven years); see also UK 
Parliamentary Office of Sci. & Tech., EU Chemicals Policy, POSTNOTE, Sept. 
2004, at 2, available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/POST-PN-229.pdf 
(noting that the European Commission deems that 30,000 substances are used in 
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19, 2008, ECHA reported that approximately 170,000 substances had 
actually been pre-registered between June 1 and December 1, 
2008.613 It also reported that the screening of the approximately 2.75 
million pre-registrations for the 150,000 substances, “around 15 
times more than originally estimated,” would take longer than 
expected.614 Thereafter, on March 29, 2009, ECHA published an 
updated list of pre-registered substances under REACH, which 
reflected a slightly lower number—approximately 143,000 pre-
registered substances.615  
Moreover, it is generally accepted that “[t]he technical heart of 
ECHA is [REACH-IT], the information technology system with 
which the agency receives and saves registrations, requests, reports, 
 
higher volumes that require registration); Press Release, Parliament Adopts 
REACH – New EU Chemicals Legislation and New Chemicals Agency (Dec. 13, 
2006) at 3, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language= 
en&type=IMPRESS&reference=20061213IPR01493 (providing that registration 
of a substance is determined by the risk the substance poses and the quantity 
produced of the substance); Press Release, Europa, REACH: Industry Urged to 
Pre-Register All Chemicals by 1 December 2008 (Apr. 11, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/564 (“Registration 
is expected to impact some 30,000 chemicals between 1 June 2008 and 30 May 
2018.”); cf. Eurostat, supra note 55, at 11 (demonstrating that 237 substances had 
been chosen for pre-REACH snapshot from the 30,000 substances covered by 
REACH). 
 613. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FINAL REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE 
EUROPEAN CHEMICALS AGENCY 17, § 2.1.2 (2012) [hereinafter PWC Report], 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/ 
review2012/echa-final-report_en.pdf (claiming the increased number of pre-
registrations demanded more from systems like REACH-IT). 
 614. See Sean Milmo, Chemical Data Forums Latest Stumbling Block for 
Reach, CHEM. WORLD (May 11, 2009), http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/ 
News/2009/May/11050901.asp (explaining that after having difficulty with pre-
registration, the REACH process continues to pose challenges with the next stage 
of forming substance information forums (SIEFS)); see also Chris Jones, ECHA 
Delays Publication of Final Reach Pre-registration List, ICIS (Dec. 19, 2008), 
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2008/12/19/9180868/echa-delays-publication-of-
final-reach-pre-registration-list.html (declaring that the fully screened list of 
substances would be published past its deadline). 
 615. See Stefan Baumgarten, ECHA Updates List of Pre-Registered Substances 
Under REACH, ICIS (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/03/27/ 
9204015/echa-updates-list-of-pre-registered-substances-under.html (reporting that 
ECHA stated the list contains some substances that did not require registration and 
some improvements of the previous list, including CAS numbers that only had 
been identified by chemical name in the prior list). 
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and payments . . . .”616 However, due in part to what ECHA 
Executive Director Geert Dancet described as computer and finance-
related start-up difficulties and the unanticipated flood of pre-
registrations ECHA received during late 2008,617 the REACH-IT 
system was severely compromised and required extensive 
revamping.618 One university report observed that, unless ECHA’s 
size and capacity are increased, “a majority of the data submitted 
under the REACH registration process may never be evaluated.”619 
Another EU Commission–funded report evaluating ECHA’s 
performance since start-up confirmed that the REACH-IT system 
failure had an adverse impact on ECHA’s subsequent ability to 
prepare dossier evaluation decisions.620  
In addition, a third recently released study evaluating the impact of 
REACH implementation obligations on EU markets and European 
chemicals industry competitiveness cited the lack of adequate EU 
Member State resources as posing another impediment to effective 
use of the information generated as the result of the REACH pre-
registration process.621  
[EU] Member State Authorities consider the knowledge created through 
 
 616. Brigitte Osterath, Let Registration Commence, CHEM. WORLD, May 2008, 
at 71, available at http://www.rsc.org/images/ECHA_tcm18-119381.pdf 
(explaining that companies use REACH-IT to send complete registration dossiers 
to the agency). 
 617. See Anne Eckstein, Chemicals: Geert Dancet: Budget Problems Looming 
for ECHA (European Chemicals Agency) (July 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-181376416.html (discussing ECHA budget 
problems caused by many companies rushing to receive authorization under the 
previous rules so they could avoid paying a fee). 
 618. See Milmo, supra note 614 (highlighting that REACH software systems are 
continuously being enhanced to facilitate the substance information exchange 
forms (SIEFS)). 
 619. ABELKOP ET AL., supra note 464, at 24 (“[T]he REACH registration 
process may ultimately be seen more as a system of data collection and 
warehousing than a procedure for protecting the public and the environment from 
exposures to hazardous substances.”). 
 620. See PWC ECHA Report, supra note 613, at 16, 56 (noting REACH IT 
absorbed more resources than anticipated, and there were delays in the 
development of ECHA’s internal systems). 
 621. See INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 92 (indicating 
survey responses showed most industry associations were pessimistic about the 
capacity to employ the knowledge acquired). 
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REACH “fundamental” and “absolutely necessary for authorities” in their 
own policy making . . . . The key issue for most of them is the actual 
capacity to utilize this knowledge. Not all Member States are equally 
equipped and resource limitations are often stated as an important 
constraint in this direction.622 
These observations strongly suggest that the relevant EU regional 
and national institutions have experienced rather serious capacity 
limitations that have challenged their ability to efficiently process 
and use the very large volume of complex hazard-based information 
they continue to receive from registrants in satisfaction of REACH’s 
registration/data-gathering requirement.  
d. ECHA’s Capacity to Clearly Disseminate REACH Registration 
Data to Stakeholders 
REACH anticipates that the hazard information generated as the 
result of the registration/data-gathering process will be used for 
various purposes by EU and EU Member State institutions. For 
example, information contained in registration dossiers623 and a 
classification and labeling inventory624 are included by ECHA in 
REACH-IT.625 Said database shall be notified to EU Member State 
national authorities626 and made freely accessible to the EU public627 
to permit them to make informed decisions about their use of 
chemicals, subject to REACH confidentiality provisions protecting 
registrants’ proprietary, sensitive, and confidential business 
information submitted as part of a REACH registration.628 In 
 
 622. Id. 
 623. REACH, supra note 2, art. 10(a)–(b) (including contact information of the 
manufacturer or importer, details about the substance, and a chemical safety report 
when required). 
 624. Id. art. 114(1) (asserting the inventory will include the information 
described in Article 113(1) as well as information submitted as part of 
registration). 
 625. Id. art. 77(2)(e) (explaining the database will be available over the Internet 
free of charge). 
 626. Id. art. 20(4) (claiming all Member States where the manufacture takes 
place or the importer is established shall be notified no later than 30 days after the 
submission date). 
 627. Id. art. 119. 
 628. See id. pmbl. ¶ 117 (allowing the public to review descriptions of 
hazardous properties, labeling requirements, and laws on uses of substances and 
risk management); see also id. arts. 10(a)(xi), 105, 109, 118, 120 (requiring 
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addition, REACH also anticipates that such information will be 
included in the development of a voluntary EU regional eco-labeling 
scheme or an EU quality mark.629 
One EU Commission–funded report found that the exposure-
related information contained in the REACH pre-registration 
dossiers and CSRs submitted through REACH-IT was quite 
complex, and that the ECHA database dissemination website was 
“poorly laid out and structured” and not very user-friendly.630 It 
determined that these deficiencies could potentially prevent ECHA 
from effectively communicating and disseminating meaningful and 
new substance exposure-related information to: a) EU Member State 
national authorities for purposes of ensuring REACH registration 
compliance and enforcement via the REACH Information Portal for 
Enforcement;631 b) industry for purposes of developing more 
ecological and less harmful chemical “substitutes”;632 and c) 
 
registrants to give an explanation of why such information would be harmful for 
commercial interests if he or she wants to refrain from disclosure on the Internet, 
except the registrant need not disclose information covered by the duty of 
professional secrecy); Bronckers & Van Gerven, supra note 410, at 1839–43 
(discussing the conflict within REACH between these confidentiality provisions 
and Preamble paragraph 117, which obliges ECHA and EU Member States to 
provide access to such information consistent with the UNECE Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters otherwise known as the “Aarhus Convention”). 
See generally The Aarhus Convention, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/aarhus/ (last updated Sept. 14, 2012) (noting the Aarhus Convention 
gives rights to the public with regard to the environment like the right to receive 
information held by public authorities). 
 629. REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶ 14. 
 630. See PWC Report, supra note 613, at 25, 30, 35, 42 (claiming information 
was difficult to locate on the website and that the site lacked clarity in the routing 
and search capabilities); see generally INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF 
THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra 
note 535, at 17 (explaining that, as part of its objective to share chemical 
information among interested parties, REACH-IT has “a dissemination-focused 
website addressed to the general public where non-confidential data on chemicals 
and information on the status of those chemicals are provided.”). 
 631. See generally Press Release, Eur. Chems. Agency, ECHA Releases a Web 
Portal for REACH and CLP Inspectors (June 28, 2011), available at 
http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/view-article/-/journal_content/7b1e2ff9-38a0-
4cac-b93e-ae9e18347552 (noting that inspectors can use the REACH Information 
Portal for Enforcement (RIPE) website to see who submitted a dossier and when, 
among other information about the relevant substance). 
 632. See INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
  
2013] REACH REVISITED 621 
consumers of typical household or recreational products for purposes 
of ensuring their safer use.633 Furthermore, the report found that 
ECHA’s poor dissemination of information to these stakeholders 
“deprived . . . stakeholders . . . of the information they need for their 
learning processes and to contribute to the learning processes of 
ECHA as well as the Member States and other private actors . . . .”634 
Consequently, the report’s authors concluded that,  
[i]n the area of dissemination . . . [ECHA] did not achieve its own goals, 
or those set or implied by the REACH . . . regulation . . . . Dissemination 
is of particular importance, as it is a key area in which ECHA can 
contribute to achieving the goals of REACH.635 
Moreover, REACH provides for the establishment of a 
classification and labeling inventory system that identifies the 
intrinsic hazardous properties of and provides safe-use information 
for substances and substance mixtures designated as “dangerous”—
information that requires notification and submission to ECHA.636 
REACH anticipates that the presentation and public reporting of such 
information will take into account existing and emerging 
international standards in the regulation of chemicals, such as the 
United Nations Globally Harmonized System (“GHS”) of 
classification and labeling of chemicals, which aims “to provide a 
harmonised basis for globally uniform physical, environmental and 
health and safety information on hazardous chemical substances and 
mixtures.”637 During 2008, the EU enacted a separate classification, 
 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 26 (expressing 
that matters concerning confidentiality may also affect the “innovative capacity of 
the industry”). 
 633. See PWC Report, supra note 613, at 25, 32, 41, 42 (“The dissemination of 
non-confidential (pre)registration data through ECHA’s dissemination website has 
been criticized as insufficient by representatives of various stakeholder groups.”); 
see also INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at VI, 26, 37 
(declaring that REACH has not made a significant contribution to increasing 
consumer confidence in chemical products). 
 634. See PWC Report, supra note 613, at 32 (explaining that, while there is no 
deadline for publication of information, the fact that it has already taken over a 
year is detrimental to stakeholders). 
 635. Id. at 5. 
 636. REACH, supra note 2, arts. 112–16. 
 637. See UK DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, SCOPING STUDY FOR 
THE EVALUATION OF EU REACH AND CLP REGULATIONS § 2.2.3 (2009), 
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labeling, and packaging (“CLP”) regulation638 with terms and 
definitions consistent with those of REACH639 to implement the 
general principles of the GHS.640 REACH and CLP were deemed 
similar to the extent they both were hazard-based and focused on 
gathering hazard data with the objective of ensuring a high level of 
protection of health and the environment.641 The subsequent 2010 
amendment of REACH Annex II has since resulted in the actual 
convergence of REACH and CLP to the extent updated REACH 
Annex II guidelines for compiling “safety data sheets” “take into 
account the rules for safety data sheets of the [GHS]” over the course 
of a five-year phase-in period.642  
Pursuant to this amendment, suppliers already required to prepare 
and submit a safety data sheet (“SDS”) to their downstream users 
must now provide their downstream users and distributors with an 
SDS on substances and substance mixtures where “[a] substance [or 
mixture] meets the criteria for classification as hazardous according 
to CLP . . . .”643 Practitioners will notice that the CLP regulation, by 
 
available at http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/chemicals/reach/ 
documents/eu-reach-clp-regs-report.pdf (explaining how REACH complements 
GHS goals by using the same chemical classifications to protect humans and the 
environment against hazardous effects of chemicals and to facilitate trade). 
 638. See generally Commission Regulation 1272/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 353) 1 
[hereinafter CLP Regulation] (“repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, 
and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006”). 
 639. Id. pmbl. ¶ 12. 
 640. See European Commission Directorates General Enterprise and Industry 
and Environment, An Introduction to the CLP Regulation for Professional 
Suppliers/Users, at 1, available at, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/ 
files/ghs/clp_introduction_en.pdf (describing that users will see new pictograms on 
chemical labels as suppliers switch to the GHS system to achieve the goal of a 
single worldwide operation to identify hazards). 
 641. Compare REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶ 1 (differing slightly in that it calls 
for the promotion of alternative hazard assessment methods), with CLP Regulation, 
supra note 638, pmbl. ¶¶ 1, 3 (differing only in that it calls for a mixture of 
protection of human health with attempts to achieve sustainable development). 
 642. See REACH, supra note 2, arts. 1(1)–(2), 2(1)–(7) (defining the aim, scope, 
and application of REACH); see also EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON THE 
COMPILATION OF SAFETY DATA SHEETS § 1.1 (2011), available at 
http://www.schc.org/pdf/ECHA_fourth_draft_sds_Guidance_july_2011.pdf 
(providing that additional GHS elements beyond the safety data sheet were also 
implemented into EU legislation introduced by CLP via REACH Annex II); 
Commission Regulation 453/2010, supra note 603, at 133/4 (listing requirements 
for the compilation of safety data sheets). 
 643. See ECHA Compilation Guidance, supra note 642, § 1.1 (explaining 
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comparison, communicates hazard information in simpler, more 
comprehensible and symbolic terms than does REACH, primarily 
through use of point-of-purchase labels, containing hazard 
statements, hazard pictograms, and precautionary statements that are 
directed at both downstream members of the substance supply chain 
and at end-consumers.644 Thus, practitioners should question the 
extent to which REACH’s registration/data-gathering and 
notification requirements contribute to the regulation’s objective of 
ensuring a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment without the classification, labeling, and packaging 
procedures required by the CLP regulation. 
ECHA and the EU Commission may be inclined to argue that 
ECHA’s capacity is not a problem since it is the responsibility of 
suppliers under REACH and the subsequently enacted CLP 
regulation to produce and convey substance information contained in 
dossiers and CSRs in a clear and comprehensible manner that ECHA 
can then disseminate.645 However, such claims do not necessarily 
relieve ECHA and the EU Commission of the burden of ensuring for 
WTO purposes that REACH’s registration/data-gathering 
requirement achieves the regulation’s objective without imposing 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
e. ECHA’s Perfunctory and Infrequent Evaluation of Harmful 
Substances 
Of arguably greater significance are ECHA’s perfunctory, 
automated registration “completeness checks”646 and the infrequent 
 
application of such a provision will apply to a mixture by June 2015); see also 
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION March 2012 Draft, supra note 48, § 6.1.1 
(concluding that the supplier must also provide an SDS to downstream users and 
distributors if substance is persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic in accordance 
with Annex XIII of REACH or if it is among the candidate list substances). 
 644. See CLP Regulation, supra note 638, arts. 19, 21, 26–28 (taking measures 
to reduce the number of hazard pictograms and precautionary statements on 
substances to avoid duplication and redundancy). 
 645. See id. (demonstrating how the CLP regulation arguably communicates 
hazard information in a more comprehensible manner using point-of-purchase 
labels, containing hazard statements, hazard pictograms, and precautionary 
statements). 
 646. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 20(2) (“The completeness check shall not 
include an assessment of the quality or the adequacy of any data or justifications 
submitted.”); see also GUIDANCE ON DOSSIER AND SUBSTANCE EVALUATION, 
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substantive registration dossier evaluations entailing both registration 
“compliance checks”647 and registration testing proposal 
examinations of phase-in substances subject to the first registration 
deadline,648 particularly those involving vertebrate animals.649 These 
practices strongly suggest that relatively few potentially harmful 
substances can or will be prioritized and adequately examined during 
the course of any given fiscal year. They also raise serious questions 
about the extent to which REACH could contribute to the fulfillment 
of its objective of ensuring a high level of health and environmental 
protection, and also about whether the benefits of REACH outweigh 
its costs.  
For example, REACH Article 41(5) and accompanying ECHA 
guidance documents indicate that ECHA need only evaluate little 
more than 5% of the dossier registrations received for each tonnage 
band for compliance, regardless of the year of manufacture or 
import.650 Dossier registrations numbered approximately 25,300 by 
 
supra note 473 (confirming no quality or adequacy assessment is done during the 
completeness check). See generally JAVIER SANCHEZ, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, 
OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL COMPLETENESS CHECK PROCESS (2010), available 
at http://apps.echa.europa.eu/legacy/doc/webinars/overview_of_the_technical_ 
completeness_check_process_javier_sanchez_echa.pdf (detailing both the 
information requirements that need to be submitted and the entire technical 
completeness check process). 
 647. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 41 (declaring that, to ensure that registration 
dossiers are in compliance, a small amount of the total received will be examined 
for compliance checking). 
 648. See id. arts. 40, 43 (giving different time schedules for draft decisions for 
non-phase-in substances and for phase-in substances). 
 649. See id. art. 40 (informing that the information on test proposals involving 
vertebrate animals will be published on the Agency website). 
 650. REACH, supra note 2, art. 41(5); see GEORGE CATLIDGE, EUR. CHEMS. 
AGENCY, FEEDBACK FROM EVALUATION 8 (2012), available at 
http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/1674131/05_feedback_from_evaluation_c
artlidge_en.pdf (claiming the ECHA has discretion in choosing which dossiers to 
check); see also EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, EVALUATION UNDER REACH: PROGRESS 
REPORT 2011 12 (2012) § 1.2 [hereinafter EVALUATION UNDER REACH: 
PROGRESS REPORT 2011], available at http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/ 
13628/evaluation_report_en.pdf (explaining the compliance check is one of three 
processes of evaluation with the other two being testing proposal examination and 
substance evaluation); EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, EVALUATION UNDER REACH: 
PROGRESS REPORT 2010 6 (2010) [hereinafter EVALUATION UNDER REACH: 
PROGRESS REPORT 2010], available at http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/ 
13628/evaluation_under_reach_progress_report_2010_en.pdf (noting that the 
number of registration submitted per year varies and the 5% target does not always 
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year-end 2011,651 and approximately 28,000 as of June 1, 2012, 
covering “more than 5,500 different substances” in all.652 At most, 
only 1,400 of these 28,000 dossiers will be subject to an ECHA 
REACH compliance check for purposes of prioritizing substances for 
evaluation by EU Member States and identifying SVHCs.653 The 
balance of 95%, or 26,600 dossiers, was not subject to any ECHA 
compliance check at all.654  
Indeed, ECHA initiated only 16 dossier compliance checks in 
2009, 135 dossier compliance checks in 2010, and 158 dossier 
compliance checks in 2011, for a total from 2009 to 2011 of 309, or 
1.22%, compliance checks initiated with respect to 25,300 submitted 
dossier registrations during the same period.655 This means that 
unless a Member State Competent Authority itself commences a 
substance dossier evaluation based on information obtained from 
non-ECHA sources, such as supply chain members, the substance(s) 
registered within these dossiers may not be evaluated for some time, 
if ever.656 Furthermore, of the 25,000 dossiers thus far registered, 
 
have to be met every year); GUIDANCE ON DOSSIER AND SUBSTANCE EVALUATION, 
supra note 473, at 42 (explaining that prioritization criteria for the compliance 
check will be further developed). 
 651. See EVALUATION UNDER REACH: PROGRESS REPORT 2011, supra note 
650, at 14 (citing more than 3,700 new registrations in 2011). See generally 
EVALUATION UNDER REACH: PROGRESS REPORT 2010, supra note 650, at 10 
(noting approximately 21,600 registrations submitted by year-end 2010). 
 652. See Press Release, Fed. Envtl. Agency & Fed’n of German Consumer 
Orgs., Scope of Information About Chemicals Improved: Five Years after REACH 
– Positive Balance Despite Obvious Deficits (May 31, 2012) [hereinafter Scope of 
Information about Chemicals Improved: Five Years After REACH], available at 
http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/uba-info-presse-
e/2012/pe12020_scope_of_information_about_chemicals_improved.htm (citing 
the number of dossiers as evidence that REACH may be going in the right 
direction). 
 653. See generally GUIDANCE ON DOSSIER AND SUBSTANCE EVALUATION, supra 
note 473, at 14–15, 39 (providing the actors and their responsibilities in the 
evaluation process and the scope and purposes of the compliance check). 
 654. See ABELKOP ET AL., supra note 464, at 34–35 (noting the ECHA will 
complete its compliance checks for dossiers submitted in 2010 by the year 2013). 
 655. Compare EVALUATION UNDER REACH: PROGRESS REPORT 2010, supra 
note 650, at 10–11 (containing an additional overview of compliance checks 
undertaken by the agency since the beginning of the evaluation process), with 
EVALUATION UNDER REACH: PROGRESS REPORT 2011, supra note 650, at 20 
(explaining that ECHA opened more dossiers for compliance checks than was 
anticipated). 
 656. See EVALUATION UNDER REACH: PROGRESS REPORT 2011, supra note 
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only 1,116 carcinogenic, mutagenic, or toxic for reproduction 
(“CMR”)657 substances have been identified as being included within 
the CLP inventory to-date, and 40% of those have been found not to 
be registered, let alone prioritized, under REACH.658 In addition, 
only eighty-four registered substances have thus far been identified 
as SVHCs that may include CMRs and/or endocrine disruptors.659  
EU officials may be inclined to argue that REACH, by design, 
imposes upon chemical substance-based product manufacturers and 
importers the legal responsibility “to assess the risks and hazards of 
 
650, at 13, 16 (claiming dossier evaluation includes compliance checks and testing 
proposal examinations). 
 657. See REACH, supra note 2, art. 40(1) (“Priority shall be given to 
registrations of substances which have or may have PBT, vPvB, sensitizing and/or 
carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic for reproduction [CMR] properties, or substances 
classified as dangerous according to Directive 67/548/EEC above 100 tonnes per 
year with uses resulting in widespread and diffuse exposure.”). 
 658. See EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, CMR SUBSTANCES FROM ANNEX VI OF THE 
CLP REGULATION REGISTERED UNDER REACH AND NOTIFIED UNDER CLPA – 
FIRST SCREENING 5, 12 (2012), available at http://echa.europa.eu/ 
documents/10162/13562/cmr_report_en.pdf (noting that UVCB substances used in 
the petroleum industry make up some of the 40% of substances for which no match 
could be found); see also Press Release, Eur. Chems. Agency, ECHA Publishes the 
First Report on CMR Substances Registered or Notified After the 2010 
Registration Deadline (June 4, 2012), available at http://echa.europa.eu/en/ 
web/guest/view-article/-/journal_content/84609700-3f19-4bcb-83c8-cd0c48ec2df2 
(reasoning that some of the substances with no match could have been substituted 
for less hazardous substances, and some are so rare that they will not likely be 
found on the market). 
 659. See Emma Chynoweth, EU Commission Drives Towards Candidate List 
Goal, CHEM. WATCH (Aug. 17, 2012), http://chemicalwatch.com/12091/eu-
commission-drives-towards-candidate-list-goal (“In a surprise move aimed at 
hitting its target of 136 substances on the REACH candidate list by the end of 
2012, the European Commission has requested ECHA prepare 38 dossiers 
nominating substances of very high concern [SVHCs]. The Annex XV SVHC 
proposal dossiers, which are all for substances classified as carcinogenic, 
mutagenic and reprotoxic [CMR], are expected to be completed in time for the 
next candidate list consultation beginning on 3 September. If the proposals are not 
challenged the substances could be added to the candidate list by the end of 2012 
and – in combination with dossiers for 15 substances from member states [CW 15 
August 2012] – fulfil the European Commission’s target. At present there are just 
84 substances on the list.”); see also Scope of Information About Chemicals 
Improved: Five Years After REACH, supra note 652, at 1 (noting fourteen 
chemicals may no longer be in use without approval by 2014 and 2015); REACH 
SVHC List 2012: SVHC Testing, supra note 403 (explaining the SVHC candidate 
list will expand as member states provide more suggestions for inclusion). 
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substances,”660 to manage “the risks of substances,”661 and ultimately 
“to ensure that, under reasonably foreseeable conditions, human 
health and the environment are not adversely affected” by 
manufactured or imported substances.662 However, such putative 
delegations of responsibility by government to the private sector do 
not necessarily relieve the European Commission, ECHA, or EU 
Member State governments of legal liability in the event EU Member 
State citizens are injured by a dangerous chemical substance-based 
product that was not sufficiently evaluated and prioritized by such 
authorities.663 Similarly, such delegations of responsibility do not 
relieve the EU of its sole burden under international trade law to 
ensure that REACH’s registration/data-gathering and notification 
requirements contribute as much as possible to the fulfillment of the 
regulation’s stated objective without creating unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade. 
f. REACH Pre-Registration Process Design Flaws Impaired Phase-
in Substance Identification  
Several commentators have noted that although “[o]ne of ECHA’s 
goals for the pre-registration process was to determine which phase-
in substances were actually still on the market . . . ECHA failed to 
accomplish this objective . . . [d]ue to the high volume of pre-
registration applications.”664 In their view, several REACH 
 
 660. See REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶ 25 (providing that those handling the 
chemicals should also take risk-management measures). 
 661. See id. pmbl. ¶ 18 (“Information on this regulation should be easily 
accessible, in particular for SMEs.”). 
 662. See id. pmbl. ¶ 16 (stating that REACH provides specific duties and 
obligations for manufacturers and importers in this regard). 
 663. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 340, ¶ 2, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 53 (stating that the Union will address any 
damage caused by its institutions or servants in the execution of their duties); see 
also Case C-352/98P, Laboratoires Pharamceutiques Bergaderm SA v Comm’n, 
2000 E.C.R. I-5291 (declaring that the Court of Justice stated there is EU liability 
where “the rule infringed confers rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently 
serious and there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage.”). See 
generally Tamara Ćapeta, ACTION IN DAMAGES AGAINST EU INSTITUTIONS (Univ. 
Maribor, Lecture Notes, Dec. 2008), available at www.pf.uni-mb.si/datoteke/ 
knez/t._capeta_-_damages.doc (explaining contractual and non-contractual liability 
for EU institutions as provided for under Article 288 TEC). 
 664. ABELKOP ET AL., supra note 464, at 21; see EUR. COMM’N; REACH IN 
BRIEF: WHY DO WE NEED REACH? HOW DOES REACH WORK? WHAT ARE THE 
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registration process design flaws triggered this occurrence:  
• REACH required each “legal entity not pre-registering a 
substance manufactured or imported at more than 1 tonne per 
year to halt manufacture/import of that substance 
immediately after the pre-registration deadline”;665  
• ECHA had made various changes or clarifications to the pre-
registration process prior to the pre-registration deadline, 
which likely raised uncertainties among prospective 
registrants;666  
• “[N]either REACH nor ECHA established any barrier or 
disincentive [to manufacturers, producers and importers] to 
pre-register,” thereby encouraging the prudent “pre-
registering [of] more rather than fewer substances” to avert 
“the risk of a potential supply disruption”;667  
• Pre-registration uncertainties encouraged pre-registration by 
“downstream users who . . . [either] misinterpreted ECHA’s 
guidance . . . or . . . feared [being held] liable as potential 
importers if their suppliers . . . forgot to pre-register”;668 and  
• Several opportunistic “firms pre-registered chemical 
substances that they did not even produce or import in an 
attempt to earn profit from involvement in substance 
registration by acting as an importer for companies who 
missed the pre-registration deadline.”669  
According to these commentators, had REACH and ECHA 
imposed a more “modest fee for registration,” poorly considered 
submissions could have been discouraged.670 In addition, had 
REACH and ECHA imposed “a more modest financial penalty for a 
 
BENEFITS AND COSTS? WHAT WAS THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS? HOW WILL 
REACH BE IMPLEMENTED? 3–4 (Oct. 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/chemicals/reach/pdf/2007_02_reach_in_brief.pdf (noting the 
problems of the former chemical legislation, including the system’s hampering of 
research and innovation within the EU chemicals industry). 
 665. ABELKOP ET AL., supra note 464, at 21. 
 666. Id. 
 667. Id. 
 668. Id. 
 669. Id. at 22. 
 670. See id. (claiming such a reform could lead to a more manageable number of 
submissions to review). 
  
2013] REACH REVISITED 629 
first-time failure to pre-register (rather than an immediate halt of 
production),” it might have prevented companies from thinking that 
their failure to pre-register would result in a forced government 
cessation of their production and the consequent loss of their 
products’ market share.671 Practitioners should consider the extent to 
which these alleged pre-registration process design flaws 
undermined the ability of REACH’s registration/data-gathering 
requirement to contribute to the regulation’s principal objective of 
ensuring a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment. 
5. Whether the Technical Regulation Is “More Trade Restrictive 
Than Necessary” to Fulfill the Objective Concerned, Taking into 
Account the Risks Nonfulfillment Would Create 
As the US—Tuna II (Mexico) Panel explained: 
[T]o determine whether a measure is more trade restrictive than necessary 
within the meaning of Article 2.2 . . . [practitioners] must assess the 
manner in which and the extent to which the measures at issue fulfill their 
objectives, taking into account [the WTO Member’s] chosen level of 
protection, and compare this with a potential[ly] less trade restrictive 
alternative measure, in order to determine whether such alternative 
measure would similarly fulfill the objectives pursued by the technical 
regulation at the Member’s chosen level of protection.672  
The prior section’s findings strongly suggest that the REACH 
registration/data-gathering and notification provisions are capable of 
at least partially contributing to the achievement of REACH’s 
legitimate objective of ensuring a high level of protection of human 
health and the environment. Therefore, the next step in this TBT 
Article 2.2 analysis should entail an examination of whether REACH 
is “more trade restrictive than necessary” to fulfill that objective.  
A “more trade restrictive than necessary” inquiry, within the 
meaning of TBT Article 2.2, should focus on REACH’s “trade 
restrictiveness” rather than on its necessity, and it should seek to 
ascertain whether REACH’s level of trade restrictiveness is required 
to fulfill its legitimate objective(s) “at its chosen level of 
 
 671. See id. (explaining the need to prevent panic among companies due to fear 
of cessation of production). 
 672. US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶ 7.465. 
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protection.”673 First, REACH’s trade restrictiveness must be 
compared to a reasonably available alternative to determine whether 
such alternative is potentially less trade restrictive than REACH and 
is also capable of achieving REACH’s objective at the same level of 
protection.674 Second, the “risks of nonfulfillment” of REACH’s 
legitimate objective at the EU’s desired level of protection must be 
considered.675 In other words, practitioners should seek to ascertain 
the likelihood and gravity of the potential risks, and any associated 
adverse consequences that would arise if the identified and 
reasonably available, less trade-restrictive alternative were unable to 
fulfill the EU’s legitimate objective. In assessing such risks, 
practitioners should secure and make reference to available scientific 
and technical information and related processing technology, 
intended product end-uses, and other relevant probative evidence.676  
a. Demonstrating How REACH Is More Trade Restrictive Than 
Necessary 
As previously discussed, REACH may appropriately be classified 
as a type of non-tariff measure that arguably distorts and creates 
uncertainty surrounding international trade flows of chemical 
substance-based products. However, many WTO Members have also 
alleged that REACH’s costly and burdensome hazard-based 
registration/data-gathering and notification requirements constitute a 
non-tariff trade barrier because they have served to restrict 
international trade in chemicals by imposing on global industry a 
significantly altered cost structure in order to achieve REACH’s 
primary objective of ensuring a high level of protection of human 
health and the environment.677  
One recently released report evaluating REACH implementation 
in relation to its impact on EU markets and European chemicals 
 
 673. Id. ¶ 7.460; see also discussion supra Part III.B.3.d (examining the analysis 
of trade restrictiveness employed by the WTO in previous disputes). 
 674. Id. ¶ 7.465; see also discussion supra Part III.B.3.d.i (identifying several 
factors previously used by the WTO in determining trade restrictiveness). 
 675. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.d.ii (explaining the analysis of non-
fulfillment risk in the WTO U.S.-Mexico tuna dispute). 
 676. US — Tuna Panel Report, supra note 154, ¶¶ 7.466–7.467. 
 677. See discussion supra Part IV.B (analyzing REACH under TBT Article 2.1 
to show that it accords less favorable treatment to “like” chemicals and products 
containing such chemicals that originate outside the EU). 
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industry competitiveness sets forth a number of findings that appear 
to strongly corroborate this allegation.678 Perhaps the report’s most 
prominent revelation is that EU as well as non-EU chemical 
manufacturers and importers incurred approximately €2.1 billion in 
costs for the first REACH registration period, “close to double . . . 
the initial estimations made by the [European] Commission in 
2003.”679 The report indicates that this aggregate figure was 
composed of various direct and indirect REACH compliance-related 
expenses that were incurred to:  
• Secure human resources to carry out the various REACH 
compliance-specific activities;  
• Pre-register and register manufactured and imported 
substances;  
• Apply for authorizations for manufacturing, importing, and 
downstream use of substances;  
• Engage in information-exchange activities along the supply 
chain;  
• Notify governmental authorities about articles containing 
SVHCs and to submit chemical safety reports; and 
• Change production, substitute substances, manage risks, and 
undertake other necessary investments.680  
The following subsections will briefly discuss items 1, 2, 4, and 5 
above and their likely trade impacts.  
i. Human Resource–Related Costs 
The report clearly indicates that, in most of the cases surveyed, 
large chemical manufacturers, importers, and downstream users 
established a REACH unit occupied by between one and five full-
time equivalent (“FTE”) staff to satisfy their REACH compliance 
obligations; in some cases, they hired up to 100 FTE staff.681 Such 
 
 678. See INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 105 
(identifying data collection and ECHA registration as the key drivers of REACH 
compliance costs). 
 679. Id. at iii–iv, 105. 
 680. Id. at 38. 
 681. Id. at 39 (finding that “according to the survey responses, in most cases — 
around 55% — REACH units typically occupy between one and five staff (Full 
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companies also appointed a minimum of one REACH officer to each 
separate production unit.682 Small firms, meanwhile, dedicated “at 
least one member of staff with technical background working on 
REACH on a full or part-time basis.”683 “Based on an average [EU-
27]684 cost of €50,000/FTE for the EU chemicals industry, annual 
human resource costs for the typical large firms are in the range of 
€100,000–€250,000 per annum, and €25,000–50,000 for smaller size 
firms.”685 
ii. ECHA Registration Costs 
The report also clearly indicates that registration costs, which 
include data collection, ECHA registration, and supply-chain 
communication and exchange-of-information costs, were quite 
substantial.686 It found that ECHA fees represented “close to 36% of 
the median value of the total registration costs for large firms and 
38% for medium size. In comparison they represent[ed] around 22% 
of the costs for small firms and around 9% of the average registration 
costs for very small (micro) firms.”687 In addition, it found that 
ECHA fees and registration costs “more generally . . . represent[ed] a 
greater share of the turnover [or sales revenue] of smaller size firms 
by a factor of 4 to 5.”688 For each REACH Article 6, 7, and 11 
individually registered substance, substance mixture, or substance-in-
an-article, ECHA fees can range from €1,600 to €31,000, whereas 
for each REACH Article 7 and 11 jointly registered substance-in-an-
 
Time Equivalent). The survey responses suggest that . . . manufacturers of 
chemicals tend to have more sizable REACH units than downstream users and 
distributors”). 
 682. Id. 
 683. Id. at 105. 
 684. See Glossary: EU Enlargements, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:EU-27 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (using EU-27 to refer to the number of countries in the 
EU upon the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007). 
 685. INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 39. 
 686. See id. at 41 (stating that 70% of respondents to a business survey 
estimated their total cost of REACH registration compliance at between €25,000 
and €250,000 for one substance). 
 687. Id. at 101. 
 688. Id. at 101–02 (showing that, for each €1 million in sales revenue, micro, 
small, medium, and large firms incurred ECHA fees of €1550, €1240, €434, and 
€310, respectively). 
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article, ECHA fees can range from €1,200 to €23,250, depending on 
the annual tonnage range.689 SMEs are afforded reduced rates for 
such filings.690  
Further ECHA registration fees are charged for “updates of 
tonnage bands,” which can range from €2,700 to €29,500 for 
individual registrations, and from €2,025 to €22,050 for joint 
submissions, with reduced rates for SMEs, depending on the tonnage 
band in question.691 An additional ECHA fee of €1,500 for individual 
registrations will be charged for changes in identity of the registrant 
involving a change in legal personality and for each item change in 
the access granted to information in the submission, with reduced 
rates applicable to SMEs.692 Additional, not insignificant registration-
related ECHA fees are imposed for requests for access to a study 
summary to be referenced in an individual registration, which can 
range from €1,500 to €4,500 depending on the type of information 
sought and whether the request is made by an SME.693 
iii. Data Gathering, Supply-Chain Communication and Exchange, 
and IT-Related Costs 
Furthermore, the report revealed rather considerable supply-chain 
information and exchange-related costs for “the handling of [SDSs]” 
and “the extensive and continuous information exchange along the 
supply chain—inside and outside Europe.”694 For example, it noted 
that small manufacturers or formulators with no more than five 
employees “might have to deal with 50-100 substances each with an 
SDS of some 100 pages,” whereas slightly larger firms “with 50-100 
employees might have 5-10,000 substances to handle,” each with a 
comparable SDS of approximately 100 pages.695  
The report also observed that many companies utilize external 
 
 689. Commission Regulation 340/2008, art. 3, Annex I, tbl.1, 2008 O.J. (L 107) 
6 (EC) [hereinafter FCP Regulation]. 
 690. Id. tbl.2. 
 691. Id. art. 5, Annex III, tbls.1–2. 
 692. Id. tbls.3–4. 
 693. Id. art. 6, Annex IV, tbls.1–2. 
 694. See INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at iv, 105 (stating 
that the cost of IT systems implemented for the management of SDSs can rise to 
more than €1 million for large firms with complex systems). 
 695. Id. at 97 (emphasis added). 
  
634 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
consultants to assist them in the development and translation of SDSs 
and extended Safety Data Sheets (“eSDSs”), which can cost 
approximately “€200 for each SDS and €500 for each [eSDS],” 
without translation costs; translation costs can then add between €100 
and €300 per language.696 Given the amount of information and the 
volume of pages involved, companies often purchase IT applications 
or systems to facilitate their development and handling of SDS and 
electronic eSDSs and associated supplier and customer 
communications.697 Although the report does not provide direct 
information concerning such costs, its individual discussions with 
industry members yielded estimated IT application costs of €30,000 
for medium-sized companies and upwards of €100,000 for large 
firms.698 The report also referred to an Accenture analysis of the cost 
of IT systems that “support a greater range of REACH 
activities . . . .”699 According to the Accenture report, REACH IT 
investments to maintain compliance can cost upwards of €1,000,000 
to €3,000,000 for a small to medium-sized company, and between 
€5,000,000 and €15,000,000 for a medium- to large-sized company.700 
Moreover, the REACH report identified other supply-chain 
communication and exchange-of-information costs, including hidden 
transportation costs and SIEF LoA costs.701  
LoAs are most often used by importers and non-EU-based firms through 
their only representatives and represent, together with ECHA fees, the 
most important driver of registration costs. They are also the most typical 
approach adopted by SMEs that are not willing or do not have the 
resources to be involved in creation and sharing of data within the context 
of SIEFs.702  
 
 696. Id. at 45. 
 697. Id. 
 698. Id. at 46. 
 699. Id. 
 700. ACCENTURE, MASTERING THE CHALLENGE OF REACH FOR HIGH 
PERFORMANCE: THE CLOCK IS TICKING 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture_Chemicals_
POV_REACH.pdf. 
 701. See INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 77–78 
(reporting that 80% of survey respondents stated that SIEFs had caused them to 
incur significant information-exchange costs). 
 702. Id. at 78. 
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It found that LoAs can exceed €100,000 in some cases, as may be 
readily confirmed by the €200,000 price charged for a LoA issued by 
the SAS Consortium.703  
Apparently, the high cost of LoAs is driven, in part, by REACH’s 
strict limitation on the use of vertebrate animals for purposes of 
conducting chemical health and environmental testing704 proposed as 
part of the technical dossier submitted at the time of substance 
registration.705 On the one hand, these limitations oblige companies 
to reduce their overall use of vertebrate animal tests to establish 
chemical safety by becoming participants in SIEFs whose members 
must negotiate how to share such existing testing data.706 As 
discussed previously, however, SIEF participation, with its attendant 
LoA expense, is likely to increase registration costs given REACH’s 
obligation to utilize and rely on relatively unproven non-animal 
testing methods to perform reproductive toxicity testing.707 
According to one recent study, REACH is likely to have severely 
underestimated the number of animal tests required and associated 
 
 703. Id. at 95; see discussion, supra Part IV(B)(2)(d) (discussing the weak 
bargaining position of non-EU firms when negotiating LoA costs). 
 704. See, e.g., REACH, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶¶ 37, 40, 47, 64, arts. 13(1)–(2), 
25(1), 117(3), 138(9); Commission White Paper on the Strategy for a Future 
Chemicals Policy, supra note 565, at 7 (affirming that a reduction in vertebrate 
animal testing is one of the political goals of REACH). 
 705. REACH, supra note 2, art. 10(a)(ix). 
 706. See id. art. 29 (mandating that SIEF members share testing data between 
themselves); see also EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, PRACTICAL GUIDE 10: HOW TO 
AVOID UNNECESSARY TESTING ON ANIMALS 5 (2010), http://echa.europa.eu/ 
documents/10162/13655/pg_avoid_animal_testing_en.pdf (providing guidance to 
practitioners on how to effectuate useful transfers of data in a SIEF to avoid 
unnecessary animal testing). 
 707. See, e.g., Press Release, Comm’n Joint Research Ctr., EURL ECVAM 
Issues Recommendation on Three Alternative-to-Animal Testing Methods for 
Carcinogenicity (Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/ 
index.cfm?id=1410&obj_id=14660&dt_code=NWS&lang=en (discussing three in 
vitro test methods that can help decide whether animal testing for carcinogenicity 
is necessary to satisfy EU legislation). See generally Press Release, Comm’n Joint 
Research Ctr., EURL ECVAM Recommendation on Three Cell Transformation 
Assays Using Syrian Hamster Embryo Cells (SHE) and the BALB/c 3T3 Mouse 
Fibroblast Cell Line for In Vitro Carcinogenicity Testing (Mar. 14, 2012), 
available at http://ihcp.jrc.ec.europa.eu/our_activities/alt-animal-testing/eurl-
ecvam-recommendations/EURL-ECVAM%20-Recommendation.pdf (exploring 
the three Cell Transformation Assays [CTAs] that can curtail the use of animal 
testing, including discussions of the methods, overall performance, possible 
regulatory uses, and limitations of the tests). 
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costs for exacting studies in the area of reproductive toxicity testing, 
“suggest[ing] a demand of 54 million vertebrate animals and testing 
costs of 9.5 billion euro. This clearly challenges the feasibility of the 
[REACH] program without a major investment into high-throughput 
methodologies.”708 Should this study’s calculations be proven 
correct, it would arguably further demonstrate that the high cost 
structure that REACH’s registration/data-gathering requirement has 
imposed on chemical substance-based imports is more trade 
restrictive than necessary to achieve the regulation’s primary 
objective of ensuring a high level of protection of human health and 
the environment, and also its tertiary objective of reducing vertebrate 
animal testing.709  
iv. Notification, Hidden and External Consultant Costs 
One previously mentioned report indicated that there are 
notification-related costs with respect to articles “using SVHCs . . . 
when the use of the substance is not already described in the 
registration.”710 This same report also noted that “the cost for a 
notification is usually in the range of €800-1000.”711 
Many companies are increasingly outsourcing REACH 
registration tasks to outside consultants.712 “In addition to in-house 
staff, or often instead of them, firms sometimes employ external 
consultants for the provision of legal and technical support. A large 
 
 708. COSTANZA ROVIDA & THOMAS HARTUNG, RE-EVALUATION OF ANIMAL 
NUMBERS AND COSTS FOR IN VIVO TESTS TO ACCOMPLISH REACH LEGISLATION 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CHEMICALS – A REPORT BY THE TRANSATLANTIC THINK 
TANK FOR TOXICOLOGY, 26 ALTEX 187, 187, 205 (2009), available at 
http://www.altex.ch/resources/rovida_hartung_altex_3_09.PDF. 
 709. See id. at 194–97, 205–06 (detailing the report’s calculations, including the 
determination that implementing REACH as it is would require tests on nearly 141 
million vertebrate animals). 
 710. INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 49, 105 
(emphasizing that the figures are based on limited experience and still require 
confirmation). 
 711. Id. at 49. 
 712. See CHEM. WATCH, SERVICE PROVIDERS GUIDE 2011: A GUIDE TO 
CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL SERVICES 24 (2011), available at 
http://chemicalwatch.com/downloads/ServiceProvidersGuide2011.pdf 
(establishing that 77% of firms surveyed expected to increase their reliance on 
outside consultants in the next five years). 
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number of small firms outsource most, if not all, of the registration 
and other REACH related activities,” and for many such “firms the 
small number of FTEs dedicated to REACH is replaced by fees to 
consultants.”713 The report, furthermore, noted that with respect to 
registration activities, approximately half of those surveyed who had 
made use of external consultants “suggested that their fees did not 
exceed 10% of the[ir] total registration costs, while 32% suggested 
that this was in the range of 10-25%.”714  
The report then provided the following example: “A small size 
producer of paints and varnishes has a technical person dedicated full 
time along with support for communication along the supply chain. 
The total annual cost is estimated at around €50,000. On top of that 
they spent around €13,000 for consulting support.”715 Lastly, the 
report provides a total estimate of the costs incurred incident to the 
first REACH registration period, indicating that “for the majority of 
firms that submitted a registration in the first registration period, the 
total registration costs were within the range of €100,000 to 
€1,000,000[, while] [f]or the fewer large firms with more than 100 
registrations, total registration costs ha[d] sometimes exceeded the 
total of €10 million.”716 
v. Trade Impacts of REACH Registration Costs 
The REACH implementation report reflects that these 
substantially higher than anticipated registration-related costs have 
already begun to negatively affect international trade flows in 
chemicals.717 For example, the report found that because of such 
expenditures a number of large and SME chemicals companies have 
 
 713. INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 40. 
 714. Id. 
 715. Id. at tbl. box 4.1; see also REACH Registration - Joint Submission, supra 
note 535 (stating that fees charged by the Chemical Inspection and Regulatory 
Service (CIRS) consultancy “to advise the whole registration process and prepare 
the individual part of registration dossier in iuclid 5” can be as much as €4,000 per 
substance). 
 716. INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 45. 
 717. See id. at v (noting that 35% of those surveyed said they had had at least 
one substance withdrawn from at least one their suppliers, with registration costs 
being cited as the primary cause). 
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decided to reduce substance production volumes to a lower and less 
expensive tonnage band and, thereby, effectively shrink their EU 
market share.718 Furthermore, high registration costs and the 
inclusion of substances on the SVHC candidate list, which can 
potentially trigger additional ECHA authorization request–related 
fees and make the overall trading of such substances unprofitable,719 
have seemed to persuade non-EU SME chemical companies to 
withdraw substances from the EU market720 or to abandon or forsake 
entering the EU market altogether.721  
For example, “the additional costs for exporting to the EU as a 
result of registration obligations and supply-chain communication—
calculated to be between €60,000-€72,000 for Indian companies—is 
leading a number of them to withdraw from the EU market.”722 High 
registration costs have also been observed to motivate EU 
downstream users to shift their procurement of substances to EU 
sources.723 The report strongly suggests that these responses to 
REACH and the cost of REACH compliance could very well lead to 
fewer available substances, somewhat higher prices, and a potentially 
more concentrated and less competitive EU chemicals market.724 
“[This] analysis suggests that there is still scope for the reduction of 
 
 718. Id. at v, 65. 
 719. See FCP Regulation, supra note 689, Annex VI, tbls.2–3 (demonstrating 
that such fees for a small or medium-sized enterprise begin at €25,000 and 
€40,000, respectively, and can increase by €8,000 and €10,000, respectively, for 
each substance and use for which an authorization is requested). 
 720. See INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 57–60, 66 
(declaring that survey results revealed that 37% of firms surveyed experienced the 
withdrawal of a substance, either as a user or producer, because of REACH). 
 721. Id. at 97, 106. 
 722. Id. at 66; see also A. Nair, REACH Threatens Exports, SOC’Y OF CHEM. 
INDUS. (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.soci.org/Chemistry-and-Industry/CnI-
Data/2011/6/REACH-threatens-exports.aspx (stating that REACH has raised 
exportation costs by between €69,000 and €82,800 per chemical for Indian 
producers). 
 723. INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 66, 106. 
 724. Id. at 57, 59, 64, 66, 97, 99, 105–08, case study #8, app. A at 62; see FCP 
Regulation, supra note 689, Annex VI, tbls.2–3 (showing that the base application 
fees for medium and small enterprises are €40,000 and €25,000, respectively); see 
also Nair, supra note 722 (opining that REACH compliance has been difficult for 
small and medium-sized Indian chemicals producers, many of whom have decided 
to curtail exports). 
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costs without a detrimental effect on other objectives of the 
Regulation.”725  
Based on the above findings, it is arguable that REACH’s 
registration/data-gathering and notification requirements are more 
trade restrictive than necessary to achieve REACH’s legitimate 
objective, especially considering the limited indirect qualitative 
benefits that these requirements have generated to date.726 As the 
findings of another recently released study have revealed, REACH’s 
registration/data-gathering, notification, and information-sharing 
requirements have merely contributed to a general increase in 
awareness of hazardous chemicals and their raw materials, as 
reflected in the ongoing changes that are being made to substance 
classifications727 and by the gradual withdrawal of certain SVHCs 
from the marketplace.728 Although the study concludes that 
 
 725. INTERIM EVALUATION: FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
MARKET AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF REACH, supra note 535, at 11. 
 726. See Risk & Policy Analysts Limited, Assessment of Health and 
Environmental Benefits of REACH, Final Report, Executive Summary, EUR. 
COMM’N (Apr. 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/ 
reach/review2012/benefits-final-report-summary_en.pdf [hereinafter Assessment of 
Benefits, Executive Summary] (“A key conclusion from this work is that, at this 
current stage in the implementation of REACH, it is not possible to quantify 
benefits and the assessment will have to rely on the use of a series of qualitative 
information together with a limited set of quantitative indicators . . . . The drivers 
of benefits within REACH . . . are the set of legal provisions which are expected to 
trigger direct or indirect human health and/or environmental benefits.”) (emphasis 
added); id. at 1–2; see also Risk & Policy Analysts Limited, Assessment of Health 
and Environmental Benefits of REACH, Final Report, Part B – Assessment of 
Benefits, EUR. COMM’N (Apr. 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/ 
reach/pdf/studies_review2012/report_study11b.pdf [hereinafter Assessment of 
Benefits, Final Report]. 
 727. “The realisation of benefits expected from the registration driver through 
these four pathways is limited to date but expected to have a greater impact in the 
future. . . . [I]t is clear that the information being generated by REACH is resulting 
in changes in classification, with the majority of these being more restrictive 
classifications. This is particularly noticeable for endpoints such as acute toxicity, 
sensitisation, reproductive toxicity and aquatic toxicity (acute and chronic).” 
Assessment of Benefits, Final Report, supra note 726, at 149 (emphasis added). “It 
can also be concluded that the need to communicate on SVHCs has delivered 
benefits, in that it has made companies more aware of raw materials in their 
products. In the longer term, this will lead to much greater awareness throughout 
the supply chain of chemicals management issues and the replacement of SVHCs 
in articles . . . .” Id. at 154. 
 728. “With regard to substance withdrawal, there is evidence that substances 
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industry’s evolving behavior suggests the potential for improved 
health and environmental protection over time,729 the study 
nevertheless fails to compare these new benefits with the benefits 
previously secured through the use of to-be-substituted chemicals, or 
with the risks of using potential new substitutes that can ultimately 
undermine such protection.730 
 
have been ‘dropped’ from the market or otherwise not registered due to their 
properties (in particular CMRs) and the potential costs of supporting them through 
authorisation as well as registration. It is also clear though that substance 
withdrawal may be taking place as part of the rationalisation of product 
portfolios.” Assessment of Benefits, Final Report, supra note 726, at 150. 
“Candidate listing is leading to early action towards substitution by formulators 
and demands for substitution within their supply chains by article producers. Thus 
SVHCs are gradually being withdrawn from use, particularly from supply chains 
that produce end-consumer goods.” Id. at 154. 
 729. “[T]o ensure that REACH does result in the desired shift in mind-set and 
deliver its intended human health and environmental benefits, ECHA and the 
European Commission should continue and build upon the level of their activities 
aimed at building trust and cooperation. . . . It was envisioned from the beginning 
that REACH would be a ‘learning system’. It is therefore important to provide 
sufficient time for that learning to take place and to collect sufficient information 
about the system . . . . [I]t is clear that for REACH to deliver its intended human 
health and environmental benefits, priority has to be given to supporting the less 
experienced registrants and smaller companies who will have less capacity to 
respond to its requirements.” Assessment of Benefits, Executive Summary, supra 
note 726, at 4. “[I]t is too soon to have a complete picture of the extent of the 
impacts: databases are still being set up and all the relevant stakeholders (from the 
chemical companies to the Agency and the Commission) are in the ‘learning by 
doing’ process, familiarising themselves with the duties imposed by this ambitious 
Regulation. Nevertheless, the assessment carried out for this study provides an 
indication of areas where improvements should be made if the expected benefits of 
REACH are to materialise. It also verifies the general hypothesis that REACH will 
deliver human health and environmental benefits. Although the extent to which it 
has done so to date is limited, this is much as expected for the first round of phase-
in substances to be registered. As problems in implementation are ironed out and 
more and better information is generated for those substances where the lowest 
levels were available prior to REACH, benefits can be expected to improve and for 
many of these to have a last impact in relation to human health and the 
environment.” Assessment of Benefits, Final Report, supra note 726, at 147–48. 
 730. “It is less clear that where substances have been withdrawn, they have been 
replaced by a less hazardous alternative as consultees report that, in some cases, 
manufacturers are offering alternative substances of a similar hazard profile.” 
Assessment of Benefits, Executive Summary, supra note 726, at 6; Assessment of 
Benefits, Final Report, supra note 726, at 150. “There are concerns, though, that 
substitutes are not necessarily always better from a human health or 
environmental perspective. There is also concern that candidate listing leads to 
pressure for substitution even in those applications which have been assessed as 
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b. Comparing REACH to a Reasonably Available Less Restrictive 
Alternative 
REACH’s registration/data-gathering requirement should also be 
evaluated in light of other reasonably available regulatory models 
that could potentially prove less trade restrictive than REACH.731 
One recent study prepared by several risk analysis experts concludes 
that “a majority of the data submitted under the REACH registration 
process may never be evaluated.”732 With this in mind, they have 
recommended Canada’s and Japan’s chemicals management 
regulatory strategies as possible alternatives to REACH. Each of 
these regulatory frameworks features “an iterative screening 
approach” that permits regulators to “set aside a vast array of 
substances/uses at the beginning on the grounds that they are 
unlikely to cause unacceptable risk . . . .”733 Because these screening 
approaches also focus on a substance’s potential for “risk” rather 
than “hazard,” they may significantly reduce the costs and burdens 
associated with substance registration while ensuring the same high 
level of protection of human health and the environment. This 
section examines whether Canada’s and Japan’s chemicals 
management regulatory strategies qualify as reasonably available 
less trade-restrictive alternatives to REACH that are also capable of 
achieving REACH’s principal objective. 
i. Canada’s Risk Prioritization-Based  
Chemicals Management Plan  
According to these commentators, the substance registration/data-
 
being safe and for which there may be no feasible or suitable alternatives. In other 
words, all applications are blacklisted even if they do not pose a real risk. 
Although this is one of the stated aims of the authorisation provisions, it has 
potential implications for both costs and human health and the environment if it 
results in shifts to alternatives (substances, techniques or materials) which present 
their own risks. It is therefore important that consideration is given to the risks 
from substitution with alternative chemicals or processes vis-à-vis the risks from 
continued use of the candidate list substance and whether there would be a net 
reduction in risks with substitution.” Assessment of Benefits, Final Report, supra 
note 726, at 104 (emphasis added). 
 731. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.d (discussing prior WTO jurisprudence on 
the issue of less-restrictive alternatives to non-tariff barriers to trade). 
 732. ABELKOP ET AL., supra note 464, at 24. 
 733. Id. at 24–25. 
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gathering requirement of Canada’s Chemical Management Plan 
(“CMP”) may serve as a potentially less trade-restrictive alternative 
to REACH’s registration/data-gathering provision. The CMP, 
adopted in December 2006, subjects all “legacy chemicals” 
manufactured within or imported into Canada between January 1, 
1984, and December 31, 1986, to a scientific risk assessment.734 The 
CMP is notable primarily because it “has a prioritization process that 
takes place before industry and government are compelled to 
produce and review dossiers.”735 
The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (“CEPA 
1999”) “is the primary statute the Government [uses] to implement 
the [CMP]. The information developed through CEPA’s 
categorization process provided the basis for establishing the 
priorities for action under the Plan.”736 CEPA 1999 is considered 
“one of Canada’s most important laws respecting pollution 
prevention and the protection of the environment and human health 
in order to contribute to sustainable development . . . [by] 
support[ing] a ‘precautionary approach.’”737  
The Canadian Government has employed CEPA to ensure that all 
“new [chemical] substances manufactured [within] or imported into 
Canada above certain thresholds since 1994 undergo government-led 
human health and environmental assessments” to determine whether 
they are toxic or capable of becoming toxic to the environment or 
human health.738 If a substance potentially poses risks to human 
 
 734. See Press Release, Prime Minister of Can., Canada’s New Government 
Improves Protection Against Hazardous Chemicals (Dec. 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=1450 (last visited Sept. 14, 
2012). See generally Chemicals Management Plan, Chemical Substances Website 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.chemicalsubstanceschimiques.gc.ca/ 
plan/index-eng.php. 
 735. ABELKOP ET AL., supra note 464, at 22 (citing The Rapid Screening 
Approach, GOV’T OF CAN., http://www.chemicalsubstanceschimiques.gc.ca/plan/ 
approach-approche/rapid-eng.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2012)) (emphasis added). 
 736. CEPA Review: The Interim Government Response, ENV’T CAN., at 4, 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/lcpe-cepa/default.asp?lang=En&n=586965A3-
1&offset=2&toc=show (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 737. Canada Nat’l Reporting to CSD-18/19 – Thematic Profile on Chemicals, 
COMM’N ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., U.N. DESA, at 1 (May 2011), http://www.un.org/ 
esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_ni/ni_pdfs/NationalReports/canada/Chemicals.pdf [hereinafter 
Canada Nat’l Rep.]. 
 738. Id. at 2. 
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health or the environment, CEPA 1999 permits control measures to 
be imposed before such substance is granted access to the Canadian 
marketplace.739 If the risks are deemed significant or become too 
difficult to adequately manage, Canada may prohibit the substance.740 
The cornerstone of CEPA 1999 is Canada’s Domestic Substance List 
(“DSL”), which establishes a foundation for distinguishing between 
new substances and those contained within an “existing substances” 
inventory.741 Section 73(1) of CEPA 1999 required the Canadian 
Government to examine, by 2006, all existing substances contained 
on the DSL, approximately 23,000 substances, “to determine if they 
were potentially harmful to human health or the environment” and to 
identify and categorize those that “warranted further attention. . . .”742 
The CMP employs the CEPA 1999 categorization process 
pursuant to which governmental scientists prioritize for examination 
only those substances that:  
• are inherently toxic (harmful, by its very nature, to humans or 
to the environment);  
• are persistent (take a very long time to break down);  
• are bioaccumulative (collect in living organisms and end up 
in the food chain); and  
• have the greatest potential for human exposure.743  
From this process, the CMP developed a new Rapid Screening 
Approach that has enabled the Canadian Government to rapidly 
identify substances that have a low likelihood of toxicity as defined 
in CEPA 1999 Section 64(a) and to instead focus resources on those 
substances that have a “higher probability of causing harm.”744 This 
 
 739. Id. 
 740. Id. 
 741. Id. 
 742. Id. at 2–3; Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), S.C. 1999, c. 
33, art. 73(1). 
 743. Canada Nat’l Rep., supra note 737, at 3. 
 744. Technical Approach for “Rapid Screening” of Substances of Lower 
Ecological Concern, ENV’T CAN., at 3 (Mar. 30, 2007), http://www.ec.gc.ca/lcpe-
cepa/AF2B4B54-A419-1BAE-DD4E-23AC1DB194C0/at-ta_epr-rs_eng.pdf 
[hereinafter Technical Approach]; see also CEPA, supra note 742, art. 64(a) 
(defining a substance as toxic if it “is entering or may enter the environment in a 
quantity or concentration or under conditions that have or may have an immediate 
or long-term harmful effect on the environment or its biological diversity”). 
  
644 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
process entails the application of a series of qualitative and 
quantitative steps to evaluate a substance’s likelihood to cause harm 
to human health or the environment under conservative—worst-
case—exposure scenarios. It also employs complex hazard and other 
tools to identify, based on conservative assumptions, true priorities 
for items to test and assess in the absence of data.745 By the time the 
Canadian Government’s categorization process was completed in 
2006, it had identified approximately 4,300 substances requiring 
further attention.746  
The CMP was developed (and its objective is) to address these 
chemicals by 2020.747 To achieve this objective, the CMP calls for a 
number of actions to be taken pursuant to the authorities vested 
under CEPA 1999. These include:  
• the immediate regulation of five groups of chemicals deemed 
to pose a risk to the environment or human health, including 
draft regulations on flame retardants and substances used in 
the manufacturing of some non-stick coatings and stain 
repellents, and amendments to the Prohibition of Certain 
Toxic Substances Regulations covering impurities or 
resulting from waste incineration and anti-icing agent in jet 
fuels and chemical/industrial processes;748  
• the implementation of a new “Challenge Approach,” which 
challenges stakeholders to provide use and risk management 
information about 200 high-priority chemical substances 
identified pursuant to the CEPA 1999 categorization process 
as being the highest priority for further action on these 
chemical substances;749  
• the restriction of new uses of 150 priority chemicals 
identified pursuant to the categorization process but not 
currently used in Canada until data is provided to “support a 
 
 745. Canada Nat’l Rep., supra note 737, at 3. 
 746. Id.; see also Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 Annual Report 
for April 2009 to March 2010, ENV’T CAN., at iv (2010), available at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/lcpe-cepa/477203E8-2DA5-422B-84FB-FC3597E7EBD3/ 
ar09_10-eng.pdf (relating the results of many quality-monitoring initiatives and 
other aspects of the CEPA program). 
 747. CEPA Review: The Interim Government Response, supra note 736, at 2. 
 748. Id. 
 749. Id. at 2–3. 
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risk assessment demonstrating that the substance would not 
pose an unacceptable health or environmental risk”;750  
• the identification of “the health and environmental effects of 
2,600 medium-priority substances through successive rounds 
of assessment”;751 and  
• the “Rapid Screening of low-concern substances.”752  
The Government of Canada has described the Rapid Screening 
Approach as a series of steps that seek to ascertain a substance’s 
potential to cause ecological harm.753 Step 1 entails the identification 
of substances categorized as high priority for purposes of further 
evaluation and assessment.754 Step 2 involves the application of 
different exposure scenarios to identify potential concerns near the 
point of a substance’s discharge into the environment.755 Further 
substance assessment is required if these “scenarios indicate a 
potential harmful effect to aquatic or terrestrial organisms,” whereas 
a substance proceeds to Step 3 if these “scenarios indicate a low 
likelihood of harm to these organisms.”756 Step 3 employs a series of 
information source “filters” to determine whether a given substance 
requires further assessment or can be designated as being unlikely to 
cause harm.757 The aim is to identify whether the substance appears 
on or within one or more domestic or international hazard or 
exposure lists or information sources that designate such substance 
as being of greater concern due to its hazardous properties and/or 
high commercial trading volume.758 The information contained 
within such lists and sources is then vetted to ascertain its relevance 
to the particular inquiry.759  
During 2007, the Government of Canada applied the Rapid 
Screening Approach to “1066 substances that [were identified as] 
persistent and inherently toxic to non-human organisms (PiT(eco)) or 
 
 750. Id. at 3. 
 751. Id. 
 752. Id. 
 753. Technical Approach, supra note 744, at 3. 
 754. Id. 
 755. Id. at 4. 
 756. Id. 
 757. Id. at 5. 
 758. Id. 
 759. Id. 
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bioaccumulative and inherently toxic to non-human organisms 
(BiT(eco)), and that [were] believed to be in commerce in Canada at 
a maximum of 1000 kg [low quantities] per year across the 
country.”760 Substances that were “persistent and bioaccumulative 
and inherently toxic to non-human organisms” (“PBiTs”) were 
“excluded from consideration under this assessment, due to 
particular concerns identified for substances having this combination 
of properties.”761  
The Canadian Rapid Screening Approach exercise yielded 312 
substances requiring further assessment and 754 substances for 
which further assessment was unnecessary because they were 
deemed unlikely to cause ecological harm.762 In other words, 
approximately 70% of all the substances rapidly screened were found 
unlikely to cause ecological harm and were consequently not subject 
to costly and burdensome mandatory registration. Such a result 
would not be possible under the EU REACH. 
Moreover, Canada’s CMP provides for the communication and 
exchange of risk-based information about chemical substances with 
industry and the public for the purpose of informing their chemicals-
assessment and risk-management activities via the Canadian 
Government’s Chemical Substances, CEPA Environmental Registry, 
and Chemicals Management Plan websites. These websites provide 
“up-to-date information on the progress being made [and] links to 
key initiatives in related program areas . . . searchable or 
downloadable lists of existing chemical substances, results of rapid 
screening and prioritization exercises, detailed substance 
 
 760. ENV’T CAN., RAPID SCREENING OF SUBSTANCES OF LOWER ECOLOGICAL 
CONCERN: RESULTS OF THE ECOLOGICAL SCREENING ASSESSMENT 2 (2007) 
[hereinafter RAPID SCREENING OF SUBSTANCES OF LOWER ECOLOGICAL 
CONCERN], available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/lcpe-cepa/5189C3B6-B777-1FD4-
CD3B-B04A1F4FA0CC/epr-rs_eng.pdf. 
 761. See id. at 4. 
 762. See id. at 8–9, fig.2 (finding that 4 organic substances bore chemical 
structures similar to PBiTs that were deemed priority substances necessitating 
further assessment, that 836 substances did not indicate a potential for ecological 
harm, and that 226 substances required further assessment. After application of 
various information source filters to the 836 substances, it was revealed that 29 of 
the substances appeared on international lists of high-production-volume chemicals 
requiring further assessment, 417 of the substances were unlikely to meet the 
criterion of paragraph 64(a) of CEPA 1999, and of the remaining 390 substances 
manually evaluated, 53 were found to require further assessment). 
  
2013] REACH REVISITED 647 
assessments, and proposed risk management activities.”763 These 
media also facilitate public input taken into account for risk-
management decisions following the release of the government’s 
conclusions of a draft screening assessment report.764  
Canada’s CMP is also consistent with several international 
environmental initiatives, including the Strategic Approach to 
International Chemicals Management (“SAICM”), and is designed to 
meet the 2020 goals established by the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development for Sound Management of Chemicals.765 Upon the 
renewal of the CMP in 2011, the Canadian Government also 
undertook a Strategic Environmental Assessment (“SEA”) to ensure 
it took into account environmental considerations during the 
decision-making process.766 The SEA evaluates the positive and 
negative “environmental effects . . . of a proposed policy, plan, or 
program and its alternatives . . . [and] informs strategic decision-
making through analysis of environmental risks and 
opportunities.”767 The Canadian Government has concluded that the 
SEA satisfies the commitments Canada undertook at “the World 
Summit for Sustainable Development” because the SEA process 
aims at developing measures that promote positive environmental 
impacts.768  
Lastly, CEPA 1999, which serves as the legal basis for Canada’s 
risk-based CMP, arguably implements, through Preamble paragraph 
6 and Articles 2(1), 6(1.1), and 76.1, a risk-based version of the 
precautionary principle—i.e., a precautionary approach.769 The EU 
REACH, by comparison, implements a hazard-based version of the 
precautionary principle through its Preamble paragraphs 9 and 69 
 
 763. Canada Nat’l Rep., supra note 737, at 6. 
 764. See id. at 7 (stressing the role the public plays in informing the decisions of 
the Canadian Government as it develops risk-management methods). 
 765. See Christine Norman, GOV’T OF CAN., Canada’s Experience from 
Assessment of Highest Priorities Under Its Chemicals Management, at 1, 3 (May 
2011), available at http://www.isesweb.org/Meetings/Docs/session-a2_ 
cnorman.pdf. 
 766. See Strategic Environmental Assessment of the Chemicals Management 
Plan, GOV’T OF CAN., http://www.chemicalsubstanceschimiques.gc.ca/plan/sea-
ees-eng.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 767. Id. 
 768. See id. 
 769. See CEPA, supra note 742, arts. 2(1), 6(1.1), 76.1; see also Canada Nat’l 
Rep., supra note 737, at 1. 
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and Article 1.3, which is informed by quasi-quantitative or 
qualitative risk assessments. As one recently released report 
observed, although the EU Commission’s communication on the 
precautionary principle provides that “[t]he precautionary principle is 
relevant only in the event of a potential risk, even if this risk cannot 
be fully demonstrated or quantified or its effects determined because 
of the insufficiency or inclusive nature of the scientific data,” such 
communication fails to discuss how serious the risk or its 
consequences must be to trigger the application of the precautionary 
principle.770  
While ECJ case law is helpful, it does not appear determinative. 
According to the report, such case law holds, for example, that “[i]t 
is not sufficient to make a generalized presumption about a putative 
risk”771 or to make reference to a purely hypothetical risk in the 
absence of scientific support.772 It is generally recognized that 
REACH identifies a hazard—”negative effect”—in part through a 
regulatory risk assessment.773 The report concludes that, in the 
absence of such direction, “it cannot be deduced that the 
[precautionary principle] only applies where a potentially serious risk 
is identified,” and consequently “the burden of proof necessary to 
justify such application may be lower.”774  
This absence of a risk threshold for action would seem to explain 
much of the difference between the Canadian CMP prioritized 
screening approach informed by a quantitative risk assessment–
focused precautionary approach and the REACH hazard-based pre-
registration/data-gathering approach informed by a qualitative 
hazard-focused precautionary principle.775 Under REACH, the 
 
 770. See MILIEU LTD., T.M.C. ASSER INST. & AND PACE, EUR. COMM’N, 
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 
CHEMICALS SECTOR 36 (Aug. 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
chemicals/reach/pdf/Final%20report%20PP.pdf. 
 771. See id. 
 772. See id. 
 773. See id. (suggesting that hazard can also be identified through 
epidemiological studies that search for causes within particular populations or 
through monitoring/biomonitoring of a certain chemical where it is known that 
such chemical’s presence may have an adverse effect). 
 774. Id. at 37. 
 775. See id. at 38 (“The scientific evaluation is assumed to be a risk assessment 
since the Communication refers to the four components of risk assessment: hazard 
identification, hazard characterisation, appraisal of exposure and risk 
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precautionary principle appears already to have been applied in 
requiring the pre-registration of tens of thousands of substances for 
which risk assessments have not yet been performed at a pre-risk 
assessment stage, premised only on the annual substance 
manufacturing and import volumes and, perhaps, also on some 
qualitative risk data informed by socioeconomic analysis.776 By 
comparison, under the CMP, a precautionary approach would appear 
to be applied at the risk management stage once a risk assessment 
has been performed on a medium- or high-priority substance and has 
revealed a high likelihood of harm to human health or the 
environment under particular exposure scenarios.  
ii. Japan’s Risk Prioritization-Based  
Chemical Substance Control Law 
In 1973, Japan enacted the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and 
Regulation of Their Manufacture, etc. referred to as the Chemical 
Substance Control Law (“Kashinho”).777 The Kashinho introduced a 
notification and prior-assessment system to cover “new” substances 
being placed on the market several years prior to the enactment of 
the U.S. Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976.778 However, the 
 
characterization. If the evaluation and/or risk assessment can show that there is 
sufficient data and evidence, the risk management decisions can be based on the 
prevention principle, rather than on the [precautionary principle].”). 
 776. See Ortwin Renn & Andreas Klinke, A New Approach to Risk Evaluation 
and Management: Risk-Based, Precaution-Based and Discourse-Based Strategies, 
22 RISK ANALYSIS 1071, 1074 (2002), available at http://josiah.berkeley.edu/ 
2007Fall/NE275/CourseReader/6.pdf; EUR. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON SETTING 
THE SCIENTIFIC FRAME FOR THE INCLUSION OF NEW QUALITY OF LIFE CONCERNS 
IN THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 9–11 (adopted Apr. 10–11, 2003), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out362_en.pdf.; W. MARZOCCHI ET AL., EUR. 
COMM’N, PRINCIPLES OF MULTI-RISK ASSESSMENT: INTERACTION AMONGST 
NATURAL AND MAN-INDUCED RISKS 7–11 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
research/environment/pdf/multi-risk_assessment.pdf. 
 777. See Kagakubusshitsu no Shinsa oyobi Seizoto no Kisei nikansuru Horitsu, 
[Kashinho] [Chemical Substances Control Law] Law No. 117 of 1973, art. 1 
(amended by Law No. 39 of 2009) (Japan), translated in Japanese Law Translation 
Database Sys., http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=5&re= 
02&dn=1&gn=99&sy=1973&ht=A&no=117&x=65&y=6&la=01&ky=&page=1 
(laying out the purpose of the act as an attempt to create a system to prevent 
chemical pollution from impairing human health or destroying the environment). 
 778. Yoshiko Naiki, Assessing Policy Reach: Japan’s Chemical Policy Reform 
in Response to the EU’s REACH Regulation, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 171, 184 (2010); see 
also Kashinho, supra note 777, arts. 3–4 (providing the procedures that must be 
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Kashinho actually applied to both “new” and “old” industrial 
chemical substances by virtue of an “old” substance list that had, at 
such time, identified approximately 20,000 regularly manufactured 
or imported substances.779 By 2007, only 1,500 of those substances 
had been subject to a risk assessment.780 
The Kashinho was amended during May 2009781 to initiate the 
review of measures concerned with the assessment of hazards posed 
by chemicals and to update them consistent with international health 
and environmental law and policy trends.782 A primary objective of 
the 2009 amendment was to “ensure consistency with the [GHS] 
established by the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development 
[(“WSSD”)] and the 2006 [SAICM].”783  
The Kashinho amendment was phased in over a two-year period 
and effectively facilitated Japan’s shift from a hazard-based to a risk-
based chemical substance management framework. It looks beyond 
the intrinsic hazardous properties of chemical substances to employ 
risk assessments, risk control measures, and risk communication for 
 
followed to notify government agencies of a desire to manufacture a particular 
substance and the procedure by which the government will evaluate the substance 
to determine its impact on human health and the environment). 
 779. See Naiki, supra note 778, at 185–87 (explaining that Japanese law 
suffered from the same deficiencies as EU law prior to REACH, that is, a lack of 
data on the safety of “old” chemicals already being sold on the market). 
 780. Id. at 185. 
 781. See id. (describing the process the government ministries went through to 
create the report that formed the foundation of the new law). 
 782. See Kashinho, supra note 777, art. 4(6) (calling for international trends to 
be respected when dealing with establishing items to be tested); see also JAPAN 
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS., NOTIFICATION OF THE MANUFACTURING 
AMOUNT, ETC. OF GENERAL CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AND PRIORITY ASSESSMENT 
CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES – PRELIMINARY PREPARATION MATERIALS 2 (2010), 
[hereinafter METI PRIORITY SUBSTANCES], available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/chemical_management/english/files/CSCL-setsumei-
H22-12-jizen-12eng.pdf (explaining that Japan amended the Chemical Substance 
Control Law, in part, to establish regulations that reflected international trends). 
 783. Sunanda Banerjee, Reach-like Regulations Enacted Globally: A Regulatory 
World Tour, ICIS CHEM. BUS., May 31, 2010, at 28, available at 
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2010/05/31/9362538/reach-like-regulations-enacted-
globally.html; Abstract of the Joint Committee Report, New System of the Act on 
the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation of Their Manufacture, etc. 
(the Chemical Substances Control Law) to be Established by 2020, at 1, 6–7 (Dec. 
22, 2008), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/chemical_management/ 
english/files/joint_committee_report.pdf. 
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purposes of ascertaining and reflecting the nature and amount of 
health and environmental exposure for all chemical substances, 
consistent with a risk-based precautionary approach.784  
Japan’s Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (“METI”) has 
indicated that this shift was precipitated by Europe’s enactment of 
REACH, which effectively triggered a systematic strengthening by 
national governments of chemical substance management regimes to 
address environmental concerns.785 However, according to at least 
one commentator, because Japan was hesitant to move toward a 
European “REACH-type policy,” REACH had only a limited 
influence on the Japanese reform.786 Consequently, although the 
amended Kashinho, like REACH, expedites risk assessment for a 
good number of “existing” substances already on the market, it goes 
about ensuring the supply of information relating to such assessment 
in a different manner—by requiring such data as part of a priority 
substance assessment only after the Japanese Government has 
already conducted a chemical substance screening assessment.787  
Amended Kashinho Article 8 added a new requirement obliging 
manufacturers and importers of “general chemical substances” to 
notify and submit data annually to METI regarding estimated 
substance quantities and uses, regardless of hazard.788 Amended 
Kashinho Article 2(5) provides that such information will be used by 
the Japanese Government to create a list of “priority substances.”789 
 
 784. METI PRIORITY SUBSTANCES, supra note 782, at 2. 
 785. See id. (reflecting on the increased public awareness of safety and security 
issues and the strengthening of chemical management methods based on the 
Environmental Summit in 2002); see also Japan Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus., 
Chemical Substances Control Law (CSCL) 8–10 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter CSCL 
Presentation], available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/chemical_management/ 
english/files/CSCL_English.pdf (suggesting that one reason that the amendment 
needed to bring Japan up to international standards in chemical substance 
management was the passing of REACH in 2007). 
 786. See Naiki, supra note 778, at 171, 187–93 (pointing to four factors as 
possible explanations for Japan’s hesitation to adopt the European system: “(1) 
incompatibility with the Japanese domestic structures; (2) Japanese industry’s lack 
of support for the European model; (3) the possible effects of information 
disclosure in Europe; and (4) difficulties in mobilizing non-state actors”). 
 787. See id. at 185–86. 
 788. Kashinho, supra note 777, art. 8. 
 789. Id. art. 2(5); see Naiki, supra note 778, at 186 (using the term “priority 
chemicals”). 
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Priority substances are essentially “substances requiring prior 
assessment” because it is not clear whether they qualify under the 
criteria for “Class II Specified Chemical Substances” set forth in 
Amended Kashinho Article 2(3).790 Kashinho defines “priority 
substances” as substances that, due to their known highly residual 
properties, are thought “likely to damage human health or to damage 
the inhabitation and/or growth of flora and fauna in the human living 
environment through environmental pollution . . . .”791 Kashinho also 
obliges manufacturers or importers of an existing chemical substance 
“requiring priority assessment”—a “Class I Specified Chemical 
Substance”792—in excess of specified volumes to notify and submit 
information to METI each year regarding estimated substance 
quantities, usage, and other matters as may be required.793  
According to at least one commentator, certain changes to 
Kashinho reflect the influence of the EU REACH on Japan’s 
chemicals management system.794  
Kashinho was originally applied to substances having ‘persistent’ 
properties. Before the amendment, substances having PBT (persistent, 
bioaccumulative and toxic) were subject to the restrictive control (known 
as Class I Specified Chemical Substances), and substances having 
persistent, toxic but without bioaccumulative properties were subject to 
the less restrictive process (known as Class II Specified Chemical 
Substances). Under the amended Kashinho, these two classifications still 
remain, but the latter category of Class II now covers substances that do 
not have ‘persistent’ properties. This suggests that the amendment 
expanded the scope of high-risk chemicals under Kashinho and endocrine 
disruptors are now covered, which is similar to REACH.795  
Once a substance is designated as a “priority chemical” and 
 
 790. Kashinho, supra note 777, art. 2(3)(i)–(ii) (covering “class II specified 
chemical substances”); cf. id. art. 2(2)(i)(1)–(2), 2(2)(ii) (covering “class I 
specified chemical substances”). 
 791. Id. art. 2(5); Naiki, supra note 778, at 186. 
 792. See CSCL Presentation, supra note 785, at 22–23 (stating that the 
Stockholm Convention in 2009 designated twelve substances as Class I Specified 
Chemical Substances, including Perfluorooctane sulfonate, or PFO). 
 793. Kashinho, supra note 777, art. 9(1). 
 794. See Naiki, supra note 778, at 182, 185 (identifying the similarities as the 
expedited risk assessment for old substances already on the market, an element of 
“prioritization,” and the scope of high-risk chemicals). 
 795. Id. at 186–87. 
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undergoes a “priority assessment,” Amended Kashinho may require 
manufacturers and importers of that substance to conduct a hazard 
and an exposure assessment, the results of which must then be 
submitted to the Japanese Government.796 Depending on the results, 
such priority substances may be “subject to further risk assessment 
by the government.”797  
At least one commentator has noted that the Amended Kashinho 
imposes a significantly lower informational and testing burden on 
manufacturers and importers than does the EU REACH because 
under the Kashinho, unlike under REACH, risk assessment is 
performed by the government and companies are not required to 
identify uses of a substance incorporated within “their own 
product[s] [as well as] in their respective supply chains.”798 This 
lower burden is attributable in part to the relatively lower 
responsibility imposed on Japanese industry to generate information 
with respect to chemical substances. REACH obliges European 
industry to provide better information, including risk assessments, as 
a precondition to entering the market, per the “no data, no market” 
rule of REACH Article 5. The Amended Kashinho, by contrast, sets 
forth a prioritization approach pursuant to which government 
remains responsible for demanding additional data from industry 
concerning prioritized substances.799 
Furthermore, the Amended Kashinho has many similarities to, but 
did not replicate, the Canadian CMP.800 Discussions, held during the 
Kashinho amendment process, revealed how Japanese legislators 
referenced the Canadian chemical substances prioritization system, 
particularly its process of risk assessment and information gathering 
and that the government would be responsible for performing risk 
assessments.801 Japanese legislators had also favorably compared the 
Canadian chemical substances prioritization system to Japan’s then-
existing stepped prioritization approach of screening old substances, 
classifying them as “monitored chemical substances,” and then 
subjecting them to further risk assessment and, possibly, to 
 
 796. Naiki, supra note 778, at 186. 
 797. Id. 
 798. Id. 
 799. Id. at 187. 
 800. Id. at 188. 
 801. Id. at 189–90. 
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restrictive control.802 Overall, it would appear that “Japanese 
chemical policy favoured the Canadian system over REACH as its 
model.”803  
Thus, in the context of this TBT Article 2.2 analysis, the key issue 
is whether the registration/data-gathering and notification provisions 
of the Canadian and Japanese regulatory chemicals management 
regimes, employing iterative screening methods, represent 
reasonably available alternatives that could achieve the same level of 
protection—a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment—as REACH’s more costly and burdensome hazard-
based registration/data-gathering and notification provisions.  
c. Taking into Account the Risk(s) That a Reasonably Available 
Less Trade-Restrictive Alternative Will Not Fulfill the Legitimate 
Objective  
In this final step of a TBT Article 2.2 analysis, practitioners should 
seek to ascertain the likelihood and gravity of the potential risks and 
any associated adverse consequences that would arise if an identified 
reasonably available less trade-restrictive alternative was unable to 
fulfill REACH’s legitimate objectives—the “risk of nonfulfillment.” 
When assessing such risks, it is important to secure and/or make 
reference to available scientific and technical information and related 
processing technology, intended product end-uses, and other relevant 
probative evidence.804  
In assessing the risk of nonfulfillment, however, proper attention 
should first be directed toward whether and how the data gathered 
from the REACH registration process will be utilized in furtherance 
of protecting human health and the environment. Several risk 
analysis experts have observed that the testing and hazard data that 
has been gathered from REACH registrations does not appear to be 
prioritized pursuant to any “systematic risk-ranking process” that 
could meaningfully contribute to ECHA’s decision concerning 
whether to restrict the use of a given substance.805 In addition, as 
 
 802. Id. at 190. 
 803. Id. at 193. 
 804. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.d.ii. 
 805. See ABELKOP ET AL., supra note 464, at 48 (“[T]here does not appear to be 
a systematic risk-ranking process in the EU that informs which uses of chemicals 
become targets of restrictions.”). 
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noted previously, the perfunctory, automated registration 
“completeness checks” and the infrequent substantive dossier 
evaluations of phase-in substances strongly suggest that relatively 
few potentially harmful substances will be prioritized and adequately 
examined under REACH during the course of any given fiscal 
year.806 Also, the uncertainty surrounding the degree to which 
REACH’s registration/data-gathering requirement contributes to the 
achievement of the regulation’s objective raises serious questions 
about whether the consequences from the Canadian and Japanese 
alternative measures’ nonfulfillment of REACH’s principal objective 
would be particularly grave.807 It is against this backdrop that the 
risk-based priority assessment mechanisms of the Canadian and 
Japanese chemicals management regimes should be reviewed and 
compared with REACH’s registration/data-gathering requirement for 
purposes of determining whether they are capable of equally 
contributing to the achievement of REACH’s principal objective.  
Like the hazard-based EU REACH, the Canadian and Japanese 
systems rely on dated national chemicals inventories to assess the 
harm posed by high-priority substances. In addition, like the EU 
REACH, both of these systems are consistent with international 
environmental and chemicals initiatives such as GHS808 and the 2006 
SAICM.809 Furthermore, like the EU, Canada and Japan contribute to 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development chemicals 
testing and management initiatives and to the chemicals-related 
public health and environmental initiatives of the World Health 
Organization and United Nations Environment Program.810 
 
 806. See discussion supra Part IV.C.4.e. 
 807. See US — COOL Appellate Body Report, supra note 156, ¶¶ 478–79 
(discussing how the consequences that may arise from nonfulfillment of the COOL 
labeling measure’s objective would not be particularly grave, given consumers’ 
reluctance to pay extra to receive meat origin information). 
 808. See About the GHS, U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., 
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs_welcome_e.html (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2012) (describing the role that GHS plays in the classification of 
chemicals); see also Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Dev., ¶¶ 19–20, 
Aug. 26–Sept. 4, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002) (calling for the renewal 
of the commitment “to sound management of chemicals” and encouraging nations 
to adopt the GHS). 
 809. STRATEGIC APPROACH TO INT’L CHEMS. MGMT., http://www.saicm.org/ 
index.php?ql=h&content=home (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 810. Canada Nat’l Rep., supra note 737, at 11–13; Japan Nat’l Rep. to CSD-
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Moreover, like the EU REACH, the Canadian CMP and Japanese 
Amended Kashinho are consistent with Canada’s and Japan’s 
commitments as Parties to several international environmental 
conventions pertaining to toxic chemicals, including the Basel,811 
Rotterdam,812 and Stockholm813 Conventions. 
Unlike the hazard-based REACH registration/data-gathering 
provision, however, the multiple-level screening mechanisms of 
Canada’s CMP and Japan’s Amended Kashinho focus mostly on the 
exposure risks posed by substances rather than on merely a 
substance’s hazardous intrinsic properties.814 These screening 
mechanisms are iterative in nature and flexible, and thus capable of 
adapting to new exposure-related information as it is acquired.815 
They have thus far been successful in channeling potentially 
problematic substances to further levels of risk assessment and in 
eliminating a substantial number of substances from further 
government consideration where the most rapid of first-level screens 
had found they posed no risk to human health and the environment, 
 
18/19, COMM’N ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., U.N. DESA, at 7–8, 12–13 [hereinafter 
Japan Nat’l Rep.], available at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_ni/ni_pdfs/ 
NationalReports/japan/Chemicals.pdf. 
 811. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125, art. 10. 
 812. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 10, 1998, 
2244 U.N.T.S. 337. 
 813. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 
2256 U.N.T.S. 119, arts. 1, 3; see also Canada Nat’l Rep., supra note 737, at 12–
13 (confirming Canada’s participation in all three international initiatives); Japan 
Nat’l Rep., supra note 810, at 3 (discussing Japan’s promotion of aligning its 
“evaluation and regulation systems with international standards”). 
 814. See RAPID SCREENING OF SUBSTANCES OF LOWER ECOLOGICAL CONCERN, 
supra note 760, at 10–11 (detailing the myriad information types that will trigger 
the need for a substance to be evaluated further in the Canadian system); see also 
LSR Assocs., Japanese Chemical Substance Control Law (Kashinho), Criteria for 
“Flexible Assessment,” NEWS WATCH (Nov. 2011), http://www.lsr-
associates.com/pages/news%20watch/nov2011/japanese_chemical_substance_cont
rol_law.html (showing that exposure assessments play a role in each level of risk 
assessment in Japan). 
 815. RAPID SCREENING OF SUBSTANCES OF LOWER ECOLOGICAL CONCERN, 
supra note 760, at 10; see also Banerjee, supra note 783, at 28–29 (discussing how 
the approach of Japan’s government is to “gradually evaluate[] the risk and 
request[] appropriate management by manufacturers and importers according to 
the risk in CSCL” while Canada’s CMP process “leads to categorization and 
prioritized assessment of existing substances that need further evaluation”). 
  
2013] REACH REVISITED 657 
thereby saving scarce government financial and human capital 
resources.  
Based on these observations, one can make the following findings. 
None of the three chemicals management regulatory regimes 
(REACH, CMP, and Amended Kashinho) have been in operation for 
more than a few years, and all continue to evolve. Consequently, it is 
likely too soon to draw any definitive conclusions regarding their 
relative effectiveness such that the CMP or the Amended Kashinho 
can be justified as a less trade-restrictive alternative to REACH that 
can contribute to the fulfillment of REACH’s legitimate objective of 
ensuring a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment to the same extent as REACH, within the meaning of 
TBT Article 2.2. 
D. TBT ARTICLES 12.3 AND 12.1 ANALYSIS OF REACH 
As previously discussed, the Panels in US—Clove Cigarettes and 
US—COOL were in general agreement about the analysis that must 
be performed to determine whether a WTO Member’s regulatory 
actions have violated the obligation owed to developing countries 
under TBT Articles 12.3 and 12.1.816 A complaining WTO Member 
must demonstrate that it qualifies as a “developing country”; that the 
disputed measure affects its special development, financial, and trade 
needs; and that the regulating WTO Member failed to take account 
of—i.e., give consideration to—such needs in the preparation and 
application of the disputed measure.817 
1. Analyzing Whether the EU Considered Developing Country 
“Special Development, Financial, and Trade Needs” in Proposing, 
Adopting, and Implementing REACH 
a. Developing Country Trade Concerns Summarized 
As previously discussed, fourteen developing country WTO 
Members raised trade concerns about the EU REACH regulation 
during several TBT Committee meetings convened March 2007 to 
March 2011.818 They related to the EU’s alleged failure to provide 
 
 816. See discussion supra Part III.B.4. 
 817. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.a. 
 818. See discussion supra Part II.C.9. 
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adequate and sufficient compliance-oriented technical assistance 
with respect to the REACH regulation and its accompanying 
guidance documents, despite multiple WTO Member requests having 
been made.819 Many of these members claimed that the term 
“technical assistance” should be construed in light of the “special and 
differential” circumstances of developing countries.820 To remedy 
these perceived failings, the Argentine, Chilean, Chinese, and 
Chinese Taipei representatives offered the EU representative the 
following proposals: 1) The EU should establish REACH Help 
Desks within non-EU WTO Members to provide guidance on 
classification of chemical substance-based products just as it had 
done for EU Member States, consistent with the EU’s WTO national 
treatment obligation; and 2) The EU should dispatch technical 
experts to developing countries to provide local industry with direct 
training on REACH, which, in their view, would be more effective, 
prompt, and precise than the assistance provided online.821 
b. European Union Response to Developing Country Trade 
Concerns 
The EU arguably endeavored to respond to these criticisms and 
proposals at nine separate TBT Committee meetings during which it 
proceeded to outline the actions that it was then undertaking and was 
prepared to undertake to address developing country grievances.822 
 
 819. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 142; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 3-4 November 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶¶ 96–98; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 
2010, supra note 83, ¶ 57; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 
March 2010, supra note 83, ¶¶ 40, 46–49; TBT Committee Minutes for the 
Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, supra note 83, ¶¶ 45, 56, 64; TBT Committee 
Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 132; TBT Committee 
Minutes for the Meeting of 9 November 2007, supra note 83, ¶ 27. 
 820. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 57; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 46; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 64. 
 821. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
note 83, ¶ 41; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, 
supra note 83, ¶ 198; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 
2008, supra note 83, ¶ 165; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 
2008, supra note 83, ¶ 40; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 9 
November 2007, supra note 83, ¶¶ 33–34. 
 822. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra 
  
2013] REACH REVISITED 659 
The EU representative(s) conveyed that the EU intended to fulfill its 
TBT Agreement Article 11.3 obligations to render technical 
assistance to other WTO Members with respect to REACH through 
several means.823 The following subsections examine those means. 
i. Establishing ECHA Help Desks  
The EU stated that ECHA would establish a Help Desk within 
each EU Member State to serve as an access point for EU and non-
EU manufacturers.824 Apparently, the EU has since established 
ECHA Help Desks in all twenty-seven EU Member States, Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, and Norway, as well as contact points within the EU 
Embassy, Consulate, and Missions capable of directing REACH-
related queries from outside Europe.825  
ii. Providing REACH Regulatory Guidance 
The EU indicated that ECHA would provide Internet-based 
guidance materials consisting of: a) general, summarized REACH 
process information web pages; b) an Internet-based “Guidance 
Navigator” flowchart directing web visitors to relevant detailed 
 
note 83, ¶ 164; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 60; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 
2010, supra note 83, ¶ 53; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 
November 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 76; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 
25–26 June 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 108; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting 
of 18–19 March 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 203; TBT Committee Minutes for the 
Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 198; TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 65; TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 149; TBT Committee Minutes 
for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra note 83, ¶ 42. 
 823. TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11.3; see TBT Committee Minutes for 
the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra note 83, ¶ 42 (“[E]xtensive guidance 
material, technical assistance and capacity building was planned.”). 
 824. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra 
note 83, ¶ 42; see also ECHA Helpdesk, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, 
http://www.echa.europa.eu/web/guest/support/helpdesks/echa-helpdesk (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012) (“The ECHA Helpdesk provides administrative advice to 
those who have obligations under the REACH . . . Regulations.”). 
 825. ECHA Helpdesk Contact Form, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, 
http://apps.echa.europa.eu/forms/cms_helpdesk_form.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012); HelpNet, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/about-
us/partners-and-networks/helpnet (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); List of National 
Helpdesks, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/support/ 
helpdesks/national-helpdesks/list-of-national-helpdesks (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
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guidance; and c) detailed guidance on roles, obligations, and actions 
to be taken with respect to REACH.826  
iii. Providing International Funds for Technical Assistance and 
Capacity Building  
The EU stated that it would make funds available within 
international “assistance programs” falling under the auspices of the 
United Nations SAICM process and engage United Nations agencies 
such as United Nations Industrial Development Organization for 
purposes of facilitating REACH compliance.827 The EU indicated 
that it was also possible to incorporate technical assistance in 
ongoing EU trade-related—bilateral or regional—assistance 
programs.828  
iv. Rendering Bilateral Technical Assistance 
The EU invited any WTO Members, including developing 
countries, interested in receiving technical assistance regarding 
REACH to direct their requests to European Commission delegations 
located in their respective territories.829 The EU assured non-EU 
WTO representatives that their requests would be evaluated to see 
whether they could be met under existing EU assistance programs or 
would require further resources.830 Alternatively, the EU indicated 
 
 826. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra note 
83, ¶ 203; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra note 
83, ¶ 42; see Guidance on REACH, EUR. CHEMS. AGENCY, http://echa.europa.eu/ 
web/guest/guidance-documents/guidance-on-reach (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) 
(displaying internet-based “guidance navigator”). 
 827. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 21 March 2007, supra note 83, 
¶ 57. 
 828. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra note 
83, ¶ 203; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, supra 
note 83, ¶ 198; see TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 1–2 July 2008, 
supra note 83, ¶ 65 (“For specific technical assistance to third countries, the EC 
representative recalled the intervention of the representative of UNIDO.”). 
 829. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 18–19 March 2009, supra note 
83, ¶ 203 (“She invited WTO Members having specific needs for technical 
assistance programmes, to direct their requests to the respective delegations of the 
European Commission in their country.”). 
 830. See TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 60 (“[R]eadily available tools were a form of technical assistance, meant 
to assist both EU and non-EU manufacturers.”); TBT Committee Minutes for the 
Meeting of 5–6 November 2009, supra note 83, ¶ 76 (“[The EC representative] 
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that its representatives would meet directly with concerned 
delegations in Brussels.831  
v. Convening REACH Training-Based Webinars 
The EU ECHA organized a series of webinar-based “training 
sessions” and “stakeholder days” to provide stakeholders with 
critical information about various REACH issues. These issues 
included: 1) how to prepare a registration dossier for submission to 
ECHA, 2) the 2010 and 2011 registration deadlines, 3) how to ensure 
that SIEFs operate more efficiently, and 4) the ECHA registration 
and dossier evaluation process.832 The EU also emphasized that 
developing country delegations and industries were invited to and 
should participate in such sessions, and that recordings of the 
sessions would be available afterwards for viewing on the ECHA 
website.833  
c. Adequacy of the European Union Response 
It would appear that the EU has gone a long way toward 
responding to the trade concerns of all WTO Members, including 
developing countries, which were provided some special indirect 
financial and technical assistance through international programs and 
perhaps some bilateral financial and technical assistance, as well. 
However, the EU representative also made it very clear at one TBT 
Committee meeting that there would be no derogations afforded 
WTO developing country members with respect to REACH’s 
registration requirement. Because “the primary objective of REACH 
 
invited Members who considered that appropriate assistance had not been provided 
to clarify whether specific requests had not been adequately followed up.”); TBT 
Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 20 March 2008, supra note 83, ¶ 149 
(“[R]equests would be examined also in light of whether they could be met by 
existing technical assistance programmes or whether further assistance would be 
needed.”). 
 831. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra note 
83, ¶ 164. 
 832. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra note 
83, ¶ 60; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 53. 
 833. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2011, supra note 
83, ¶ 164; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 23–24 June 2010, supra 
note 83, ¶ 60; TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 24–25 March 2010, 
supra note 83, ¶ 53. 
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was the protection of human health and environment . . . no 
exceptions for developing countries could therefore be provided . . . 
[in the context] of special and differential treatment and technical 
assistance . . . for requirements such as the pre-
registration/registration obligation.”834  
While the directness of the EU representative’s statement is 
indisputable, it remains uncertain, at this juncture, whether such 
statement symbolizes that the EU had more broadly failed to “take 
account of” developing country WTO Members’ development, 
financial, and trade needs when proposing, adopting, and 
implementing REACH, within the meaning of TBT Articles 12.3 and 
12.1. The EU may be required to do more than allocate European 
assistance funds to international technical-assistance and capacity-
building initiatives and programs operating under the auspices of 
various UN agencies, and to undertake ongoing outreach to and 
liaison with all WTO Members, including developing countries, for 
purposes of facilitating foreign industry REACH registration/data-
gathering and notification compliance.  
Practitioners are therefore advised to confer with their non-EU 
clients resident or having operations in WTO Member developing 
countries to ascertain the extent of any liaison between their 
governments and the EU’s REACH-related institutions. In this 
regard, it would be helpful to secure evidence confirming any access 
to EU federal government officials; any REACH-related developing 
country government comments submitted prior or subsequent to 
REACH’s adoption; any EU governmental responses thereto; any 
bilateral or regional exchanges of executive, regulatory, or legislative 
branch REACH-related correspondences; and any bilaterally or 
regionally convened REACH-related meetings, briefings, and/or 
initiatives.  
V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF REACH TBT FINDINGS 
This article has outlined a possible analytical framework 
employing recent and relevant WTO jurisprudence for evaluating 
 
 834. TBT Committee Minutes for the Meeting of 5–6 November 2008, supra 
note 83, ¶ 198. 
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whether technical regulations in REACH, as adopted or as applied, 
are WTO-consistent. This legal review focused on the WTO TBT 
Agreement and analogous case law under the GATT 1994, 
concerning disputed health- and environment-related technical 
regulations alleged to constitute illegal nontariff barriers to trade. At 
least thirty-four WTO Members, including developing countries, 
have expressed specific trade concerns about the EU REACH 
regulation, most of which pertain to the REACH’s registration/data-
gathering and notification obligations, and arguably its 
registration/data-gathering requirement.  
Three WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have reaffirmed that 
the TBT Agreement recognizes the sovereign right of WTO 
Members to regulate for the protection of human health and the 
environment at their chosen level of protection, provided that right is 
not exercised to employ such regulations in a discriminatory manner 
or as unnecessary obstacles to trade. The EU REACH regulation 
would arguably qualify as a “technical regulation” within the 
meaning of TBT Annex 1 and, thereby, fall within the coverage of 
the TBT Agreement.  
A TBT Article 2.1 “like product” analysis of REACH reveals the 
growing importance of product-related PPMs, which focus on how 
products are made in addition to how they perform, as a factor in 
evaluating putative claims of trade discrimination. On the one hand, 
it would appear that the EU could potentially defend the application 
of REACH’s registration/data-gathering requirement against a claim 
of trade discrimination where the substances contained in articles 
qualify as SVHCs because their intrinsic properties could credibly be 
found to pose high-level health risks. These risks indicate distinct 
physical properties and are capable of triggering distinct consumer 
preferences and buying habits; therefore, the EU could argue that 
REACH-registered articles containing SVHCs are not “like” non-
REACH-registered articles containing SVHCs, the intrinsic 
properties of which would not otherwise have been identified and 
notified to ECHA and the public. However, this finding may depend 
on whether the ECHA or EU Member State competent authorities, 
when classifying such substances and later reviewing technical and 
substance dossiers, employ a semi-quantitative or qualitative rather 
than a purely quantitative risk-assessment approach.  
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On the other hand, it would appear that the EU would find it 
difficult to defend the distinct treatment it might accord to non-
REACH-registered non-SVHCs against a claim of trade 
discrimination vis-à-vis REACH-registered non-SVHCs on the sole 
grounds that their manufacturing and/or import volumes had 
exceeded an arbitrarily determined annual threshold, without more. 
In the absence of any known or reasonably suspected or actual 
harmful intrinsic characteristics, and in the absence of any 
preliminary risk-based screening exercise, REACH’s volume-based 
exposure and risk proxy would not likely be sufficient to substantiate 
that groups of REACH-registered non-SVHCs and groups of non-
REACH-registered non-SVHCs are not “like” products.  
EU Member States have been observed to implement REACH’s 
registration/data-gathering and information-sharing provisions in a 
manner that raises the cost structures of imported chemical 
substance-based SVHC and non-SVHC products. However, it is too 
early to draw any definitive conclusions concerning whether these 
provisions, as enacted or applied, accord “less favorable” treatment 
to, and thus discriminate against, “like” groups of imports. 
Additional and updated information is required to determine whether 
the conditions and expectations for competition between groups of 
non-SVHC imports and “like” domestic non-SVHCs have been 
fundamentally altered to the detriment of the former. Similarly, 
additional and updated information is needed to identify more clearly 
the particular markets or market segments in which such groups of 
“like” chemical substance-based products compete. 
A TBT Article 2.2 analysis of REACH, meanwhile, reveals that 
REACH’s primary objective of ensuring a high level of protection of 
human health and the environment likely qualifies as a legitimate 
objective and that the REACH registration/data-gathering 
requirement’s default reliance upon a volume-based exposure and 
risk proxy may reasonably reflect its chosen level of protection. Such 
analysis also indicates, however, that REACH’s registration/data-
gathering requirement may suffer both from design flaws and 
implementation irregularities. A number of reports indicate that the 
operation, implementation, and effects of said provisions have 
undermined REACH’s ability to contribute to its objective and have 
imposed on third-country products more trade-restrictive treatment 
than is necessary for REACH to achieve said objective. Still other 
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reports indicate that REACH’s hazard-based registration/data-
gathering, notification, and information-sharing requirements have 
imposed on global industry a significantly altered cost structure that 
is more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve REACH’s 
objective. 
Moreover, in evaluating whether there are less trade-restrictive 
regulatory alternatives available that are capable of achieving 
REACH’s objective taking into account the risks non-fulfillment 
would create, it is advisable to consider the iterative risk-based 
priority assessment systems utilized by the Governments of Canada 
and Japan. Like the EU REACH, the Canadian and Japanese systems 
rely on dated national chemicals inventories to assess the harm posed 
by high-priority substances and reflect government efforts to 
implement a number of international chemicals-related initiatives 
and treaty obligations. Unlike the hazard-based REACH 
registration/data-gathering provision, however, the multiple-level 
screening mechanisms of Canada’s CMP and Japan’s Amended 
Kashinho focus mostly on the exposure risks posed by substances 
rather than on merely a substance’s hazardous intrinsic properties. 
These screening mechanisms have, thus far, been successful in 
channeling potentially problematic substances to further levels of 
risk assessment and have also eliminated a substantial number of 
substances from further government consideration where the most 
rapid of first-level screens found they posed no risk to human health 
and the environment. Nevertheless, because neither REACH, CMP, 
nor Amended Kashinho have been in operation for more than a few 
years, and all three continue to evolve, it is likely too soon to draw 
any definitive conclusions regarding their relative effectiveness. 
More information is required to substantiate whether Canada’s CMP 
or Japan’s Amended Kashinho can be justified as a less trade-
restrictive alternative to REACH.  
Lastly, a TBT Article 12.3/12.1 analysis of REACH reveals that it 
would be quite difficult, but not impossible, for developing country 
WTO Members to demonstrate that the EU had failed to adequately 
consider their special development, financial, and trade needs prior 
to proposing, adopting, or implementing REACH’s registration/data-
gathering, notification, and information-sharing provisions. The 
securing of evidence of the existence or non-existence of bilateral 
meetings, briefings, initiatives, and correspondences would go a long 
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way toward confirming whether or not the EU particularly 
considered developing country WTO Member interests.  
B. LOOKING FORWARD 
The framework proposed in this article has been largely shaped by 
the limited anecdotal evidence that has been available to date and by 
the current state of REACH’s evolution and WTO law. While all 
three of the recent WTO TBT Panel decisions in US—Clove 
Cigarettes, US—Tuna II (Mexico), and US—COOL have resulted in 
final “clarifying” Appellate Body rulings,835 arguably not enough 
time has elapsed to draw definitive conclusions from them, 
especially as they may be interpreted to apply to a technical 
regulation as comprehensive and complex as REACH. Consequently, 
this framework may need to be updated or enhanced to reflect future 
ongoing analyses of REACH, these WTO decisions, and the possible 
alternative regulatory models discussed in this article. Indeed, given 
the EU Commission’s five-year REACH review, it is likely that 
additional relevant reports evaluating REACH’s cost-effectiveness 
and its potential to enhance human health and environmental 
protection will be forthcoming. Such findings, once released, should 
be incorporated into the analysis underlying this framework before 
any final determinations are made regarding REACH’s WTO 
consistency.  
Moreover, the ongoing evaluation of REACH should take into 
account the European Commission Directorate General’s efforts to 
promote “more global attention to chemical hazards in line with the 
EU’s REACH regulation,” particularly by “including chemicals 
regulation in the Rio talks on sustainability.”836 It is, however, 
uncertain whether these efforts could eventually mature into a formal 
initiative such as a proposal for the development of a binding global 
chemicals management framework treaty modeled after the EU 
REACH or in a more ambitious “global institutional framework for 
sustainable development which . . . include[s] a strengthened 
 
 835. See generally US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 
15; US — Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 156; US — COOL Appellate 
Body Report, supra note 156. 
 836. EU Environment Chief Vows ‘Concrete Results’ at Rio+20, 
EURACTIV.COM (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.euractiv.com/sustainability/eu-
environment-chief-vows-concrete-results-rio20-news-510639 (emphasis added). 
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environmental dimension” such as an international environmental 
organization to rival the WTO, as has been suggested, considering 
how such proposals are likely to engender international resistance.837  
At the same time, such evaluation should consider a recent WTO 
Secretariat report prepared in advance of the Rio + 20 Conference 
that advises governments that the transition to a green economy in 
pursuit of sustainable development goals, if carefully and 
conscientiously designed and implemented, need not give rise to 
disguised nontariff barriers to trade.838 The report explicitly 
acknowledges that “[m]any countries are concerned that the 
transition to a green economy may lead to an increase in the use of 
measures that could adversely affect trade,” and it admonishes WTO 
Members to pay heed to “Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration [which] 
expresses the international community’s resolve that trade measures 
with an environmental purpose should not be disguised restrictions 
on international trade . . . .”839  
Some of the myriad measures that could potentially trigger trade 
concerns include environmental requirements established by the 
“setting [of] technical specifications . . . for products and production 
methods . . . to improve energy efficiency or emissions performance, 
minimize waste, improve forestry management, or enhance the 
protection of soil, wildlife and natural habitats.”840 With respect to 
these measures, the report emphasizes the TBT Agreement’s critical 
role in balancing the right of governments to regulate to pursue 
legitimate public policy goals such as the protection of human health 
and the environment, with the obligation of governments to ensure 
that such measures are non-discriminatory and do not create 
 
 837. EU Leaders Eye Stronger UN Role to Police the Environment, 
EURACTIV.COM (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.euractiv.com/sustainability/eu-leaders-
eye-stronger-un-role-police-environment-news-511197; see EU Environment Chief 
Vows ‘Concrete Results’ at Rio+20, supra note 836 (suggesting that other world 
actors have paid attention to the commitment to chemical regulation displayed by 
the EU in REACH and may want to address a new world program at Rio). 
 838. See Harnessing Trade for Sustainable Development and a Green Economy, 
WTO, 9, 16 (2011), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ 
brochure_rio_20_e.pdf; EU Leaders Eye Stronger UN Role to Police the 
Environment, supra note 837 (stressing that the rules and transparency 
mechanisms built into the multilateral trading system can diffuse the concern about 
hidden nontariff barriers to trade). 
 839. Id. 
 840. Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added). 
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unnecessary obstacles to international trade.841 In this regard, the 
Secretariat’s report, most importantly, reaffirms the Appellate 
Body’s recent interpretation of the TBT Agreement in US—Clove 
Cigarettes that serves as the underlying premise of this article: 
“[WTO] Members’ right to regulate should not be constrained if the 
measures taken are necessary to fulfill certain legitimate policy 
objectives, and provided that they are not applied in a manner that 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on international trade . . . .”842  
Lastly, any ongoing evaluation of REACH should remain 
cognizant of longstanding EU-U.S. governmental and industry 
efforts to reduce NTBs via enhanced regulatory cooperation and 
mutual standards recognition,843 the primary objectives of which are 
to increase market access and reduce regulatory uncertainty and 
related cross-border transaction costs within the greater North 
Atlantic region, and to dissuade emerging third-country regulatory 
opportunism elsewhere (e.g., in Asia and Latin America).844  
 
 841. Id. at 10; US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 
95. 
 842. US — Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 15, ¶ 95 
(emphasis added). 
 843. See, e.g., Inside U.S. Trade, Companies, Trade Groups Float Ideas for 
U.S.-EU Regulatory Cooperation, WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Nov. 9, 2012, 
http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-World-Trade-Online/ 
companies-trade-groups-float-ideas-for-us-eu-regulatory-cooperation/menu-id-
896.html?S=LI; Office of the United States Trade Representative, Promoting U.S. 
EC Regulatory Compatibility, 77 Fed. Reg. 59702 (Sept. 28, 2012), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/09/28/2012-23613/promoting-us-ec-
regulatory-compatibility (including a request for public comments and a link to the 
public comments received); International Affairs: EU-USA — Regulatory 
Cooperation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE FOR ENTERPRISE AND 
INDUSTRY, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-
governments/usa/regulatory-cooperation/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 11, 
2012); John Morrall III, Determining Compatible Regulatory Regimes Between the 
U.S. and the EU, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (2012), available at 
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/partnerships/Cornerstone%20Project/cornerstone_ 
project_morrall.pdf; cf. Reinhard Quick, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation on 
Chemicals—An Idealist’s Dream?, in SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSATLANTIC 
REGULATORY COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 241−85 (Simon J. Evenett & 
Robert M. Stern eds., 2011).  
 844. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Is REACH a Trade Barrier? Imported Chemicals 
Suffer from Higher Cost Structure, CHEM. WATCH BUSINESS BRIEFING – EXPERT 
FOCUS (Dec. 14, 2012), available at http://www.koganlawgroup.com/uploads/ 
CW53_December12_Kogan.pdf. 
